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Tyranny is a theme that reverberates in politico-philosophical scholarship since the post-
war era of the twentieth century and it has been taken up with a renewed interest in recent years. 
Aside from Leo Strauss, only very few scholars have focused on the link between ancient and 
modern tyranny, and even fewer on how the concept of tyranny might give insight into the study 
of political philosophy itself. In this dissertation, I argue that the concept of tyranny can make us 
aware of the permanent character of the problems that arise between philosophy and politics, and 
help us distinguish between the core and the peripheral tenets of political philosophy. On this 
basis, I contend that it is possible to draw a closer connection between Socratic and 
Machiavellian political philosophy. Through a close reading of select passages of Xenophon, 
Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, and of Machiavelli, on the other, I address the main 
differences that separate the philosophic from the political way of life. 
I first analyze the concept of tyranny from the viewpoint of the city and of “real men” 
(andres), and then contrast it with the perspective of the philosopher. I assert that the praise of 
kalokagathia is more of a concession than the real essence of the classics’ philosophic teachings. 
Although I show that there is a close connection between the philosopher and the tyrant, I also 
explain what sets them apart. The subtle distinction that the classics made between the principles 
of their philosophic politics as opposed to the principles of philosophy itself, I argue, helps us to 
understand the classics better and to read Machiavelli in a different, more benevolent and more 
 
philosophical light. While I acknowledge that modern forms of tyranny, such as the universal and 
homogeneous state that Kojève proposes, originate in Machiavelli’s revolution, I hold that the 
essence of Machiavelli’s teachings, in harmony with the classics, shores up philosophy, not 
tyranny. The return both to the classics and to the origins of modernity that I put forward aims at 
keeping philosophy alive against tyranny of thought.  
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TYRANNY AS A POLITICO-PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT 
Tyranny was, in ancient Greece, an absolute form of rule in which one individual 
exercised power according to his will rather than according to the rule of law. While some tyrants 
were relatively benevolent toward their subjects and brought stability to their cities through 
equitable rule, others were famously avaricious, violent, or cruel. The former received heroic 
honors, whereas the latter were the target of continual plots, often overthrown, and put to death. 
The outcome of tyranny was always uncertain because people could not know beforehand 
whether the tyrant, having taken power, would behave in a kingly rather than in a self-serving 
manner. Since there was no peaceful or legal way to depose the tyrant, if need be, or to moderate 
his actions once he took power, tyranny was generally considered dangerous and undesirable. 
Although for some time now there has been a reticence to speak of “tyranny” as such,1 
modernity too has seen tyrannical rulers. Like ancient tyranny, modern tyranny is generally2 
thought to be cruel, high-handed, and unjust. Modern tyranny is also conceived of as dangerous, 
and perhaps much more so than ancient tyranny, due especially to the technological advances of 
our era, which enable it to cause greater harm at a larger scale. 
Despite the similarities between ancient and modern tyranny, the face of tyranny has 
changed substantially, to the point that modern tyranny has been considered to be at root 
different from ancient tyranny. Some believe that unlike ancient tyranny, which was a tool of 
oppression for the benefit of the tyrant, modern tyranny can be a means to further the common 
good in ways that the ancients could not even dream of. Others, in contrast, see in modern 
tyranny a formidable threat that is potentially worse than what the ancients could have imagined. 
 
1 See Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, 23. 
2 As we will see in chapter 5, in our discussion of the universal and homogenous state that Alexandre Kojève 
proposes, there are indeed champions of “beneficent tyranny.” 
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In either case, it would seem that from their standpoint the lessons we can draw from the ancient 
study of tyranny have a very limited scope when it comes to speaking of modern tyranny. 
However rewarding the study of ancient tyranny may be in itself, it does not help to understand 
the challenges that modern tyranny poses, except perhaps by way of contrast.3 In that sense, not 
only the study of ancient tyranny but also of classical political philosophy appears to be, if not 
altogether futile or obsolete, at least poor or insufficient to address the problems of today. Since 
modern tyranny is thought to be fundamentally different from ancient tyranny, the philosophic 
insights of the ancients about tyranny are bound to be taken as little more than outmoded 
sermons, altogether irrelevant to the study of modern tyranny. 
In this dissertation, I offer arguments that contest that view. Part of what motivates my 
investigation is the conviction that modern hopes in the prospect of beneficent tyranny bespeak a 
dangerous lack of awareness of the nature of political things. Modern overconfidence in human 
mastery and the belief that the problems that ancient tyranny posed have been overcome prevent 
us from seeing the inescapable nature of the problems that arise in the relation between 
philosophy and politics. As an antidote against this modern view, I propose a return to the 
classics because, I argue, the ancients’ approach to tyranny shows the inevitable character of the 
problems that afflict humankind and raises awareness about the limits that the nature of political 
things entails for the perfection of human nature.  
My research is also motivated by the awareness that among those who forcefully reject 
tyranny today, there is an undeserved disparagement of the classics, which prevents them from 
reading the ancients as they intended. It is not that the ancients are in need of defense but rather 
 
3 Insightful as it may be to draw this contrast, I believe that focusing on the differences rather than on the common 
root of ancient and modern forms of tyranny may prevent us from fully understanding the political problem as it was 
posed by the ancients. 
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that the failure to understand the problems the classics so carefully delineated, makes some 
modern analysts favor a worse kind of tyranny than the one they reject, if unwittingly. Their 
warped view of the classics as wanting to, so to speak, immanentize the eschaton, makes them 
see the abandonment of reason as the only possible solution to the problems facing modernity. 
Believing to escape tyranny, they deliver themselves to the worst kind of tyranny, which is a life 
that renounces reason.4 In defense of the philosophic way of life as I hold the ancients 
understood it, I try to show that, properly understood, classical political philosophy can help us 
face the challenges that modern tyranny poses. I contend that notwithstanding the new forms that 
tyranny has indisputably taken, the questions we should raise in the face of tyranny remain the 
same.  
A thorough comprehension of tyranny as a politico-philosophical concept is crucial for 
the study of political philosophy today, as it was for the classics. Tyranny is the most useful 
starting point to understand the complex relationship between philosophy and politics because it 
prompts the most important political questions, which point beyond political things themselves, 
namely, toward philosophy. While I argue that philosophy helps to raise questions that are 
primordial to maintain the health of political regimes, I also hold that the study of philosophy, in 
turn, is enhanced by the ancient understanding of tyranny to the extent that it reveals the nature 




4 See, for example, Waller Newell’s interpretation of Heidegger: “Whereas the classics believed that the tyrannical 
impulse was the ultimate departure from the life of reason, whose only therapy lay in redirecting it toward the 
guidance of reason, Heidegger argues that reason itself, originating with Plato and actualized as global technology, 
is the worst and most complete tyranny ever experienced, and that the only escape from it is to return headlong into 
the primordial origins of chance, chaos, accident, motion, and impulse,” Tyranny. A New Interpretation. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 508. 
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LITERATURE ON TYRANNY 
Tyranny, as a political phenomenon in ancient Greece, has been widely studied and 
discussed. James McGlew’s remarkable study of tyranny5 is indispensable to comprehend how 
actual tyrants ruled, the nature of their power, and the relationship between tyrants and their 
subjects, who both supported and resisted them. More recently, Lynette Mitchell6 has explored 
rule by a single man deeply in archaic and classical Greece to show how and why, despite its 
instability, tyranny was often considered legitimate. While she touches upon the relationship 
between ruling and law, her account of tyranny, like McGlew’s, puts considerably more weight 
on the historical phenomena than on their politico-philosophical significance or implications. 
Essays with a similar approach to tyranny can be found in Mitchell’s and Charles Melville’s 
Every Inch a King, as well as in Kathryn Morgan’s Popular Tyranny. Further examples are John 
Salmon’s “Lopping off Heads?,” an essay in which he explores the importance of tyranny in the 
political development of a number of ancient Greek poleis, and Arlene Saxonhouse’s “The 
Tyranny of Reason in the World of the Polis,” which interestingly ties tyranny not to oppression 
but to liberty. Although all these sources make important contributions to the study of tyranny 
and some of them even mention the specific philosophic role that the concept of tyranny plays, 
none of them addresses this role directly. 
Much less literature can be found on modern tyranny, partly because, as Catherine 
Zuckert—following Leo Strauss—suggests, “Twentieth-century political scientists [have] been 
reluctant to talk about ‘tyrannical’ as opposed to ‘totalitarian’ and ’authoritarian’ forms of 
government.”7 The book from which this quote is taken has the aim to fill precisely this gap. 
Edited by Toivo Koivukoski and David Tabachnik, Confronting Tyranny is a collection of essays 
 
5 James McGlew, Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece. 
6 Lynette Mitchell, The Heroic Rulers of Archaic and Classical Greece. 
7 Catherine Zuckert, “Why Talk about Tyranny Today?,” 1. 
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that reflect on modern forms of tyranny or compare them to ancient tyranny. Yet, very much like 
the books cited above, they focus more on the historical than on the philosophical aspect of 
tyranny. There are two notable exceptions: one is Nathan Tarcov’s excellent “Tyranny from Plato 
to Locke,” which is a discerning survey of tyranny based on primary sources. As can be guessed 
from the title of the chapter, his scope is ambitious. Unfortunately, space does not allow him to 
elaborate on his observations. The other exception to the historical approach to tyranny in this 
book is Waller Newell’s “Is there an Ontology of Tyranny?,” an essay which was later used in his 
book Tyranny. Newell also authored an essay in Mitchell’s and Melville’s book (Every Inch a 
King). Although I agree with several of the conclusions he arrives at, he starts with a premise 
opposite to mine, namely, that ancient and modern tyranny are fundamentally different. In any 
case, more than other authors in that book, Tarcov and Newell have made efforts to 
systematically study tyranny from a politico-philosophical perspective. 
The topic of tyranny has also been treated from a politico-philosophical perspective in 
works that comment on Leo Strauss’s On Tyranny. A particularly useful volume is Philosophy, 
History, and Tyranny, recently edited by Timothy Burns and Bryan-Paul Frost. In the 
introductory chapter, Burns has eloquently encapsulated the core of Leo Strauss’s On Tyranny. 
Other chapters shed light on the topic of tyranny as well; nevertheless, as with most articles and 
book chapters inspired by this work of Leo Strauss, greater emphasis is understandably placed on 
the famous Strauss-Kojève debate than on the concept of tyranny per se. (We will also take up 
this debate in the last chapter of this dissertation but only after having explored the topic of 
tyranny in classical political thought as well as in Machiavelli.) One can also find illuminating 
insights in texts that deal obliquely with tyranny, such as Eric Buzzetti’s “A Guide to the Study 
of Leo Strauss’ On Tyranny” and his book Xenophon the Socratic Prince, or that treat topics akin 
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to the concept of tyranny, like moderation, ambition, or kalokagathía.8 Finally, because it was 
published only very recently, I was unable to include in my study the book Liberty, Democracy, 
and the Temptations to Tyranny in the Dialogues of Plato, a collection of essays edited by 
Charlotte C. S. Thomas.9 
 
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
Although my dissertation builds on current efforts, it does not seek to reproduce them. In 
studying tyranny and its relation to political philosophy, I mean to join the endeavors of others 
who also aim for the necessary renewal of political philosophy as the ancients understood it. My 
purpose is to bring clarity to a topic often obscured or neglected by contemporary authors, whose 
reflections are ultimately rooted in historicism or whose interpretations adhere to strict “literary” 
readings. Especially the latter explicitly reject the allegedly Straussian “ironic” way of reading 
texts.10 I share Leo Strauss’s conviction that “there exists an unchanging framework which 
persists in all changes of human knowledge of both facts and principles,” and that “the 
fundamental problems persist in all historical change,”11 which is why I believe that the study of 
tyranny, both ancient and modern, can help rehabilitate the wisdom that the ancients cultivated. 
And while I consider to be true what Strauss also asserts, that “tyranny is a danger coeval with 
political life,”12 it is no less true that the analysis of tyranny is the most appropriate gateway to 
philosophy, because, I argue, tyranny is the closest link between philosophy and politics or 
 
8 See, for example, Benjamin Lorch, “Moderation and Socratic Education in Xenophon’s Memorabilia” and 
“Xenophon’s Socrates on Political Ambition and Political Philosophy”; Philip Davies, “’Kalos Kagathos’ and 
Scholarly Perceptions of Spartan Society”; Fabio Roscalla, “Kalokagathia E Kaloikagathoi in Senofonte”; Joseph 
Reisert, “Xenophon on Gentlemanliness and Friendship”; Adam Schulman, “What is a Gentleman? An Introduction 
to Xenophon.” 
9 I have nevertheless included below one reference from the first chapter, “Connection between Liberty and 
Tyranny,” by Catherine Zuckert. 
10 See Vivienne Gray, ed., Xenophon, 5-6; and Michael Flower, The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon, 7. 
11 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 23-24. 
12 Strauss, On Tyranny, 22. 
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between the wise and the ruler. By studying tyranny through the lens of the classics I seek to 
shed light on modern tyranny as well. Since the broad extent of the subject matter as well as 
space constraints force me to focus on select passages and to leave out several works and 
authors, I hope to show above all an adequate approach to analyze the concept of tyranny and its 
importance for the study of political philosophy. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
The perspective from which I will be analyzing the concept of tyranny is one that seeks to 
highlight the relation between the city and man, placing the problem of law and legitimacy at the 
center of the discussion. The politico-philosophical approach to tyranny prompts us to explore 
related topics (for example, wisdom, virtue, honor), the treatment of which will help us to see 
tyranny in the proper light. As a first step, I will examine each of these topics and their 
connection to tyranny through a careful reading of relevant passages, especially in Xenophon’s 
Hiero, Memorabilia, and Cyropaedia; in Plato’s Republic; and in Aristotle’s Politics. A second 
step is to track the changes that the concept of tyranny undergoes in Machiavelli’s Prince and 
Discourses on Livy, and in Alexandre Kojève’s “Tyranny and Wisdom.” 
It is important to emphasize that each work treated here is conceived of as only one piece 
of a larger whole. In other words, I start from the premise that each author’s corpus constitutes a 
coherent whole. In consequence, when expounding specific topics or concepts, I will often 
compare passages from different works with an eye to understanding those concepts as I believe 
the authors intended them to be understood. Moreover, my dissertation attempts to find a precise 
way to coherently assemble the thoughts of the classics and contrast them to those of the 
moderns. To do this, I try to show the common substratum that I believe the former share, rather 
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than focusing on those traits that distinguish them. This implies that I refute readings which 
make efforts to classify works in early, middle, and late periods, and which use chronological 
arguments to interpret the authors’ oeuvres. Likewise, I treat each author with the seriousness I 
believe they all merit, that is, I do not let myself get carried away with commonly accepted views 
that, for example, still today tend to dismiss Xenophon as a jocular or inaccurate writer or that 
reprove Machiavelli for being unscrupulous or “Machiavellian.” 13 In this regard, I wish to 
contribute to the efforts of several scholars who have also taken this stand. 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This dissertation consists of five chapters, each of which examines tyranny from a 
different angle, but always bearing on the connection between tyranny and political philosophy. 
The first chapter, “The Beginning of Philosophy,” introduces the main concepts that will be 
treated throughout. Tyranny is briefly looked at as a historical phenomenon but I soon turn to the 
definition of tyranny as a philosophico-political concept. I then define political philosophy and 
propose a reexamination of classical texts to address the problematic relation between 
philosophy and politics. I argue that the core of political philosophy is not an array of 
straightforward claims14 but rather a set of complex questions to which there is no easy answer. 
Since such questions can be best posed by studying tyranny, I suggest that tyranny is a good 
place to start the study of political philosophy. Likewise, I contend that while politics can for the 
most part do without philosophy by cultivating common sense, philosophy becomes necessary at 
 
13 Some of these views are summarized in Vivienne Gray, ed., Xenophon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 
pp. 4-6 (although she there also includes Leo Strauss’s exegesis of Xenophon and the “ironical readings” that stem 
from it). 
14 By which I mean that political philosophy is not a list of political principles based on philosophic assertions, but a 
series of questions that raise awareness about the permanent problems that arise from the confrontation of the 
philosophic and the political way of life. 
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the founding moment of political regimes or when facing turbulent times. 
I then turn to the problem of law and legitimacy. Central to the discussion is to show that 
the idea of justice that each regime defends is inevitably biased or partial. Likewise, I argue that 
legitimate government is not equal to good government, to the extent that the wise do not rule.15 
By addressing this problem, based both on Xenophon’s and Plato’s allusions to it as well as on 
Aristotle’s discussions of it, I argue that all regimes are in a sense and to a certain extent 
inevitably tyrannical—an insight that, I assert, escapes many modern thinkers due to their 
tendency to focus on means rather than on ends. In other words, I try to make apparent that 
tyranny can sometimes be understood more as a mode of governing in all regimes than as a 
political order in itself. 
Finally, I close the chapter by examining the role of tyranny in the tension between 
philosophy and politics. I argue that, within the framework of classical political philosophy, 
tyranny can be addressed from two different perspectives: the political perspective or the 
perspective of the city, and the philosophical perspective or the perspective of the wise. These 
two ways of addressing tyranny call for different manners of argumentation that seem 
incompatible with each other. My aim in the following two chapters is to develop these 
perspectives, discuss their implications, and ultimately show that they share the same 
philosophical horizon. 
The main aim of chapter 2, “The Real Man and the City,” is to discuss tyranny from a 
political perspective. I begin by setting up the problem by looking at Callicles’s posture in Plato’s 
Gorgias. I explain why the point of departure for discussing tyranny is necessarily the vulgar 
misconception that although tyranny is the worst scenario for the city, it is deemed best for the 
tyrant. I then define the different characters that make up the city, starting with the real man 
 
15 See Strauss, On Tyranny, 99. 
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(aner), for which I also use Simonides’s account in Xenophon’s Hiero. I argue that whereas the 
tyrannical man takes his bearings by the most pleasurable life, the real man finds the greatest 
pleasure in the honorable life. 
To complement the view of the real man and how he relates to the city, I further define 
the character of private men (idiotes), lovers of gain (philokerdeis), and the tyrant. The collection 
of characters in the city will help to put together the elements that come into play when thinking 
about the nature of political things. By looking at the workings of the city we will be able to see 
the tension between the real man’s way of life and the way of life sought by those who are either 
not guided by honor or are not public spirited. Finally, I link the view of the tyrant with that of 
the real man by offering a rhetorical reading of Xenophon’s Hiero. I argue that this superficial 
reading of the Hiero has a politically salutary purpose, namely, to persuade readers that private 
life is compatible with political life (even in a tyranny) and that honorableness is best. 
Chapter three, “The Philosopher and the Tyrant,” constitutes the central part of the 
dissertation and is the fulcrum between my interpretations of classical and modern political 
philosophy. I there discuss tyranny from a philosophical perspective or from the viewpoint of 
wisdom, which Aristotle called “the most precise of the sciences.”16 It should first be noted that 
this discussion is complex and needs to be somehow justified. While one might consider 
discussing political ideas from a philosophical perspective, why should philosophy be concerned 
with the discussion of unjust regimes in general, and of tyranny in particular? Doesn’t the inquiry 
into the best regime obviate the need for the inquiry into the unjust regimes?17 Concerned with 
the best regime, why would the wise man, who is known for belittling humankind,18 stoop to 
discussing faulty regimes? As we will see in this chapter, the answer to this question is twofold. 
 
16 Eth. Nic. 6.6, 1141a16; for the sense of “precise” in Aristotle, see Metaph. 1.2, 982a25-28. 
17 See Pl. Rep. 4.445a4-b5. 
18 See Pl. Leges 7.804b1. 
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On the one hand, I argue, the wise man needs to discuss faulty regimes in order to 
question common opinion and to introduce a more refined view with philosophical insights. The 
first part of this chapter will therefore be devoted to showing that from a philosophical 
perspective, the status of political life even at its best is inferior to philosophic life. Accordingly, 
I argue that the classical teaching of kalokagathia, though part and parcel of philosophy, in 
strictly philosophical terms is a concession to political life, a concession philosophers are willing 
to make for politically salutary purposes. On the other hand, I will contend that the philosopher is 
interested in studying tyranny to the extent that the tyrannical and the philosophic nature are in 
some degree kindred. Consequently, in the second part of the chapter, I explain what brings the 
tyrant and the philosopher together as well as what sets them apart. 
In Chapter 4, “Modern Tyranny or Machiavelli’s Restoration of Philosophy,” I propose a 
reading of Machiavelli that depicts him as a philosopher who belongs to the Socratic tradition. I 
suggest that by looking at Machiavelli as a philosopher we can both sound the depth of his 
thought and show some viable directions in which future research might go. The first step to 
approach Machiavelli’s thought, I argue, is to analyze tyranny in the modern setting, that is, 
tyranny as it came to be understood after Machiavelli’s revolution of political thought. More 
importantly, I study the place tyranny occupies in Machiavelli’s political philosophy. Machiavelli 
is known for rejecting classical political philosophy, but, as I try to show summarily, his efforts 
were directed less at attacking the ancient paradigm than at dismantling the hegemony of 
Christian thought over philosophy and politics. Admittedly, he rejects the solution proposed by 
the ancients as useless, and his enterprise is to offer a new political solution—which, I argue, 
remains “Socratic”—to restore human freedom or the power of human endeavors in a world 
thought to be governed by God and Fortuna. But his solution, I contend, is based to no small 
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degree on the premises of the classics. 
Machiavelli’s thought regarding tyranny, I argue, requires careful assessment. Indeed, 
Machiavelli has been charged by many with being a teacher of tyranny, while others consider 
that one of his main aims is to preclude precisely the possibility of the worst kind of tyranny, 
tyranny bound to ecclesiastical power. I, therefore, redefine tyranny according to Machiavelli 
and I also explain how and why for Machiavelli it was necessary, if not to embrace tyranny, at 
least to disclose its deepest secrets to rehabilitate human freedom. 
Next, I show in what measure Machiavelli broke with the ancients by abandoning, for 
political purposes, the teleological understanding of nature and by assigning a new role to honor. 
Here I point to his differences with Plato and Aristotle, and to his interpretation and use of 
Xenophon’s works. I claim that he was compelled to outwardly distance himself from the 
ancients in order to inject politics with a necessary dose of realism. Finally, this chapter focuses 
on Machiavelli’s renewal of political philosophy. I argue that Machiavelli’s political revolution 
was not his only or even his primary aim. Notwithstanding his rupture with the ancients, in the 
final analysis, one can recognize a certain kinship as regards their philosophical views. The steps 
he took in the direction of tyranny, I conclude, were, in the end, a contribution to the restoration 
of philosophy. 
In the final chapter, “Tyranny as Utopia,” I discuss the famous debate on tyranny between 
Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève. I begin by studying Kojève’s arguments in favor of the 
universal and homogeneous state or of beneficent tyranny as the best political solution. I argue 
that Kojève makes a case for tyranny because he believes in the possibility of an eventual perfect 
coincidence between philosophy and politics. Kojève, I argue, underestimates politico-
philosophical problems as they were conceived by the ancients because he was convinced both 
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that those problems belong to the past and that they have been or can be wholly overcome. To 
explain Kojève’s position I briefly address the premises on which his defense of the universal 
and homogeneous state is based. I place particular emphasis on Kojève’s “Slave view” and the 
role of labor for the realization of man as a human being. By confronting his Hegelian-Marxist 
view with Strauss’s reading of the classics, I argue that the universal and homogeneous state that 
Kojève upholds makes sense only if the classical horizon of philosophy is narrowed-down. 
In the second part of the chapter, I argue it is Kojève’s historicism that prevents him from 
reading the classics as they meant to be read. I also expound Kojève’s “philosophical pedagogy” 
and its double purpose, which is to provide a philosophical education to the masses and to help 
the philosopher avoid sectarian prejudices. Because Kojève’s philosophical pedagogy assumes 
that the discrepancies between philosophy and politics can be overcome, I contend that it is 
directly opposite to what Strauss calls “philosophic politics.” The manifest opposition between 
these two views of political philosophy, I argue, also reveals their disagreement regarding the 
hierarchy of goods or the highest aim of man. The contrast between the two approaches will 
serve to explain the different roles that tyranny plays in their thought, respectively. Based on Leo 
Strauss’s critique, I close the analysis of Kojève’s utopian tyranny by showing that, “at best” 
(that is, if we can find anything good in it), it is no more than a dystopia. 
Since the root of Kojève’s universal and homogeneous state can be allegedly traced back 
to Machiavelli’s revolution, and especially to his view of human nature, I conclude the chapter 
with a reassessment of Machiavelli’s enterprise. Having established that Machiavelli’s political 
philosophy is at bottom not that different from the classics’ and that he was compelled to 
abandon the classical solution but not their awareness of the problems, I hold that Machiavelli’s 






The Beginning of Philosophy 
 
Hence, as it seems, they are all the same—king, tyrant, statesman, household-manager, master, and the moderate 
man and the just man; and it is all one art—the kingly, the tyrannical, the statesman’s, the master’s, the household-
manager’s, and justice and moderation.  
Plato, Lovers 
 
However, let us avail ourselves of the evidence of those who have before us approached the investigation of reality 




On 30 January 1649, King Charles I of England walked out of the St. James Palace onto 
the scaffold outside the Banqueting House at Whitehall. He had been accused of being “a Tyrant, 
Traitor, Murderer, and a public and implacable enemy to the Commonwealth of England” by the 
Parliamentarians.19 Fifty-nine out of the eighty judges who sat in the trial against the King had 
voted for the charge of high treason and signed the death warrant. Before his decapitation, King 
Charles gave a brief speech to the people of England, in which he called himself “the martyr of 
the people.”20 Charles I’s trial and execution gave rise to lively discussions between 
Parliamentarians and Royalists. The Parliamentarians—led by Oliver Cromwell, who soon after 
imposed a military regime—favored the supremacy of the common law over the divine right of 
kings upheld by ancient tradition. They advocated the right to resist tyrants and were convinced 
that tyrannicide was legitimate. Their claims in the trial were largely based on the Petition of 
Right, drafted in 1628 by Edward Coke, by which they sought to revive the commitment made 
 
19 See Mario Turchetti, “Regicide or Tyrannicide,” n. 6. 
20 See Clive Holmes, Why Was Charles I Executed?, 93. 
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by kings since the Magna Carta of 1215 to observe the rule of law. The Royalists, in turn, 
defended the absolute authority of the king of England. Based on a tradition of authority 
originating in Roman law, they refused to accept the diminishment of the sovereignty of the king 
by other institutions or by the people.  
Three years after the execution of the king, Claude Saumaise (also known by the Latin 
name Claudius Salmasius), who then adhered to the cause of the Royalists, argued in his 
Defensio Regia pro Carolo I that the enemies of the crown had called King Charles a “tyrant” 
merely as an excuse to justify the capital sentence. For if King Charles had been a tyrant all 
along, why was he not accused of tyranny until the beginning of the trial? When exactly, he 
wondered, did Charles I stop being a king to become a tyrant? Moreover, Saumaise belittled the 
accusation, since he maintained that the word ”tyrant” meant nothing other than king, and that 
every king is a tyrant.21 But that the matter was far from being settled with the establishment of 
the Commonwealth is manifest in the instability of governments during that period as well as in 
its relatively short duration. Following the proclamation of Charles II as king of England in May 
1660, Oliver Cromwell’s body was exhumed, hanged, and decapitated. In October, the surviving 
regicides faced trial and were convicted. Now looked upon as the true tyrants, they were drawn 
on a sledge, hanged by the neck looking toward the Banqueting House at Whitehall, eviscerated 
while alive, decapitated and dismembered. 
Looking at these sanguinary events in retrospect, can it be affirmed that either Royalists 
or Parliamentarians acted more justly than their counterpart? From the point of view of justice, 
 
21 See Claude Saumaise, Defensio Regia Pro Carolo I, 259-62. See also John Milton’s famous response, “Defence 
of the People of England.” Although a theory of popular sovereignty as would be presented around those years by 
Thomas Hobbes had not yet been developed, an inchoate sense of it was already in the air, as can be appreciated by 
Milton’s remarks that the king owed his “sovereignty to the people only,” and that all kings were “consequently 
accountable to them for the management of it” (chapter 2.30); and by his citation of Titus Livius saying that “the 
sovereign power resided in the people” (chapter 5.76). 
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which side deserved to prevail? Mario Turchetti, who studies the debate between John Milton 
and Claude Saumaise and compares the trials of 1649 and 1660, raises a germane question: “As 
such, do these two points of view have the same standing? Or is one right, and the other wrong?” 
But instead of dwelling on these questions, he offers a precipitate answer: “It is up to the 
historian to decide.”22 Turchetti, who otherwise approaches this heated debate very rigorously, 
presents the solution to this exacting case as a matter of opinion or as subject to historical 
interpretation. While the perspective held by historians is not without interest, the pertinent 
question for us is not who is right or wrong in this particular case but whether and, if so, how an 
objective or definitive answer can be given in these kinds of political quandaries. 
The purpose of starting my study with an example taken from one of the most turbulent 
episodes of England’s history is not to settle the question of whether Charles I was a tyrant or the 
“regicides” were justly punished. Instead, my aim is to show that the discussion of the concept of 
tyranny—who is and what makes a tyrant—naturally gives rise to further, more profound 
questions, which are less the concern of history than they are of political philosophy. How do we 
distinguish a king from a tyrant? How can we determine whether a ruler is good or bad? Or what 
makes a ruler or a regime legitimate? These kinds of questions were en vogue for a long time in 
Europe as different peoples struggled to check the power of kings, and their discussions helped 
to gradually shape modern public law. Borne by history, these same questions acquire a special, 
deeper character when they seek to transcend the urgency to avoid impending abuses. 
Indeed, when they point beyond the historical context from which they stem, those 
questions pertain to the realm of political philosophy. While the specific answers or solutions that 
can be drawn from the reflections of the political philosopher can change in time, the teachings 
themselves have a perennial character because they address topics that lie beyond the grasp of 
 
22 Turchetti, “Regicide or Tyrannicide,” 110. 
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any legal or constitutional framework. Political philosophy is, when properly understood, so 
intimately tied to the nature of political things that it remains illuminating for all peoples 
regardless of place and time.23 In this chapter, I will lay down what I take to be the meaning of 
political philosophy according to the classics and I will explain why political philosophy thus 
understood ought to be recovered. I will then turn to the problem of law and legitimacy by 
discussing unjust regimes, and finally, I will show how this problem is linked to the concept of 
tyranny. 
 
I. The Origin of the Quest for Wisdom 
Today it is not uncommon to encounter the term “political philosophy.” There are entire 
books devoted to it: introductions to political philosophy, histories of political philosophy, works 
of contemporary political philosophy, or the political philosophy of this or that author. While we 
are now used to seeing the dyad “political philosophy,” originally the combination of these two 
words must have sounded almost like an oxymoron because whereas philosophy dealt mainly 
with the nature of the cosmos, of its principles, and of being in the broadest sense, politics is all 
about human affairs: it is the science of how to govern human beings. It is well known that 
Socrates was the first thinker to make human affairs the concern of philosophy. Socrates turned 
away from the “physical universe” toward “ethics.”24 Before Socrates, philosophers examined 
the cosmos, “how it is, and which necessities are responsible for the coming to be of each of the 
heavenly things.” But Socrates showed that those philosophers were foolish. He questioned their 
approach because they were “disposed toward one another like madmen” in trying to explain 
what lies beyond human grasp, and yet ignored or neglected the human things. 
 
23 See Aristotle’s reference to the best regime in Eth. Nic. 5.7, 1135a4-5. 
24 Pl. Phd. 96e-100b; Arist. Met. 1.6, 987b1-4. 
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Why should human beings spend a lifetime examining the working of the heavens, or 
worry about the nature of divine things, which are “not discoverable by human beings,” when 
they haven’t understood the nature of human things? Such pursuits, Socrates believed, prevented 
them from acquiring many beneficial things or made them go out of their minds.25 The way to 
proceed, as Aristotle would put it, is not by studying what is first by nature but what is first for 
us; and in the order of cognition, human things come first.26 Philosophy can therefore be defined 
as the quest for wisdom or the quest for knowledge of the natures of all things: of God, the 
world, and man,27 but it’s a quest whose beginning lies necessarily in politics. 
Political philosophy can be defined as the quest for knowledge about human nature. 
Indeed, political philosophy results from the confrontation of two opposing views of human 
nature: the philosophic and the political view as to what constitutes the highest good by nature 
for human beings. Political philosophy is animated by the longing for the most authoritative 
good of all in the city, the “political good” or “the just,”28 which ought to be understood in the 
light of the highest good for individuals rather than on its own. It is the attempt to answer the 
deepest political questions to bring them to bear on every kind of regime. Deeply preoccupied 
with justice, political philosophers undertake a complex task. On the one hand, they must 
distance themselves from both the whirlwind of the present and from the stiffness of 
preconceived notions of the past in an effort to replace opinions of political things with 
knowledge. They are thus compelled to move away from common opinion, to call tradition into 
question, and to bring laws themselves to account before the tribunal of genuine justice.29 To do 
this, they formulate their inquiries based on the nature of man as man, apart from all political 
 
25 Xen. Mem. 1.1.11-14 and 4.7.5-6; see Pl. Rep. 7.529b-d; see also Cic. Rep. 1.10.15. 
26 See Arist. Phys. 1.184a17-18. 
27 See Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 11. 
28 See Arist. Pol. 3.12, 1282b16-23; also Strauss, 10. 
29 See Strauss, 12, 14, and 93-94. 
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ties. On the other hand, they must keep one foot in concrete reality: judgment according to a 
theoretical standard does not mean that reality can or should be forced to meet that standard.30 
The search for justice leads to the awareness that the nature of political things or the political 
nature of men is unalterable. Hence, political philosophy straddles between the concreteness of 
political life and the ways in which political life can be improved or even transcended—as we 
will have a chance to explore more carefully in chapter 3—always with a view to knowledge. 
The questions posed by the political philosopher might strike anyone involved in 
everyday politics as otiose or pointless, in the same way that, in Cicero’s Republic, Scipio and 
Tubero’s conversation about the appearance of a second sun seemed frivolous to Gaius Laelius. 
Having more pressing matters to attend to, namely, household management and politics, Laelius 
wonders why they would devote their time to converse about heavenly matters. In that same 
spirit, one could ask what’s the use of discussing the legitimacy of kings and tyrants today, in 
times when democracy is the prevailing form of government in the Western world. Although our 
investigation need not yield practical advice because the questions are worth pondering for 
themselves, I contend that due consideration of these problems, which lie in the limit between 
politics and philosophy, necessarily touches the raw nerve of politics. Certainly, in the attempt to 
draw a line between kingship and tyranny, we are compelled to raise questions about justice not 
only in monarchies but also in every other political regime, and to delve into their relations with 
the rule of law. Political philosophy, in consequence, casts doubt on the legitimacy of every 
regime and questions every legal framework, even or precisely when it seeks to improve them. In 
doing so, it rocks the foundations of politics. We can therefore recognize an inherent tension 
between political philosophy and politics per se that may be reconciled to some extent but can 
never be overcome. 
 
30 See Arist. Pol. 3.4, 1276b16-1277b32; Eth. Nic. 5.2, 1130b28-29. 
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Statesmen are likely to overlook the inquiries of classical political philosophers either 
because they sincerely consider them ineffectual or because they wish to circumvent the 
difficulties that these matters involve. Moreover, political rulers are compelled to avoid or 
disregard the deepest questions concerning justice simply because they lack the time to approach 
them. Rulers are expected to carry out their duty to administer justice and to uphold the law, and 
especially to attend to urgent matters, lest they be accused of fiddling while Rome burns. But 
even those political rulers with philosophical inclinations, who might find the time to reflect 
upon these matters, cannot bring these questions to the fore without risking the stability of their 
rule. Instead of occupying themselves with the discussion of what the best regime might look 
like, or with how to bring it about, they must focus on attaining only a qualified good, a good 
that is subject to the given circumstances. 
Statesmen are respected and admired on account of their actions, which are conducive to 
the public good, rather than for the innovations they might suggest: in everyday politics action is 
generally judged superior to thought. Additionally, statesmen have the duty to abide by the 
laws—at least those that give form to the regime—which means that they need to take for 
granted that what the law says is right and just, or they at least need to act as if they believed so. 
Since politics necessarily deals with the concrete, the justice that political men pursue must be 
justice as it has been established by the law, regardless of whether the constitutional framework 
itself can in theory be perfected, or even if the regime is not genuinely just from the standpoint of 
philosophy. Rulers are expected to preserve the regime and to act on its behalf. They are 
accordingly forced to shirk facing questions related to the justice of the regime, even if the 
questions are raised with the intention of improving it.31 
The distinguishing characteristic of the statesman—as opposed to the wise man—is his 
 
31 See Pericles’s disposition in Xen. Mem. 1.2.40-46. 
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practical wisdom.32 Statesmen must be perfectly well acquainted with the present circumstances 
to determine what is just here and now. At the same time, they must try to accommodate the 
ideal33 or theoretical account of justice to the present situation as best they can. Otherwise stated, 
rulers must be politically prudent: they must strike the right balance between theory and practice, 
or between the general and the concrete, which is the arduous task of the political art. As 
Aristotle puts it, “prudence is not concerned with the universals alone but must also be 
acquainted with the particulars: it is bound up with action.”34 That political action is marked by 
practical wisdom means that it must be connected somehow to universal rules, that is, not every 
political action is valid or justifiable. One must keep in mind, however, that the inexorable 
character of political things renders the connection between theory and practice problematic, to 
say the least. Since prudence is concerned both with universals and particulars, there will always 
be a compromise between theory and practice: every political instantiation will inevitably fall 
short of the best regime.35 Although no existing regime will ever be perfect, many imperfect 
regimes, if properly guided, can in different degrees approximate to the best regime. 
From the viewpoint of the statesman, political philosophy seems not only unnecessary 
but even an impediment to the improvement of politics. Indeed, in the opinion of political men, 
politics can succeed without the help of philosophy. Whereas the Socratic quest for wisdom 
requires politics, politics does not require philosophy. Pre- or non-philosophic communities have 
managed to contrive legal frameworks based on common sense and tradition with satisfactory 
results. Based on experience, it is hard to deny that on many occasions the questions that the 
 
32 See Arist. Eth. Nic. 6.7, 1141b5-8. 
33 I am aware that the use of the word “ideal” is potentially misleading to the extent that the term carries the 
connotation of being both desirable and attainable. Nevertheless, I mean to use it in the classical sense—
etymologically linked to eidos—in which something “ideal” is not necessarily attainable and thus looked up to but 
not ipso facto desirable. 
34 Eth. Nic. 6.7, 1141b15-16. 
35 See Arist. Pol. 4.8, 1293b25. 
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political philosopher raises are not indispensable to attain a relatively healthy political life. In 
fact, while political philosophy addresses matters of great political import, often it seems 
politically salutary to avoid its incisive questions. For this reason, even statesmen who 
acknowledge the utility of political philosophy will probably not wish to pursue it. Consequently, 
it would seem reasonable to accept that before calling politics to the tribunal of genuine justice, 
political philosophy must itself be justified in the eyes of the political community. 
It is therefore pertinent to ask, why or when do politics need the insights of philosophy?36 
The quick answer is that political philosophy becomes most necessary in turbulent times. Indeed, 
all political regimes eventually face hardships due to external or internal threats that may bring 
the regime back to a state of weakness or uncertainty, in which the principles that hold the people 
together can be undermined or decimated. Admittedly, it could be said that external threats such 
as an enemy attack can be anticipated, while internal conflicts like those incited by factions can 
be prevented with good policies or dealt with by enforcing the law. But even if we grant that the 
effect of good political measures may be long-lasting, adherence to the laws does not guarantee 
stability. Indeed, as Aristotle says, the destruction of the regime can come from within, if 
legislation is not suitable for the people.37 In such cases, the moderate teachings38 of political 
philosophy are an indispensable source to help regimes recover strength and social cohesion. 
Political philosophy and politics are not altogether at odds with each other. 
But let us go back to the tension between philosophy and politics, a tension that stems 
from their differing goals. Whereas philosophy seeks truth, politics or good politics is aimed at 
the well-being of the political community. For politics to attain its goal, it must first guarantee 
 
36 See Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 93. 
37 See Arist. Rh. 1.4.12-13, 1360a18-34; see also Locke, Second Treatise, 412 (§§ 221-22). 
38 By saying “moderate” I mean that political philosophers advice against radical measures because of their impartial 
interest in the common good. 
10  
the safety and stability of the regime by embracing tradition and by encouraging concord, 
whereas philosophy, to transcend the realm of opinions, must question especially the most 
widely accepted views. The core of political philosophy thus runs counter to the harmony and 
cohesion of the political community. Yet the assault on politics that the quest for wisdom 
necessitates need not be tactless. On the contrary, for politics to bear the onset of philosophy and, 
moreover, to let itself be guided by philosophers, wisdom must be presented in a politic manner, 
hand in hand with moderation. Indeed, when radically undertaken, the quest for wisdom becomes 
incompatible with political life even to the point of becoming itself unacceptable to the political 
community. 
The Socratic quest for wisdom, however, is tied to moderation in more than one way. To 
mention just its most manifest aspect, those who seek wisdom must be moderate regarding 
politics, for if philosophy starts with the study of politics it must preserve politics as much as it 
needs to preserve itself. Therefore, one of the tasks of political philosophers in their treatment of 
politics is, if not to reduce the tension between philosophy and politics, at least to make it appear 
as less strong than it really is by showing the public utility of their reflections and by persuading 
the political community that their teachings are innocuous or helpful. As we dig deeper into the 
topic of tyranny, other reasons why tyranny is useful for the study of political philosophy will 
become apparent. At the same time, as regards their philosophic pursuit, political philosophers 
must point to and underline that tension because only there is knowledge of the nature of 
political things available.39 
 
 
39 In order to be clear, I must say that the tension between philosophy and politics exists regardless of the regime. 
Tyranny is a good starting point from which to start to delineate this tension precisely because it is more difficult to 
recognize it in “corrrect” regimes (to use Aristotle’s terminology, Pol. 3.7, 1279a30). Following Leo Strauss, when I 
say “knowledge” of the nature of political things, I think of it in opposition to “opinion” of the nature of political 
things (see Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 11-12). 
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II. Reexamination of the Classics 
It is not modern but classical political philosophy that is more fully in tension with 
politics. The political philosophies of Hobbes or Locke, no longer based on the teleological 
nature of man, are compatible with politics to a greater degree than classical political philosophy 
because they are concerned with how things are rather than with how they ought to be. Their 
philosophies are closer to politics because they start from the same premise as bare politics does, 
that human nature is base. And human nature is base because, they assert, it is defined by the 
“similitude of passions” rather than by the capacity of human intellect.40 Admittedly, the 
moderns acknowledge that there is a tension between philosophy and politics, but that tension is 
of a different character than the tension generated by the philosophical questioning of the law. 
Unlike the tension produced by the quest for wisdom, which is permanent, the tension that the 
moderns point to can be surmounted in time. However, notwithstanding the insurmountable 
character of the tension that the classics point to, reflecting on it bears insights that are necessary 
to see both philosophy and politics in the proper perspective, a perspective of which modernity 
has lost sight. 
Although the moderns took the sordidness of human life as fixed or given, they had even 
greater expectations than the ancients about the possibility of ameliorating the bleak outlook of 
political coexistence. They pinned their hopes on the power of a well-designed commonwealth to 
tame man’s impulses with a view to both the common good and individual freedom. Through the 
popularization of philosophy, they sought to educate statesmen and enlighten citizens. But the 
divulgence of philosophical insights goes hand in hand with their vulgarization, with the 
diffusion of vulgar or coarse knowledge. Political philosophy thus understood contributes to the 
 
40 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 4 (introd., par. 3). 
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education of the people but it cannot be genuinely edifying41 to the extent that it desists from the 
prospect of wisdom which constituted the essence of classical political philosophy. Classical 
political philosophy, in turn, is not immediately useful to either statesmen or enlightened citizens. 
On the contrary, despite its moderate character, classical political philosophy tends to be 
subversive and thus useless or even prejudicial. But it is not the intention of political 
philosophers to be subversive just for the sake of it. Subversive speeches are dangerous because 
they can undoubtedly turn into subversive deeds. Nevertheless, subversive speeches are needed 
to seek truth, because truth can only be found by calling into question the political good as 
opposed to the good unqualifiedly. When carefully addressed, however, subversive speeches 
need not undermine politics; they can also help to make political changes for the better to the 
extent that they propose more favorable alternatives.42 
To illustrate the latter, we can think of the following example. Every regime is born with 
an end in mind but, over time, people can easily lose sight of the original goal that brought their 
political community together. All peoples undergo changes that can make them forget the 
founding principles or they might come to disagree as regards their interpretation.43 In such 
cases, regimes are likely to deviate from their original purpose and legislation will cease to be 
suitable for the people. More importantly, legislation itself, which originally reflects the founding 
principles of the regime, becomes a reason for dispute and loses the force to hold the people 
together. While legislation presupposes the principles that guide the political community, since 
laws are only a perfectible reflection of those principles, they are incapable of explaining the 
 
41 Despite the negative connotations that the verb “edify” may carry, I do not mean to use it pejoratively or 
ironically, but, on the contrary, in a positive sense, as improvement of the intellectual condition of mankind. I 
believe this is how Leo Strauss understands the term when he uses it to translate Hegel’s “erbaulich” and to say that 
philosophy “is of necessity edifying” (Thoughts on Machiavelli, 294). 
42 That subversive speeches are both needed in the search for truth and can be useful in political life exemplifies that 
philosophy and politics can work together to enhance each other.  
43 Although he offers a different solution, see Niccolò Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy 3.1: “Because in the process 
of time [the goodness of the beginnings] is corrupted, unless something intervenes to lead it back to the mark….” 
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principles themselves. The political community cannot be made to be of one mind by legislation 
alone. To preserve the regime, due reflection on the principles becomes essential, but the 
principles remain unknown if one does not question legislation or if one does not try to 
understand its roots. It is in those cases, when legislation fails to cohere with the political 
community, that classical political philosophy and its subversive speeches become imperative for 
politics. 
Legislation proves to be insufficient to unite the people and guarantee the stability of the 
regime especially when the regime is deviant, when the rulers fail to advance the common good. 
If rulers equate good rule with having a strong rule, the “improvement” of the regime amounts to 
intensifying tyrannical measures—summum ius, summa iniuria—with the result that citizens 
secretly flee the law.44 Likewise, when rulers center their attention solely on preserving stability, 
they can very easily deviate from the common good. While rulers should foster a sense of 
community and enhance the ability of the people to undertake purposeful activities, they might 
have vicious reasons to atomize society, to undermine people’s mutual trust, and to enfeeble 
them so that they are less likely to carry out ambitious enterprises.45  
The limited horizon of politics, one without the guidance of philosophy, can drive rulers 
to commit the most atrocious crimes in the name of the common good. To make real 
improvements to political life, rulers must be able to look beyond what is possible here and now. 
Statesmen who aim at governing well need to seek philosophic insights to discover what is 
veritably good and to acquire the capacity to evaluate what decisions are truly best. In other 
words, despite the tension that inevitably arises between political philosophy and politics, 
reasonable politics needs to be complemented by the standard that the teachings of political 
 
44 See Arist. Pol. 2.9, 1270b21-36. 
45 See Arist. 5.11, 1314a15-25. 
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philosophy provide. Although classical political philosophy is likely to furnish a severe guidance, 
for the good of their regimes statesmen should have recourse to its direction.  
The full awareness of this problem led the classics to offer a stable and universal standard 
from which to address the political problem. While they realized that the political questions are 
always the same because the nature of political things remains essentially the same, they also 
acknowledged that every concrete situation calls for different solutions. Since the manifestations 
of politics vary, as do all practical human endeavors, how ideal justice can be instantiated 
necessarily varies as well. The classics knew that political philosophy is therefore best 
formulated as a complex set of questions rather than as an array of straightforward claims. By 
addressing the political problem in the form of questions, political philosophers allowed for 
flexible answers, so that they might be adapted to the given circumstances. Thus, classical 
political philosophy formulates insights that bear on the nature of political things in a way that 
the quest for wisdom becomes both possible for philosophers and useful for political life. The 
richness of the classical approach is so vast that one can hardly overestimate its value and the 
importance of its contribution to the understanding and betterment of political life. 
Yet today classical political philosophy needs to be recovered mainly because its 
teachings are no longer believed to be valid. The reason for this, I believe, is that modern 
thinkers have placed more emphasis on judging the classical solution than on trying to 
understand the problem it was meant to solve. Indeed, a correct understanding of the problem—
namely, the insoluble tension between philosophy and politics—makes clear that any solution 
must be, by definition, imperfect and provisional. But the classical solution is mistakenly read as 
if it had been intended to be universal and permanent, whereas the most profound questions the 
classics raise are dismissed out of hand, as no longer useful because they must be limited to their 
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time and place in history. Moreover, contemporary political science has purportedly superseded 
old political philosophy in the belief that human nature has undergone a fundamental change so 
that we require a new, true science of politics. The understanding of classical political philosophy 
began to be eroded with the efforts of modern political philosophy to disprove the main tenets of 
the classics. Modern political philosophers sought to replace the classical standard with a new 
science of politics because the classical solution was in their eyes useless and prejudicial. 
Indeed, for the moderns, the best regime proposed by the ancients was not only 
unattainable but also, according to them, based on an erroneous understanding of human nature. 
With the idea of a summum bonum in mind, they believed, the classics had mistakenly assumed 
that the wish to attain some higher good—intrinsic to human nature—could adequately mold 
people’s character so that they could live peacefully together. However, the moderns argue, the 
political problem cannot be solved by falsely postulating that the nature of man is teleological. In 
contrast to the classics, modern political philosophers propound that the truly basic inclination of 
all men is not some higher good but “perpetual and restless desire of power after power.”46 The 
nature of man thus ceases to be a telos and becomes a starting point: not something to be attained 
but something common to all human beings.  
With blind faith in the advent and progress of science in all human endeavors, the 
moderns thought it would eventually be possible to overcome the allegedly unsolvable tension 
between philosophy and politics. But while their apparent innovation in politics led to real 
improvements in some aspects of political life, the neglect of other aspects resulted in the 
impoverishment of political thought as a whole. To mention just one significant change that the 
moderns had no qualms acknowledging, their “novel” approach caused the human end to be 
substantially lowered. How and why such competent thinkers, who were also often remarkably 
 
46 Hobbes, Leviathan, 11.2; see also Niccolò Machiavelli’s “effectual truth” in Prince 15. 
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good readers of the ancients, arrived at the conclusion that the ancient paradigm should be 
replaced will be the concern of chapter 4. For the moment, however, we will simply start from 
the premise, based on facts, that the effect of the modern revolution had important consequences 
on our way of thinking about the human things. The movement that began with the rejection of 
teleology has, without doubt, brought us closer to democratic ideals of equality and mass-
education, but because it rejects any higher standard by which to be guided, it has also pulled us 
farther away from wisdom and virtue. 
As a corollary to the modern revolution, which began in the seventeenth and culminated 
during the twentieth century, we have become less capable of understanding the weightiest 
political problems that afflict us, even to the point that we no longer identify them as problems 
but merely as differences of opinion. The purported progress brought about by the “scientific” 
understanding of human affairs has in fact proven to be a regression, for while today’s political 
science can observe and measure political phenomena with ever-improving quantitative 
methodologies, it is unable to judge them as better or worse and is therefore impeded from 
offering genuine solutions. Moreover, it is detached from the most fundamental questions that 
philosophy poses. Classical political philosophy has become a precious relic but a relic 
nonetheless, to say nothing of the quest for wisdom, which seems to have been all but 
abandoned. Unlike classical thinkers, modern political philosophers neglected the interplay 
between the nature of political things and the quest for truth. They chose to embrace the former 
and reject the latter. The result is that their political philosophy ceased to ask the most relevant 
political questions, among which, to cite Xenophon, are those that Socrates constantly discussed:  
what is pious, what is impious, what is noble, what is shameful, what is just, what is 
unjust, what is moderation, what is madness, what is courage, what is cowardice, what is 
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a city, what is a statesman, what is rule over human beings, what is a skilled ruler over 
human beings.47 
The confrontation of these kinds of questions necessarily points in the direction of the 
philosophic view of human nature. Only by going back to them today will we be able to bridge 
the divide between the nature of political things and the higher, philosophical truth, so that the 
wise and moderate approach to politics that the most discerning thinkers of the past have handed 
down to us may be recovered. Likewise, it will serve to remind us about the crucial importance 
of recognizing the tension and complementarity that exists between philosophy and politics, 
indispensable for a proper assessment of classical thought. I therefore propose a reexamination of 
classical and modern texts as they bear upon the concept of tyranny. The reappraisal of their 
insights will shed new light on the concept of tyranny, ancient and modern, which, in turn, will 
hopefully help to counteract the inertia of our times and contribute to the recovery of classical 
political philosophy. 
 
III. Unjust Regimes  
“Law is king of all / of mortals and immortals; / It pushes through and makes just the 
greatest violence, / With a high hand.” These memorable lines from a poem by Pindar48 pinpoint 
perhaps the deepest and most characteristic political problem, namely, the difficult concordance 
between the lawful and the just. The determination of whether the lawful is just is intimately tied 
to the idea of the common good. As Thomas Aquinas says, law “is nothing else than the 
ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and 
 
47 Mem. 1.1.16. 
48 Thomas Pangle’s translation of frag. 169 in The Laws of Plato, 522, n. 24. 
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promulgated.”49 But to speak of the common good is problematic, to say the least, because the 
determination of whether there is such a thing as the public good and of what would be the best 
means to attain it is not made by an entire community but is rather established by the 
authoritative or preponderant element of the political community. 
Therefore, the so-called common or public good may well come into conflict with the 
individual or the private good, or with the idea of public good as conceived by different parts of 
the community. Thus, the public good cannot be determined decisively, let alone justly pursued, 
if there is no consensus about it or if it is imposed rather than willingly accepted by all, 
especially by the weaker elements of the community. It can be readily inferred that the question 
of legitimacy becomes crucial in the definition of the public good as well as in the judgment of 
whether laws are just or unjust. As our discussion unfolds, it will become apparent that however 
just regimes might seem, every regime is unjust to a certain degree: none can be claimed to be 
free of tyrannical traits.50 The concept of tyranny, as we will see, is in fact so intricately linked to 
political life that it is impossible to escape. 
But let us look more closely at the problem of law in its connection with the public good 
first. The question “What is law?” is comparable to the question “What is just?” Law, it is 
generally assumed, is just because it aims at the public or private good by ordaining what one 
ought to do and what to abstain from.51 Law therefore implies at least a conception of the good. 
It follows that when laws are not observed, regress can be expected as lawlessness facilitates 
chaos and violence. Even well-formulated laws need fit magistrates to look after them.52 
 
49 ST 90.4. 
50 In the words of Catherine Zuckert, “all political orders include a measure of tyranny and none is perfectly just.” 
“Connection between Liberty and Tyranny,” in Charlotte C. S. Thomas, ed., Liberty, Democracy, and the 
Temptations to Tyranny (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2021), 20. 
51 See Arist. Eth. Nic. 1.3, 1094b5-6; see also Cic. Leg. 1.6.18. 
52 See Pl. Leges 6.751b. 
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However, regress is more likely to occur when laws themselves stray from their alleged purpose 
to unjustly privilege the private good of some individuals to the detriment of the public good. 
Corrupt or incompetent legislators might write laws that only benefit themselves.53 Although 
they may hide their wrongdoings behind a veil of legality, those laws have a pernicious effect on 
the political community as a whole. Clearly, when this happens, Pindar’s pithy verses become 
true, since unfair laws that are imposed upon others make just the greatest violence simply by 
making it legal. 
Notwithstanding this instance of self-serving use of the law, one can also think of a 
somewhat counterintuitive example: legislators might seek to privilege only one part of the 
community with the sincere conviction that benefitting a particular group is just. Precisely with 
the public good in mind they might wish to privilege a particular group to give them more access 
to political decisions and thus improve the living conditions of the entire political community. 
Yet one is compelled to ask, in the first place, on what grounds can the alleged public good be 
justified as superior to the private or individual good? Secondly, who can judge whether the 
privileges bestowed on just one part of the political community will truly enhance the public 
good? Lastly, and more to our point, would such a regime be exempt from being called 
tyrannical because it is supposed to further the good of the city or nation? Although there is no 
readily available answer to these questions, it is important to keep them in the background of our 
discussion. 
From Aristotle’s political perspective the public good is deemed the greatest good, 
superior even to the individual good. That the public good is prior to the individual good is 
manifest because the latter can hardly exist without the former.54 In the words of Aristotle, “to 
 
53 See Pl. Rep. 1.338e-339a. 
54 See Arist. Pol. 1.2, 1253a20-23. To be clear, I must immediately add that Aristotle’s political perspective is not 
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secure and preserve the good of the city appears to be something greater and more complete: the 
good of the individual by himself is certainly desirable enough, but that of a nation and of cities 
is nobler and more divine.”55 Yet even if we grant this classical premise, when it comes to 
defining what constitutes the public or common good—not to speak of the means to attain it—
there are many and great disagreements. Legislators and statesmen, one would expect, should 
have clarity about what constitutes the public good and the means to attain it to reach consensus 
among the population. But is this the case? 
While statesmen seem to know with certainty what the public good is when they enforce 
the law, it in fact comprises so many subtleties and it is so difficult to grasp that, upon inspection, 
it is not hard to discover that even the leading men in a given city are in the dark as regards the 
good.56 How can a law, whose aim is the public good, be judged as legitimate or illegitimate if 
there is no agreement as to what constitutes the public good? Consequently, the definition of and 
agreement as to what constitutes the political good is prior to the law, for without consent about 
the good, law will be viewed as mere violence—or at least as injustice—by all who disagree with 
it. Law, therefore, in the highest sense or in its connection with the public good points in the 
direction of the most important political questions. 
Xenophon’s masterful dialogue between the renowned Athenian leader Pericles and the 
clever Alcibiades lays out the intricacies of the problem at hand.57 It is said, Xenophon narrates, 
that before Alcibiades was twenty years old he turned to Pericles, who was then his guardian, to 
ask if he could teach him what law is, for law-abiding men can be justly praised only if they 
 
necessarily compatible with his philosophical perspective. Although the city is by nature prior to the household and 
to individuals—because without the city human nature can hardly be developed—philosophically speaking, to attain 
full perfection of their nature human beings must transcend the limits that the city imposes. The highest human good 
is superior to the greatest political good. 
55 Eth. Nic. 1.2, 1094b8-11; see also Pol. 1.2, 1253a31; Pl. Rep. 9.578d-e. 
56 See Plato Rep. 6.505d-506a. 
57 See Mem. 1.2.40-46. 
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know this. Ignorant of Alcibiades’s furtive motives, Pericles candidly accepts to answer, claiming 
that the question Alcibiades poses entails no difficulty. He then defines law by saying that “all 
things are laws that the assembled multitude has approved and written pointing out what should 
and should not be done.” To that definition Alcibiades responds by asking whether what should 
be done according to them are good or bad things. Underlying Alcibiades’s apparently dull and 
naïve question is the awareness that, due to ignorance, the many are likely to be mistaken as to 
what is good. But Pericles, who is still unaware of Alcibiades’s intention, condescendingly—one 
can judge by the tone—responds that the good ought to be done, not the bad. 
The assumption behind Pericles’s assertion, validated in a democracy, is that the good is 
defined by the many. Consequently, Alcibiades then asks what happens when the assembled few 
rather than the many write what should be done. Pericles, in turn, needs to adjust his answer to 
include what he thinks would be a correct definition of law regardless of the regime: 
“Everything,” he says, “is called law that the overpowering part of the city, upon deliberation, 
writes that one should do.” Thus, Pericles acknowledges that what law is depends on the regime, 
but his troubles are not over, for then he must agree that even what a ruling tyrant promulgates is 
called law. In short, Pericles has unwittingly asserted both that laws are promulgated by the 
strong over the weak, and that what they say is good. How is law, as defined by Pericles, 
different from violence? 
Alcibiades opportunely changes the focus to inquire into what violence and lawlessness 
is: “Is it not when one who is stronger compels one who is weaker—not by persuasion but by use 
of violence—to do whatever is in his opinion best?” Pericles must grant this and is therefore 
forced to rectify what he said earlier about the tyrant. Cornered by Alcibiades, he acknowledges 
that “everything that one compels someone to do without persuading him, whether he writes it or 
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not, is violence rather than law.” But just as his modified definition of law fits all regimes, his 
definition of violence fits not only tyranny, but also oligarchy and democracy. As Alcibiades is 
quick to point out, Pericles has thus conceded that by imposing the will of the many upon the 
few, alleged laws in a democracy are truly mere violence against the wealthy. 
At this point and frankly exasperated by Alcibiades’s inquiries, which led him to 
propound two contradictory views of law, Pericles acknowledges that Alcibiades is clever but he 
dismisses the conversation by saying that when he was of Alcibiades’s age he too used to argue 
with such kind of sophistry. Alcibiades haughtily retorts that he would have liked to meet 
Pericles then, when he was at his cleverest. In the end, he has achieved his true goal, which is to 
prove that even Pericles, the leading man in Athens, is unable to answer what law is correctly. 
What Alcibiades does, at bottom, is to question law itself and qualify the praise of law-abiding 
men, for how can one be praised for being lawful if laws enact the greatest violence? With 
Alcibiades as his spokesman, Xenophon points to the problem of law inherent to every regime. 
Given that the most characteristic trait of tyranny is that it is rule over unwilling subjects,58 
Xenophon provocatively, though also humorously, insinuates that all regimes are in a sense 
tyrannical. 
Every political community that seeks stability must try to hide the problem of law as 
exposed by Alcibiades. While the specificity of positive laws makes them subject to 
modification, the problem of law itself ought not be too evident or a matter of public discussion. 
As Aristotle advises, even laws that can be improved ought to be changed only with great 
caution, for “the alteration of existing laws in favor of new and different ones weakens the power 
of law itself.” Aristotle teaches that although many laws can in theory be improved, to change 
them in practice might prove counterproductive, because the power of law stems from its being 
 
58 See Arist. Pol. 5.11, 1314a36-38. 
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valid for a long time or from habituation. Hence, he says, one ought to avoid “the reckless 
dissolution of laws.”59 If this is true for laws within the scope of a given regime, it helps explain 
why matters concerning legislation at the highest level—that is, laws with which the specific 
regime is founded—are usually kept away from open public deliberation. Since people generally 
rest satisfied when general rules seem fair and are set beforehand—despite the fact, or precisely 
because they know that the result of the actual exercise of power will fall short of the perfect 
good—it is politically salutary to preserve the same laws over time even if they are defective or 
perfectible. For laws to fulfill their purpose, it is necessary to avoid questioning the highest law, 
which defines the character of the regime. 
Although most people are not commonly aware of the problem of law, that they are 
concerned about the public good is manifest in the heated discussions—which, at least in 
democracies, are relatively common—over the mechanisms to decide who will rule, how the 
rulers come to power, for how long and on what conditions they are allowed to rule, etc. Yet one 
ought not confuse the procedures with the ends. While it is true that the desired end of a regime 
must be sought through legitimate means, the means alone cannot guarantee that the end is good 
or noble. Even so, not every political community, or not at all times, agrees with the mechanisms 
to decide who will rule because different people deem valid different claims to rule. The 
principles of legitimacy, as Xenophon’s Alcibiades adumbrates, vary according to the regime, 
and are, in part, the mark of the regime. 
Like Xenophon, Plato intimates as much when indirectly posing the problem of law and 
legitimacy in his works. One prominent passage concerning legitimacy appears in the Laws, 
when the Athenian Stranger points out that according to convention, there are many different 
 
59 Pol. 2.8, 1169a24-25 and 1169a16. 
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worthy titles to rule, which are opposed to one another.60 Combining public and private forms of 
rule, the Athenian Stranger lists a total of seven: (1) rule of parents over children, (2) of the well 
born over the not well born, (3) of the elderly over the young, (4) of masters over slaves, (5) of 
the stronger over the weaker, (6) of the prudent over the ignorant and, finally, (7) rule of those 
elected by lot. The Athenian Stranger makes the point that legislation must be taken seriously 
because the different worthy titles to rule—indeed, one wonders whether all these are worthy—
are a source of civil strife. Those who tread without due care when laying down laws risk 
destroying the regime itself. 
Why the Athenian Stranger asserts that two (numbers five and six) out of these seven 
titles are according to nature leads to certain difficulties, the resolution of which can yield 
important insights. Though it will be necessary to clarify this point regarding the different 
understandings of “nature,” we don’t need to take up that analysis now. More immediately 
relevant to our present discussion, however, are the implications that follow from the opposition 
or conflict between the different claims to rule, especially between these two that are “according 
to nature.” From a political perspective, that is, from the viewpoint of each particular regime, it is 
not possible to settle whether one title to rule is indisputably superior to the rest, because the 
partisans of each regime will always claim that their view is best and therefore, hierarchically 
superior to any other view.61 
Admittedly, to speak of “superiority” is ambiguous, for different regimes are superior to 
others in different respects. While rulers might wish to boast that their nation is the greatest and 
most powerful in every respect, in reality one nation might be superior when it comes to strength 
and defense in the face of foreign attacks, whereas others are, for instance, superior as regards 
 
60 Leges 3.690a-d. 
61 See Pl. Leges 4.714b-715b; also Rep. 9.581c-d. 
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freedom, commerce, or virtue.62 Unless one regime were superior to the rest in every respect, it 
does not seem possible to establish an absolute superiority of one regime over the rest. Therefore, 
what we mean when we speak of superiority is not superiority in every respect but in the 
politically most important one, namely, superiority with respect to genuine justice. 
Since, as we have said, law establishes what ought to be done and avoided, to determine 
what is genuinely just one might be tempted to look in the direction of the highest laws, of the 
laws that determine the character of the regime or which uphold the principles of legitimation. 
But even the highest laws cannot resolve which regime is best because law is relative to the 
regime. Indeed, the principles of legitimacy that substantiate the good of each regime serve to 
judge whether the government is just in a qualified sense only, for they merely indicate whether 
the rulers are leading the people in the direction the community has set, or whether they have 
strayed from their goal. 
To the extent that the principles of legitimacy ground the end in pursuit of which the 
regime is constituted, they are the most authoritative guidelines available to assess whether a 
particular way of ruling is according to the regime’s end, but they are insufficient to judge the 
end of the regime itself. Hence, principles of legitimacy are unfit as the basis for an assessment 
of justice in an unqualified sense, and equally unsuitable to establish a hierarchy of regimes. The 
judgment concerning the authoritative superiority of a regime in relation to others can only be 
established on the assumption that there is no dispute about what is just and unjust (either 
because there is actual agreement as to what is just or because justice is not being used as a 
standard). The concept of justice must transcend the particular interests of the diverse regimes 
and point to a higher, universal form of justice. It must be established on the basis of the 
 
62 Compare Pericles’s funeral oration in Thuc. 2.34-46 with Xen. Mem. 3.3.13 and see the final outcome of the war 
in Xen. Hell. 2.1.27-28 and 2.2.20-23. 
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unqualifiedly just, of which all actual regimes fall short (something the partisans of each regime 
would only grudgingly accept, if at all). To define justice in this broadest sense requires the 
formulation of the best regime, which despite existing only in speech, is the only truly 
authoritative standard to assess the just or unjust ends of regimes that exist in deed. 
One might ask, is it possible to establish a hierarchy of regimes, or to judge the ends of 
existing regimes? And if so, is it desirable, or why is it so important? This brings us back to our 
original question: if there is no objective standard against which to measure the ends of regimes, 
then there is no way to distinguish law from violence, or enacted laws from finely enacted 
laws.63 Contrary to the classical tradition, modernity has shifted the focus from the ends of 
regimes to the processes. How political things are decided has become more relevant than why 
they are decided. In other words, whether the end in mind will be beneficial for the political 
community as a whole seems less important than to know it was legitimately chosen. There is 
little or no interest in judging the ends of regimes so long as law-abidingness and democratic 
procedures are respected.64 According to the modern view, which in the West has dominated the 
international scene for the past century, principles of legitimacy are not superior or inferior to 
each other but incommensurable between them: all peoples have the right to self-determination.65 
 
63 See Arist. Pol. 4.8, 1294a5-9. 
64 An example of the emphasis placed today on the superiority of procedures and law-abidingness over what may be 
good can be found in Robert P. George’s defense of constitutionalism: “Sometimes courts have no legitimate 
authority to set right what they perceive (perhaps rightly) to be a wrong; and where this is the case, it is wrong—
because usurpative—for them to do so. There is no paradox in this. Fidelity to the rule of law imposes on public 
officials in a reasonably just regime (that is, a regime that it would be wrong for judges to attempt to subvert) a duty 
in justice to respect the constitutional limits of their own authority. To fail in this duty, however noble one’s ends, is 
to behave unconstitutionally, lawlessly, unjustly.” Robert P. George, Natural Law, the Constitution, and the Theory 
and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2269 (2001), p. 2283. Admittedly, this article does not discuss 
the ends of regimes, but the allusion to “a reasonably just regime” as “a regime that it would be wrong for judges to 
attempt to subvert” is meaningful. 
65 The two United Nations covenants where this is stipulated are 1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1; and 2) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, art. 1. 
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We cannot discuss here the several dimensions that the concept of self-determination supposes,66 
but let it suffice to say that it is partly based on the conventionalist rejection of classical natural 
right, the rejection of what the classics thought to be by nature just. 
At the same time and not unsurprisingly, the right to self-determination is based on the 
assumption that democracy is universally recognized as the best attainable regime: consent 
predominates over wisdom.67 The principles on which democracy is grounded, such as political 
egalitarianism, are assumed to be incontrovertible. Their peremptory character, focused on 
correct procedures rather than on correct ends, precludes the possibility of calling into question 
the aim of existing regimes. To the extent that regimes today are marked less by the duties of the 
citizens than by their rights, the champions of democratic values as universal values act like the 
passengers of a ship concerned with the correct navigation of the helmsman regardless of the 
destination. What modernity has lost sight of is that no matter how noble the principles of 
democracy may be, they cannot in and of themselves be a warrant against tyranny. The twentieth 
century witnessed terrible crimes whose origin may be traced to the alleged quest for the 
common good with due respect to democratic procedures. While in a sense it is true that every 
regime is in its origin tyrannical, as we will show below, it is of the utmost political importance 
to be able to recognize, both during the founding moment and afterwards, when political actions 
 
66 For a quick view on how self-determination evolved from a “principle,” in the nineteenth century, to a “right,” 
and on the problems the latter entails, see Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty-First 
Century, 55 Wash. & LeeL. Rev.773 (1998), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol55/iss3/8. 
67 On this topic, Martin Rhonheimer’s analysis of Pope Benedict’s address to the Bundestag (commonly referred to 
as the “Regensburg Adress”) is especially valuable. According to Rhonheimer, the Pope’s words “can quite 
reasonably be understood as not calling into question the principle of majority rule… but rather as reminding those 
who practice politics that even democratic, procedurally correct majority decisions can legislate materially unjust 
decisions,” Rhonheimer, M. (2015). “The Secular State, Democracy, and Natural Law: Benedict XVI’s Address to 
the Bundestag from the Perspective of Legal Ethics and Democracy Theory.” In M. Cartabia & A. Simoncini (eds.), 
Pope Benedict XVI's Legal Thought: A Dialogue on the Foundation of Law (Law and Christianity, pp. 79-92). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 83 (emphases in the original). 
doi:10.1017/CBO9781316106303.006. Although as Rhonheimer later adds, “it is not the principle of democratic 
majority decision making that is called into question; it is only, and exclusively, the material results of the process 
that are being subjected to critique” (p. 85), Pope Benedict’s address certainly serves the purpose of pointing to the 
limits of majority rule and to the need of a higher standard to judge what is just. 
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take a turn for the worse. 
 
IV. Toward the Best Regime 
That there is a hierarchy of regimes recognized and accepted by most people is indicated 
at least by the distinction between correct or legitimate regimes and tyranny, a distinction that 
remains valid today even if that distinction has been blurred by modernity or if modern thinkers 
refuse to acknowledge such a hierarchy categorically.68 While the use of the word tyranny is less 
frequent today than it was, for example, at the end of the eighteenth century (in the period of the 
American and French Revolutions), printed publications suggest that it is used more frequently 
today than it was during the first quarter of that century.69 Presently, as in ancient times, it is 
widely accepted that unlike legitimate regimes, tyranny is characterized by imposition and 
oppression, and that its end is to satisfy the desires of the tyrant rather than to attain the common 
good of the people. This implies that the common good is not among the desires of the tyrant or 
that his desires run counter to the good of the people, whereas the purported aim of legitimate 
regimes is precisely to attain the common good.70 
It is when regimes deviate or appear to deviate from their goal (which is rule by law with 
a view to the good of the whole political community as opposed to the good of only one part of 
 
68 Thomas Hobbes has no reserve in defending monarchy (which he equates to tyranny!) over democracy; he even 
goes so far as to recommend the banning of Greek and Roman texts that make tyrannicide “lawful and laudable.” 
Although he does emphatically speak of a hierarchy of regimes, he places monarchy (especially against democracy) 
at the top, because he sees the alternatives to a strong monarch as chaotic and leading to perpetual war. See Lev. 
2.29.14 and 4.46.35. 
69 See Google Books Ngram Viewer in English [2019] under ”tyranny,” 1500-2019 
(https://books.google.com/ngrams). To be more accurate one would have to compare not the frequency of the word 
now and then, but its proportional use in comparison with other words. While I am aware of the limitations of my 
claim, I believe it is nevertheless an interesting exercise. See also “monarchy, tyranny, democracy, oligarchy, 
aristocracy” for the same period. 
70 We will introduce the discussion of beneficent tyranny (where the tyrant seeks the common good) below and in 
chapter 2, and will discuss it further in chapters 3 and 5. 
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it) that they cease to be considered legitimate and are called tyrannical.71 Legitimate regimes 
count on the citizens’ willing obedience to the stipulated laws so long as the authoritative 
element of the political community presents itself as capable of and willing to further the good of 
all. In contrast, since the will of the tyrant commands what is good for him alone, no reasonable 
person would willingly obey a tyrant, unless it were to avoid a greater evil. The tyrant’s cruel 
exercise of authority renders his rule unendurable, making it the least desirable form of rule. 
From this brief description of tyranny, it is evident that citizens ought to avoid tyranny at all 
costs. The question we will explore throughout the dissertation is whether tyranny can be 
avoided and, if so, which regime would best replace it. 
Perhaps a Lydian word in origin, tyrannos was not always pejorative but was used to 
refer to any reigning monarch.72 Herodotus comments that “in the old days even tyrants were 
poor, not only common people.”73 Originally, there seemed to be no real difference between a 
king (basileus) and a tyrant (tyrannos). As Lynette Mitchell explains, “the real differences 
between basileis and tyrannoi, so entrenched in our sources, were a product of a construct of 
ruling developed in the late fifth and fourth centuries, especially at Athens, and not a reflection of 
political realities.”74 During the seventh and sixth centuries BC, many Greek city-states fell 
under the rule of tyrants, who came to power with the support of the demos and the assistance of 
mercenary troops. 
Although tyrants usually belonged to an aristocratic family, they fought the aristocratic 
powers that competed against them, and they tended, at least initially, to favor the many. There 
were tyrants honored for their benevolence toward the many, who lent money to the poor, used 
 
71 See Arist. Pol. 3.7, 1279b5-6 with 4.4, 1292a15-19 and 4.5, 1292b5-11. 
72 See Carolyn Dewald in Hdt., 837. 
73 Hdt. 8.137.2. 
74 Mitchell, Heroic Rulers, 32. 
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revenues to embellish their cities, fostered the arts, and even helped to preserve democracies 
elsewhere.75 But in time, either tyrants themselves or their heirs after them often turned 
oppressive against the people, while they became self-indulgent and delivered themselves to all 
sorts of bodily pleasures.76 Tyrannies thus came to be viewed as the lowest form of government 
because of the way tyrants ascended to power (through civil strife and against the laws), because 
of their propensity to depravity and violence, and because of their instability. In Ancient Greece, 
most tyrants were killed and no more than two generations of tyrants remained in power.77 
Somewhat paradoxically, in the greatest power of the tyrant—his capacity to oppress—
lie, as it were, the seeds of his own undoing: not to be willingly obeyed. “For it seems to me that 
this good—to rule over willing subjects—is not altogether a human thing but, rather, divine; it is 
clearly given only to those who have been genuinely initiated into the mysteries of moderation.” 
These are Ischomachus’s words in his conversation with Socrates, as they appear in Xenophon’s 
Oeconomicus.78 Ischomachus then adds that to tyrannize over those unwilling to obey is given by 
the gods to those whom they deem worthy of living like Tantalus, the Lydian king who spends 
eternity in Hades fearing a second death. According to Ischomachus’s belief, the gods reward 
kings with a divine good and punish tyrants with evil that resembles infernal torture. Not only 
kings are rewarded by the gods, but so is any ruling person or group of people who manage to 
maintain the willing obedience of those under their authority, be it in democracies, monarchies, 
 
75 It is noteworthy, for example, that Diodorus Siculus always refers to Hieron as a basileus and never as a tyrannos, 
even in his condemnation of Hieron in 11.67. See Arist. Ath. Pol. 16.2; Diod. Sic. 11.38, 53, 66; Pind. Ol. 1.8-23, 
100-108, Pyth. 1.46-50, 2.57-67; Mitchell, Heroic Rulers, 42. 
76 See, for example, Diod. Sic. 11.67. 
77 See James McGlew’s Tyranny and Political Culture, 133: “Yet if strong tyrannies could as a rule endure safely 
the transfer of power from father to son or from brother to brother, nonetheless no tyranny, with the possible 
exception of the Orthagorids of Sicyon…, made it safely through a second such transference. Those unfortunate 
individuals who undertook to assume a tyranny after two predecessors… were besieged from the very outset of their 
reigns. Even strong tyrants of the second generation seem to have felt some anxiety about their position. It was said 
in antiquity that second generation tyrants were harsher than their predecessors.” 
78 Oec. 21.12. Carnes Lord’s translation in Strauss, Xenophon’s Socratic Discourse, 80. 
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or oligarchies as regards the public realm, or masters in their private households. Yet in his 
Cyropaedia, Xenophon confronts us with the practically universal fact that “human beings unite 
against none more than those whom they perceive attempting to rule them,” with the result that 
democracies are brought down, monarchies and oligarchies are overthrown, and even masters 
cannot gain their servants’ benevolence.79 The allegedly divine good of being willingly obeyed 
seems out of the reach of humans, and every regime seems bound to be overturned. Tyranny or 
imposed government appears thus to be the only practicable alternative to any other form of rule. 
Like Xenophon, Plato tells us, in the mouth of the Athenian Stranger, how difficult it is 
for human beings to rule over other human beings: “there can be no rest from evils and toils for 
cities in which some mortal rules rather than a god.”80 Likewise, the Athenian Stranger gives as 
well the reason why men resist the rule of other men: “human nature is not at all capable of 
regulating the human things, when it possesses autocratic authority over everything, without 
becoming swollen with insolence and injustice.”81 Human beings are unwilling to be ruled by 
other human beings because power breeds injustice. To oppose rulers seems a necessary measure 
to avoid or attenuate injustice. Nevertheless, it is not true that human beings do not allow other 
human beings to rule over them. Examples abound of peoples who willingly obey their rulers. 
Willing obedience, as Xenophon tells us, is one of the traits that distinguishes kingship from 
tyranny. In his Memorabilia, he asserts that according to Socrates kingship and tyranny differ 
from each other in that the former is “rule over the human beings who are willing and according 
to laws of cities,” whereas the latter is “rule over the unwilling and not according to the laws.”82 
Kings are esteemed on that account and have citizens guard them, whereas tyrants are reprobated 
 
79 Cyr. 1.1.2. 
80 Leges 4.713e. 
81 Leges 4.713b. 
82 Mem. 4.6.12. 
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and require foreign bodyguards to look after them.83 
However, despite their reputation for cruelty, not everyone in ancient Greece disapproved 
of tyrants. For one, the demos in different cities was inclined to favor a tyrant as a means to gain 
political turf against aristocrats. No doubt, aristocrats were in turn afraid of the arbitrary rule of 
tyrants and scandalized by their popular support, as the poet Alcaeus shows in the following 
verses: “they set up Pittacus, base of lineage / as tyrant of a city lacking bile and heavy with 
doom, / with great praise of the crowd.”84 But, while accurate, the criticism against tyrannies 
obscured the fact that other regimes carried out similar practices. As Aristotle puts it, “those who 
criticize tyranny and the advice Periander gave to Thrasyboulus must not be supposed to be 
simply correct in their censure”85 (the advice Aristotle refers to here is the “removal” of the 
preeminent men in the polis, who compete with or put the authoritative power at risk on account 
of their superiority). In other words, those who condemn tyranny because it does away with 
those that stand out fail to recognize that every regime—even those considered legitimate—does 
the same and, perhaps, justifiably so.86 
Whereas tyranny was especially despised by those who cherished freedom,87 to get rid of 
adversaries was not practiced by tyrants alone, nor were they the only beneficiaries of such acts, 
but oligarchies and democracies did the same. In fact, Aristotle goes so far as to say that this 
“issue is one that concerns all regimes generally, including correct ones,” and he adds, “for the 
deviant ones do this looking to the private advantage of the rulers, yet even in the case of those 
that look to the common good the matter stands in the same way.”88 Thus every regime, not only 
 
83 Arist. Pol. 3.14, 1285a27-28. See also Rhet. 1.2.19, 1357b30-35 and 1.8.5, 1366a6. 
84 Frag. 87 Diehl. Carnes Lord’s translation in Arist. Pol. 3.14, 1284a37-85b2. 
85 Pol. 3.13, 1284a27-28. 
86 See Pol. 3.13, 1284a5-16. 
87 By “freedom” I hear mean itboth as freedom to participate in the political decisions of the city and as freedom to 
go about safely, without fear of losing one’s life or private property, and at liberty to speak one’s mind. 
88 Pol. 3.13, 1284a34-37 and 1284b4-7. 
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tyranny, is in a sense tyrannical because all rulers are compelled to impose themselves at least 
over some, who are then exiled or downright killed. 
Admittedly, to say that all regimes are to a certain extent tyrannical does not make 
tyranny any better than them. Following this train of thought, however, it could be argued that 
beneficent tyrannies can in theory reach the common good more expeditiously than other 
regimes can.89 Although tyrants are ignoble and make more use of repugnant measures than 
legitimate or checked rulers can, their extreme methods would seem to be justified if they are in 
consonance with the agreed ends of the city, that is, if they seek political justice.90 Moreover, 
tyrannies could even appear as more desirable than other regimes if they can in truth further the 
common good more effectively (which would, moreover, presume that part of the common good 
is not the absence of tyranny). Since with a view to the common good even the crimes of tyranny 
appear to be justifiable, it must be true that the correct assessment of regimes cannot be done on 
the basis of the common good alone. We must find another, higher standard than political justice 
to judge the true value of tyranny as well as of other regimes. To give it due consideration, we 
will take up that discussion in chapter 3. For the moment, let us just add a few precisions 
regarding tyranny itself. 
It could be said that wherever the subjects of a single ruler did not object to being 
subdued, there was no tyranny properly speaking. Indeed, if by tyranny we understand rule over 
unwilling subjects, many places outside the Greek world where freedom was not so valued, even 
absolute or oppressive governments would still be considered kingships rather than tyrannies. As 
Aristotle puts it in his discussion of the several varieties of kingships, “it is because barbarians 
 
89 See Pl. Leges 4.709e-710b, 5.735a-736b. 
90 See Arist. Pol. 3.13, 1284b14-17. This, I believe, is the argument that supports the Machiavellian teaching that 
“the end justifies the means.” I, however, argue that that phrase ought to be interpreted as a philosophical rather than 
as a political teaching (see below, chapter 4), 
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are more slavish in their characters than Greeks (those in Asia being more so than those in 
Europe) that they put up with a master’s rule without making any difficulties.” Even within the 
Hellenic world, tyrannies such as the one for which the above-mentioned Pittacus was elected, 
fell partly into the category of tyranny because it was despotic (like that of a master over his 
slaves), and partly into the category of kingship, because it was elective and over willing 
subjects.91 
Aristotle himself is said to have dedicated a few verses of his own to the tyrant Hermias 
of Atarneus, his father-in-law, after he was killed by king Artaxerxes III of Persia, in the 
following epigram: “This man in violation of the hallowed law of the immortals / was 
unrighteously slain by the king of the bow-bearing Persians, / who overcame him, not openly 
with a spear in murderous combat, but / by treachery with the aid of one in whom he trusted.”92 
Aristotle thus deplores the cowardly deeds of a king against a tyrant who strove for virtue. Is 
tyranny, then, not always condemnable, even when measured against kingship? If we grant that 
Aristotle truly wrote these poems, then we need to find a legitimate reason why he would defend 
a tyrant over a king. It is not simply because Aristotle valued more his kin, nor because the tyrant 
was Greek and the king Persian, though these could be good enough reasons—indeed, politically 
speaking, patriotism suffices to defend one’s rulers over foreign ones, regardless of their 
morality. Not to muddle our discussion with what Aristotle might have personally felt toward 
Greeks or Persians, we can make a judgment based on what he says in the Politics. 
Aristotle knew that whereas Persian kingship, as a regime, was difficult to change due 
both to its hereditary character and to what he considered the slavish character of barbarians, in 
Greek poleis the citizens were capable not only of overturning rulers but above all of 
 
91 Arist. Pol. 3.14, 1285a20-23 and 1285b2-4. 
92 See Diog. Laert. 5.6. For Hermias’s virtue, see in Diog. Laert. 5.7 the paean Aristotle wrote in his honor. 
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revolutionizing the regimes themselves. In Persia, after the death or murder of a king, another 
absolute king would rise. In contrast, Greek poleis that underwent civil strife often saw not only 
the overturning of rulers but a change of regime, “so that it will be transformed from the 
established one into another sort, for example from democracy into oligarchy or from oligarchy 
into democracy, or from these into a polity or aristocracy, or from the latter into the former.”93 
Therefore, even though tyranny is most dangerous for the citizens, and although it is the lowest 
form of government, not every tyranny is hopeless, and not every tyrant is necessarily evil. In 
fact, it could be argued that the central books of Aristotle’s Politics are devoted precisely to the 
issue of improving tyranny by making it beneficent, or, more importantly, of moving away from 
tyranny—and from all deviant regimes—altogether in the direction of the best regime.94 
Although civil strife (stasis) might lead to a desirable change of regime, gradual and 
peaceful changes are more advisable. In book 5 of the Politics, Aristotle therefore provides two 
important ways of preventing civil strife (stasis). One of them is focused on the distribution of 
offices and hence of political power among the citizens; the other one is based on education, to 
help reconcile antagonistic groups in the city, who hold different views of justice. Regarding the 
first one, I want to point to the seldom acknowledged fact that already in book 4, Aristotle 
introduces a new typology of regimes as he moves from the theoretical discussion of the city, in 
books 1 to 3, to the more empirical solution of the best possible regime in book 4. This shift has 
been eloquently explained by Mogens Hansen,95 whose findings I briefly summarize next. 
One of Aristotle’s most important contributions to the study of regimes is precisely one 
that differs from the traditional six-fold classification of regimes which, as Hansen points out, is 
 
93 Pol. 5.1, 1301b6-10. 
94 See especially Pol. 5.11, 1314a30-b11 and 4.9, 1294a30-b40. 
95 Mogens Hansen, Reflections on Aristotle’s Politics, ch. 1. 
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not Aristotle’s.96 Indeed, though with slight variations, the six-fold typology of regimes already 
appeared in Plato’s Statesman, and another similar version in Xenophon’s Memorabilia.97 
Aristotle’s new approach divides the regimes into two main sorts of regimes, oligarchies and 
democracies, and considers four different types of each one according to their degree.98 The 
“purest” or most extreme versions of both oligarchy and democracy are bad and are closer to 
tyranny.99 On the other side of the spectrum, the “mixed” or lightest versions of oligarchies and 
democracy look more like an aristocracy or a polity, respectively, thus approaching what is best, 
that is, virtue, rather than mere freedom or wealth.100 According to this scheme, the 
aristocracy/polity regime is practically the same, with just slight inclinations toward a more 
oligarchic or a more democratic form of rule, but “it is evident… that they are not far from one 
another.”101 
Aristocracies and polities, which are the least common regimes, take in book 4 of the 
Politics the place of the best regime, though they also fall short of the best regime unqualifiedly. 
Oligarchies and democracies are improved by mixing elements which will bring them closer to 
either an aristocracy or a polity, and away from tyranny, “since of all of them this is least a 
regime.”102 With this typology, Aristotle establishes a new hierarchy of regimes and shows the 
way in which every regime can improve, by distancing itself from tyranny in the direction of the 
best regime. It is noteworthy that kingship is left out from this empirical scheme, probably 
because as Aristotle says, “kingships no longer arise today” except in the form of tyrannies, that 
is, imposed, because “there are many persons who are similar, with none of them so outstanding 
 
96 Hansen, 2. 
97 Pl. Plt. 291c-292a, 302c-d; Xen. Mem. 4.6.12; see also Arist. Rhet. 1.8.3-4, 1365b-66a. 
98 See Pol. 4.4, 1291b13 and 4.5, 1292b12. 
99 Pol. 5.9, 1309b23-34; Hansen, Reflections, 4. 
100 See Pol. 4.8, 1294a10-29. 
101 Pol. 4.8, 1294a29. 
102 Pol. 4.8, 1293b29. According to Aristotle, tyranny “is least a regime” because it is not based on law but on the 
will of the tyrant. 
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as to match the extent and the claim to merit the office.”103 Ideal kingship is extremely unlikely 
because it requires a person outstanding in virtue, whose wisdom would obtain the willing 
obedience of the unwise, who need compulsion rather than persuasion to be ruled. If virtuous 
kingship were to arise, it would be in the form of tyranny. In this sense, to the extent that every 
regime requires compulsion, they are all to a degree tyrannical. 
 
Conclusions 
We have departed from the historical perspective of tyranny to turn to the study of 
tyranny as a philosophico-political concept. Our inquiry has by necessity begun with the political 
understanding of human things, for it is not possible to ascend to the viewpoint of philosophy 
without having looked at the city from its own perspective. Although we have focused on the 
problems that arise from practical matters, we have shown that the solution to these problems 
points to the necessity of philosophy. To restate briefly the practical matters that we referred to, 
we can say that good citizens, especially the more patriotic, are not likely to acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the regimes under which they live. Yet to acknowledge the shortcomings of each 
regime is for all practical purposes the first step toward improving them or setting them in the 
right direction. Since the clearest distinction between regimes is that of legitimate regimes and 
tyranny, to call legitimate regimes into question it is helpful to first look into tyranny and its 
limitations. 
Tyranny is closest to the nature of political things: it does not presuppose that the ruler is 
enlightened or that he knows what the public good is, and subjects are plainly conscious that 
 
103 Pol. 5.10, 1313a5-9. This is not to deny that there are certainly inequalities among citizens in all regimes and that 
some are undoubtedly more competent to rule than others; however, Aristotle here seems to refer to those who were 
“very outstanding in virtue” (Pol. 3.15, 1286b8-14) so that the city could only unjustly legislate over them, for “they 
themselves are law” (Pol. 3.13, 1284a13). 
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there is room for the betterment of the law and the regime. Unlike what happens in oligarchy or 
democracy, in which adherents and rulers assume that their law is supreme and good; in tyranny, 
which excludes all except the ruler from decision making or from giving laws, it is easier to 
acknowledge the violent element of law. Having recognized the violence of law, it is possible to 
see that, at bottom, all regimes are in a sense tyrannical. The discussion of tyranny is thus 
necessary to the extent that it helps us to understand the greatest problems of every political 
regime. In other words, while tyranny is undesirable for all practical purposes, it is theoretically 
useful. 
Besides suggesting that philosophy is necessary to find solutions to the greatest political 
problems, we also said that political concerns are not the primary aim of philosophy. Taken on its 
own, philosophy confronts the city and can potentially raise more problems than it solves. Yet 
from the perspective of philosophy, it is also necessary to understand the city and to help it 
improve. Theoretically speaking, one cannot attain knowledge of human things if one is unable 
to recognize political opinions for what they are. Tyranny is for this reason useful for the study of 
political philosophy. Still, tyranny is not without champions and, from the perspective of 
unenlightened citizens, it can be defended. To see the limitations of tyranny it is necessary to 
understand the presuppositions behind the judgment that tyranny is bad or to prove that tyranny 
is undesirable. In the end, our purpose is not only to discover what just regimes are like but to 
find what is required to make them not only just but also noble. In the following chapter, we will 
address the reaches of tyranny, and in chapter 3 we will speak of the contrasts and similarities 





THE REAL MAN AND THE CITY 
 
Be men, my friends, and take thought of furious valor. 
Homer, Iliad 
 




“When the curse was pronounced, the remains of the original offenders were uprooted 
from their graves and expelled, and their descendants were sent into perpetual exile. It was on 
these terms that Epimenides the Cretan purified the city.” These are some of the first lines that 
have been preserved from the Aristotelian Athenian Constitution, which begins with the narration 
of the sequel to a violent episode in Athenian history, after Cylon’s failed attempt to make 
himself tyrant of Athens in the late seventh century BC.104 Cylon had been a victor at the 
Olympic games in 640. He was powerful and of good birth, and was married to the daughter of 
Theagenes, himself tyrant of Megara. In Delphi, Cylon had been advised by the oracle to seize 
the Acropolis of Athens during the grand festival of Zeus, so he gathered support from his father-
in-law and persuaded his friends to make the attempt.  
The Athenians resisted Cylon’s tyrannical coup and laid siege to the citadel. Cylon and 
his brother managed to escape, but Cylon’s associates, who took refuge at the altar as suppliants, 
were slain, having been led out under the promise that if they surrendered they would be liable to 
any punishment except death. The incident had multiple reverberations in Athenian politics for a 
 
104 Arist. Ath. Pol. 1.1 (P. J. Rhodes’s translation). For the following remarks on Cylon see Hdt. 5.71 and Thuc. 
1.126. 
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long time. As can be gathered from the lines cited above, it was used by some to accuse the 
offenders—of the Alcmeonid family—of committing sacrilege, which tarnished the city. Others, 
however, believed that the gravest offense was the attempt to tyrannize the city. Indeed, because 
of its fervent defense of democratic principles,105 Athens was considered, especially in later 
centuries, the democratic city par excellence—enemy both of oligarchy and tyranny—and the 
democratic spirit of Athenians was thought to date back to its very origins. They adduced a verse 
of Homer’s Iliad as evidence: in the Catalogue of Ships the Athenians are the only people 
referred to as “demos.”106 
Having sprung from the soil they inhabited, Athenians were said to be autochthonous—
the implied assumption being that they were all equal among themselves. Despite their allegedly 
natural egalitarianism, democracy was by no means prevalent when the city originated. As stated 
in the Athenian Constitution, in the early sixth century BC “the Athenians’ constitution was 
oligarchic in all other respects, and in particular the poor were enslaved to the rich—themselves 
and their children and their wives.”107 For a long time, there was civil strife between the notables 
and the masses, the champions of oligarchy and democracy respectively. Due to the continued 
oppression exerted by the notables on the poor and to the exclusion of the rich that were 
politically unprivileged on account of not being well-born, the people rose against the notables 
and the strife became more violent until both factions agreed to appoint Solon as mediator.  
Solon carried out several measures to face agrarian and political discontent, but he ended 
up being hated by the two parties alike, for he did not satisfy their expectations. Although he was 
chosen with a view to reconciling the two conflicting factions, it can be inferred from Aristotle’s 
 
105 Consider, for example, the restoration of democracy after the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, two centuries later, in 
404 BC. 
106 Il. 2.546-47. 
107 Arist. Ath. Pol. 2.2. 
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narration that each party wanted Solon to take sides with them and to overpower the rest of the 
people. Aristotle twice tells us that Solon could have made himself tyrant of the city by taking 
sides with either of the two parties:  
Solon was so moderate and impartial in other respects that, when he could have got the 
rest of the people into his power and made himself tyrant over the city, he instead 
accepted the hatred of both sides and set a higher value on honour and the safety of the 
city than on his own advantage; 
and after five chapters, he again says: 
But Solon was opposed to both; and, while he could have combined with whichever party 
he chose and become tyrant, he preferred to incur the hatred of both by saving his country 
and legislating for the best.108 
More than Solon’s refusal to become a tyrant, what is remarkable about these passages is what 
we can learn about tyranny, at least in the so-called Archaic period of Athens, and about the 
human heart in the political struggle of all times. Tyranny was not understood merely as personal 
rule. Tyranny was a political instrument, albeit unconstitutional, that was used by partisans to 
overpower the opposite faction and to impose their way of governing. By refusing to take sides 
with either party, Solon disappointed those who chose him as their leader. It’s almost as if 
tyranny had been expected as a natural result of Solon’s appointment as archon and mediator. As 
it became apparent not long after his departure, Solon’s reforms did little to restore peace in 
Athens. The instability that ensued allowed Pisistratus to make himself tyrant on three occasions, 
with the support of the people. In the span of thirty-six years, Pisistratus spent nineteen in power, 
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during which he managed to weaken the rival notables. With the power given to Pisistratus by 
the people, he managed to accomplish through tyranny what Solon failed to accomplish through 
changes in the legislation. Because of its equalizing effect, it could be said that Pisistratus’s 
tyranny paved the way for the democratic stability that Athens would enjoy in the following 
centuries. 
By the time of Aristotle, the age of tyrants seemed to have come to an end. As Aristotle 
writes, the reason for this was that popular leaders were no longer experienced in military 
matters, as they used to be in ancient times. Since popular leaders were now experienced in 
rhetoric instead, “they do not attempt anything,” Aristotle concludes.109 But tyranny continued to 
be a threat, so much so that Aristotle recommends a mixed regime to avoid extreme democracies 
as well as extreme oligarchies, all of which are tyrannical. As Aristotle explains, oligarchies also 
turned into tyrannies when military power was given to a single individual or because the 
greatest offices were held by the powerful.110 In well-blended regimes, in which power is not 
given to a single individual but divided among many, and where offices are not held for a long 
time, tyranny and revolutions in general can be avoided. Aristotle’s recommendation to 
implement institutional mechanisms to procure the stability of regimes implies that without those 
mechanisms, both oligarchy and democracy tend to degenerate into extreme forms of 
government, which are fertile soil for tyranny to grow in. Without those mechanisms, ambition 
for power will sooner or later make a popular leader or a powerful notable seek tyranny. 
“Hence,” Aristotle asserts, “we do not permit a human being to rule, but rather law, because a 
human being makes this distribution of things good and bad for himself and so becomes a 
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tyrant.”111 Yet even if there were perfect laws, law needs human implementation. Institutional 
mechanisms may extend the duration of regimes but, according to what we know, all regimes 
will sooner or later become corrupt or perish.  
The classics were plainly aware of the aberrant passions that inevitably and recurrently 
scourge human beings. Although they wished to devote their lives to the contemplation of higher 
things, they understood that it would be a mistake to look away from the life in the city without 
having considered it thoroughly.112 The theoretical life must consider the practical life, for 
“nothing which is practically false can be theoretically true.”113 Selfishness and greed for power 
are permanent elements of political life and a frequent motive of human action: they are part and 
parcel of the nature of political things. While the classics believed that by nature human beings 
could rise above the passions, they were not blind to the fact that only few are able to fulfill that 
nature: most human beings will not desire, let alone lead, a theoretical life. As I will try to show 
in chapter three, the classics were therefore compelled to publicly advance a noble way of life 
that not only fell short of the theoretical life but was in certain respects at odds with it. But before 
we can turn to this last claim, it is necessary to lay a foundation that will help us better 
understand the workings of the city, with special attention to the real man, on whom we focus in 
this chapter. We will also study here the tension between the real man’s way of life (the 
honorable life) and the different parts of the city: private men, lovers of gain, and the tyrant. 
 
I. The Most Pleasurable Life 
In the introductory remarks to Cicero’s De Finibus, he argues that for those who are used 
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to reading philosophy with diligence, no other books are worth reading more than those which 
concern the ultimate aim of human life: “For what problem does life offer so important as all the 
topics of philosophy, and especially the question raised in these volumes—What is the End, the 
final and ultimate aim, which gives the standard for all principles of well-being and of right 
conduct? What does Nature pursue as the thing supremely desirable, what does she avoid as the 
ultimate evil?” Though the discussion of other questions is more popular, as Cicero asserts, none 
is more fecund than this one. Yet “it is a subject,” Cicero continues, “on which the most learned 
philosophers disagree profoundly.”114 We will have the chance to deal more closely with this 
question from the viewpoint of philosophers in the following chapter. 
Before we can move on to study all these matters from the highest point of view, 
following Socrates’s approach to philosophy we must dwell on a more urgent discussion, namely, 
what the final and ultimate aim is not for the few learned but for most human beings—and 
especially for the most public spirited of all, the anēr or real man, whose character and way of 
life we will discuss in this chapter. Indeed, we think that this is what is meant when it is said that 
Socrates brought philosophy down from the heavens:115 that knowledge of the whole must begin 
by studying the human things, good and evil, notwithstanding the conflicting stance toward 
philosophy of the former or the baseness of the later. The human things constitute a whole within 
the whole, a whole whose nature reveals part of the larger whole to which it belongs. 
Let us begin with a few remarks Cicero makes regarding philosophy from the viewpoint 
of the city. Philosophy, according to Cicero, far from being praised, is neglected by most and 
even disparaged by many. Very many do not love philosophy and even some who are not 
unlearned disapprove of studying it. Only very few consider that the study of philosophy can be 
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good; nonetheless, even they do not deem its study fitting for statesmen. The leading citizens of 
the Roman Republic were outspokenly unfriendly toward philosophy because it stood for 
something foreign, but especially because it alienated the patriotic Roman spirit.116 After 
Cicero’s introduction of philosophy, Rome had to wait two hundred years before one of its rulers, 
namely, Marcus Aurelius, could embrace philosophy and write in Greek without having to justify 
himself. And even he, the philosopher emperor, admonished his readers not to hope for Plato’s 
Republic.117 What Cicero says about Rome’s censure of philosophy is by no means limited to 
Rome or to that time in history but, mutatis mutandis, it is valid for all nations even today. 
Cicero’s remarks remind one of the censure against philosophy made by Callicles in 
Plato’s Gorgias. According to Callicles, philosophy “is a graceful thing, if someone engages in it 
in due measure at the proper age; but if he fritters his time away in it further than is needed, it is 
the ruin of human beings.”118 Philosophy, Callicles explains, drives real men away from their 
nature because it prevents them from acquiring the experience necessary to become noble and 
good men (kaloi kagathoi andres) and to have a good reputation in the city. Moreover, Callicles 
continues, it leads to inexperience both in private and public affairs, so that those who continue 
to philosophize well into adulthood are ignorant about the laws of the city and about the speeches 
one must use in association with other human beings. They also ignore human pleasures and 
desires and “in sum they become all in all inexperienced in customs and characters,” Callicles 
concludes, with the result that, on account of their uselessness to the cities, they do not deserve 
praise but are instead a cause of laughter.119  
These and other reasons that will be developed below make clear why, from the point of 
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view of the political man—and of many private men—philosophy is the ruin of human beings. 
As it appears, philosophy is not good but rather harmful as regards political affairs or household 
management. Such opinions of philosophy are perfectly comprehensible from the point of view 
of the anēr or the real man. The Greek word anēr (pl. andres), often rendered simply as “man,” 
is generally used in contradistinction to anthrōpos (pl. anthrōpoi), a mere human being, to 
emphatically express the virile and dauntless character of certain men. Homer reserves the use of 
anēr for heroic deeds, and aneres is commonly combined with the imperative este to instill 
courage in the soldiers, lest they flee from battle: be men!120 In Greek literature, traditionally 
manly deeds are performed by andres, never by anthrōpoi.121  
The word anthrōpos is mostly neutral, used in contradistinction to the gods or to beasts. 
However, when opposed to anēr, it can have a somewhat negative connotation. For example, in 
Xenophon’s Hiero, the poet Simonides tells the tyrant Hiero that “a real man (anēr) differs from 
the other animals in the striving for honor.… But love of honor122 does not arise naturally either 
in the irrational animals or in all human beings (anthrōpoi). Those in whom love of honor and 
praise123 arises by nature differ the most from cattle and are also believed to be no longer human 
beings (anthrōpoi) merely, but real men (andres).”124 Love of honor is the distinguishing 
characteristic of the real man in opposition to animals and to slavish, meek human beings125. The 
noun anēr also shares the same root as the cardinal virtue of fortitude or courage, andreia, which 
could be etymologically translated as “manliness.” Therefore, anēr usually describes a 
 
120 For an enlightening exposition of the nuances between andres and anthrōpoi in Homer, see Seth Benardete, 
Achilles and Hector: The Homeric Hero, Chapter 1. 
121 Contrast, for example, the use of anthrōpos and anēr in Xen. Cyr. 1.4.12 and 1.4.25, respectively. 
122 The Greek term for “love of honor” is philotimia, often translated also as “ambition.” 
123 The Greek phrasing is erōs timēs te kai epainou; both “erōs” and words with the root “phil-” can be translated as 
“love.” 
124 Hiero 7.3; see also An. 1.7.4. 
125 It is worth noting here that from the viewpoint of the city, Socrates is seen as meek or even cowardly ; but from 
the viewpoint of wisdom, he is more courageous than even real men. We will deal with Socrates’s courage in 
chapter 3. 
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redoubtable man who is courageously resolute, fierce in battle, and worthy of receiving honors 
from the city. 
Book 3 of Plato’s Republic seems entirely devoted to the rearing of real men. There, 
Socrates shows Glaucon and Adeimantus that through the appropriate mix of music and 
gymnastic the statesman can properly inform the spirit (thūmos) of real men to become 
courageous (andreios) and keep it from turning too soft or tame, on the one hand, or cruel and 
harsh, on the other.126 The real man’s character is defined by the “proper degree of tension and 
relaxation” between the philosophic and the spirited, or between logos and thūmos.127 How the 
tension between reason and spiritedness is resolved differs depending on whether it is 
experienced by the real man or by the philosopher. It is noteworthy that Socrates leaves aside 
until book 4 the discussion of the desiring part, whose close relation to erōs he studiously 
omits.128 The apparently natural harmony between spiritedness and reason over desire is 
unquestionable only from the viewpoint of the real man. 
Diametrically opposed to the real man is the character of the unambitious man, whose 
description might well accord with that of Socrates or of the philosopher. In book 8 of the 
Republic, Socrates says that the timocratic man is born of an unambitious man “who flees 
honors, the ruling of offices, the lawsuits, and everything of the sort that’s to the busybody’s 
taste, and who is willing to be gotten the better of so as not to be bothered.” That man does not 
rule, he is not serious about money, “and doesn’t fight and insult people for its sake in private 
actions in courts and in public but takes everything of the sort in an easygoing way.” Remiss, 
simpleton, and idle, he is held in small account even by his domestics, to the point that they urge 
 
126 See Rep. 3.410d-411e. 
127 Rep. 3.412a; see also 4.441e-442a. 
128 See Strauss, The City and Man, 111. 
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the son “to be more of a man (anēr māllon estai) than his father.”129 Though gentleness ought to 
be fostered in the city, from the viewpoint of the real man gentleness is a subsidiary aim and, as 
such, it is rather blamed than praised.130 
In contrast, Xenophon’s old Cyrus, who it could be argued is the real man par excellence, 
is described as “most ambitious (philotimotatos),131 with the result that he endured every labor 
and faced every risk for the sake of being praised.”132 We also learn from the Cyropaedia that the 
real man is a lover of victory (philonikos) and, if he is capable enough, he can teach others to be 
continent and to abstain from what is shameful to defeat the enemies: his men do not flee when 
war does not favor them, and they do not plunder when it does.133 The real man practices 
continence: he abstains from pleasures at hand to defeat his enemies and to enjoy more of them 
in the future. The real man is not reckless, for he mixes courage with cleverness, though we must 
note that by cleverness the real man understands to seek virtue not in itself but for the fruits it 
bears, namely, pleasure.134  
If the real man happens to have a less kingly penchant, instead of receiving honors he is 
envied because he seeks to have more than others, and he is blamed and accused of leading a 
shameful life by the many. Yet far from thwarting his enterprises, risks that arise from envy spur 
the thūmos of the real man. The real man is courageous, willing to carry out the enterprises that 
 
129 Rep. 8.549c-550a. 
130 See Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins, interpretive essay to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 265-66. 
131 To be sure, the term philotimos can have a both a positive and a somewhat negative meaning. When negative, it 
is often translated as “ambition” rather than love of honor (see Bartlett and Collins, interpretive essay to Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, 265). From the viewpoint of wisdom, “love of honor and love of money are said to be 
reproaches” (Pl. Rep. 1.347b). Socrates is here referring to the viewpoint of “most decent men” (epieikestatoi); that 
this is the viewpoint of true philosophers and not conventional human beings is hinted by their rejection of honors 
(see Strauss, On Tyranny, 102), and because he cautiously reserves the use of the superlative of epieikēs for the 
philosopher (see Rep. 6.488a2, 489b2; also Joshua Parens, Islamic Philosophy of Virtuous Religions, 36). I must 
note here that Socrates uses again the superlative only when referring to the enslaved part of the tyrant’s soul (Rep. 
9.577d). 
132 Cyr. 1.2.1; also 1.5.12. Xenophon also refers to Agesilaus as philotimotatos, and says that the man who is a lover 
of honor (erastheis tou eukleēs) since youth is justly counted as blessed (Ages. 10.4). 
133 Cyr. 4.2.25. 
134 See Cyr. 1.5.9 and context. 
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mere human beings cannot carry out due to softness, unmanliness, or lack of ambition. What 
good can philosophy bring to a man whose ultimate aim is to receive honors and praise on 
account of his bravery? In the eyes of the real man, philosophy is evidently prejudicial to the 
extent that it weakens the character of men and produces cowardice, which renders them unable 
to rule. The philosopher does not wish to rule and places thought before action, but for the real 
man action is more important than thought.135 Whereas the philosopher considers the discussion 
concerned with the best way of life of the utmost importance, a real man does not waste his time 
on a question whose answer is obvious to him. 
For the real man his own way of life is, of course, the correct and most choiceworthy way 
of life. Moreover, from the viewpoint of the real man it would be unreasonable and negligent to 
spend time discussing the nuances of an evident truth while political matters call for urgent 
solutions. Far from perceiving the philosopher’s way of life as highest, the real man sees such a 
life as deplorable. Socrates’s life would not be in the least attractive to the real man because 
Socrates is poor, powerless, and thus deprived of what the real man deems the greatest—almost 
divine—good, to rule over willing subjects.136 Unlike the real man, the philosopher is 
unambitious: he does not pursue honors or wealth. The philosopher as characterized by Socrates 
is the antagonist of the real man, for the principles he postulates are exactly opposite to those of 
the real man, who loves the city and the honors and praise that it gives in return.137 
To return to Callicles, he takes the side of Euripides’s Zethus, who champions the active 
life, and not of Zethus’s brother, Amphion, who prefers the theoretical life: the correct way of life 
involves action rather than thought.138 Admittedly, Callicles acknowledges that, at a young age, 
 
135 See Arist. Pol. 7.2, 1324a40-b2. 
136 See Xen. Oec. 21.11-12, Mem. 1.6.2-3, 12, 15; see also Pl. Menex. 234a-b. 
137 See Pl. Grg. 481d; for the political man’s rejection of Socrates’s way of life see Strauss, On Tyranny, 199. 
138 See Grg. 485e. 
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the study of philosophy is not shameful but fitting, and can even be admirable. Young men are 
not expected yet to have the experience or the manliness that statesmanship requires. However, 
an older man who flees the agora on account of his philosophical pursuits “surely seems to me,” 
says Callicles, “to need a beating.” Callicles sees the philosopher as little more than an unmanly 
rumormonger, who lives his life “whispering with three or four lads in a corner, never to give 
voice to anything free or great or sufficient.”139  
Despite Callicles’s accusation that Socrates is a “popular speaker,”140 Socrates is wholly 
unconcerned with the opinion of the many, as becomes apparent in the exchange between 
Socrates and Polus. Whether the many agree or disagree with the philosopher is indifferent to 
him.141 Given the resolved and unyielding personality of Callicles, who judges the philosopher 
by his actions only and not by his thoughts, he is unable to distinguish the wise man from the 
slavish human beings that he despises. Since according to his view the apex of human life is the 
political life—specifically the life of the strong man who rules over others—from where he 
stands the philosopher is as reproachable as any other unambitious person. Callicles champions 
the view of the real man tout court, without any necessary connection to the noble and good. 
According to Callicles, to satisfy one’s greatest desires there is no need to rely on the well-being 
of the citizens or be in any way connected to the good of the city. For Callicles, the real man is 
and must be absolutely free.142 
 
139 Grg. 485c-e. 
140 The Greek word is dēmēgoros, a mostly pejorative word that combines dēmos, the people, and agoreuō, to speak 
in the assembly; see Grg. 482c, 494d, and 520b. 
141 See Grg. 474a-b; see also Cic. Tusc. 5.2.6. 
142 In Grg. 483b, Callicles opposes the attitude of the anēr to that of the andrapodon, ‘slave,’ which supports the 
claim that for the real man only he himself is truly free. It is useful to contrast this view of human freedom with that 
of the philosopher. For Socrates, human freedom begins with knowledge of the human things, especially the 
knowledge of the noble, the just, moderation, and courage. Human beings will be slaves as long as they are bound to 
bodily pleasures, regardless of the regime or of the ruler that happens to be in power. Self-rule is more liberating and 
more truly free than rule over others (see Grg. 491d-e). The first step toward freedom is to emancipate from bodily 
pleasures through a good education. Indeed, a good education is the greatest good for human beings (Xen. Oec. 
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The guiding principle of the real man’s way of life is the law of nature as Callicles 
understands it: “nature herself, I think,” he says, “reveals that this very thing is just, for the better 
to have more than the worse and the more powerful than the less powerful.”143 Therefore, 
Callicles argues that laws—established by convention against nature—that purposefully thwart 
the efforts of those whom he thinks are real men by accusing them of immoderateness and 
injustice go against the highest law, the law of nature. Although Callicles briefly acknowledges 
afterwards the importance of becoming good and noble and of having a good reputation,144 
nowhere is it clearer that Callicles sees power and ambition as most choiceworthy than when he 
praises Socrates for suggesting as the only escape from suffering injustice that “one must either 
rule in the city oneself—or even rule as tyrant—or else be a comrade of the existing regime.”145  
Callicles does not seem concerned at all with the means to gain power. Besides, he is 
confident that Socrates is mistaken when suggesting that rule over oneself is important. To the 
contrary, Callicles asserts that moderation and self-control preclude human beings from 
becoming real men. Callicles adamantly argues against Socrates’s position: “he who will live 
correctly must let his own desires be as great as possible and not chasten them, and he must be 
sufficient to serve them, when they are as great as possible, through courage and prudence 
(di’andreian kai phronēsin), and to fill them up with the things for which desire arises on each 
occasion.”146 If the ultimate aim of a man’s life is to be happy, and pleasure brings happiness, 
then the key to the most choiceworthy life lies there, in being strong enough so as to rule over 
 
21.11). Socrates rightly points that “those who are ignorant of [the human things] would justly be called slavish” 
(Mem. 1.1.16). The word ‘slavish’ translates the Greek adjective ’andropodôdês’, which itself comes from 
‘andrapoda,’ “of whom only the feet are human” (see Robert Beekes, Etymlogical Dictionary of Greek, s.v. 
ἀνδράποδα). Socrates’s intention is to show that without knowledge of what is most noble or best there can be no 
freedom. 
143 Grg. 483c-d. 
144 Grg. 484d. 
145 Grg. 510a, my emphasis; see also Arist. Pol. 7.2, 1324b2-5. 
146 Grg. 491e-92a. 
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others, in having more, and in satisfying one’s greatest desires. The greatest and most blessed 
human beings are the strongest because only they can live the most pleasurable life.147  
One cannot dismiss Callicles’s posture out of hand. While for readers used to reading 
philosophy Callicles might seem little less than a caricature of an obtusely unphilosophical man, 
one can hardly accuse his discourse of being altogether inaccurate. To be fair with Callicles, one 
must at least examine his sayings from his own point of view. Let us briefly review his 
disposition toward Socrates first. Though he indeed asserts that the man who continues to 
philosophize past his youth deserves a beating, Callicles does not want to beat up Socrates but 
sincerely intends to open Socrates’s eyes to the effectual truth of things—if I may borrow the 
expression. Two moments in the dialogue can help us better understand his posture. Early on in 
the dialogue, Callicles shows a candid eagerness to continue to listen to Gorgias and Socrates 
discuss: “I don't know if I have ever had such pleasure as now. So for me, even if you should 
want to converse the whole day long, you'll be gratifying me.”148 Whether he agrees or not with 
Socrates, he evidently acknowledges Socrates’s ability with words. During the subsequent 
exchange between Callicles and Socrates proper, Callicles says explicitly that he is fairly friendly 
toward him. A few lines below he even asks Socrates, his friend, not to be annoyed at him, for he 
will speak with goodwill toward him.149 
Whether Callicles is being sarcastic is a moot point; nevertheless, he makes great efforts 
to convince Socrates that the alleged wisdom Socrates professes would easily prove false if he 
were unjustly accused of something and taken to prison, for Socrates would be unable to defend 
himself. Moreover, Callicles argues, Socrates would die if the accuser demanded the death 
penalty for him! Of course, the reader of Plato is plainly aware of Socrates’s fate, that Callicles’s 
 
147 See Xen. Cyr. 7.2.23. 
148 Grg. 483d. 
149 Grg. 485e-86a. 
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hypothesis did in fact occur, and that Socrates was, if not unable, at least unwilling to defend 
himself. How can an innocent man who is sentenced to death be wise and yet incapable of 
defending himself? From the point of view of the real man and, to be sure, of most human beings 
who seek happiness in pleasure, no such man can be considered wise.150 The most pleasurable 
life—for the real man and those who look up to him—is the life of the tyrant.  
But if this is so, a practical problem arises in the city, namely, that only one person can be 
happy. At the same time, the city cannot allow one person to be happy at the expense of the rest: 
just as there is a tension between the philosopher and the city, so there is a tension too between 
the city and private life, as we will see next. Despite the tensions that arise between rulers and 
ruled or private and public life, from the standpoint of the many, the tyrant’s life is most 
pleasurable, hence happiest, whereas the way of life of the philosopher is both contemptible and 
most wretched. 
 
II. The Honorable Life 
“Some Saian exults in my shield which I left—a / faultless weapon—beside a bush 
against my will. But I saved / myself. What do I care about that shield? To hell with it! I’ll get 
one / that’s just as good another time.”151 Surely to lose one’s shield and abandon it is one of the 
most dishonorable acts for a soldier, who is expected to risk his life for the sake of the fatherland 
or, in the case of mercenaries, for the sake of whomever is paying. But not according to 
Archilochus, who in another verse asserts that, when it comes to saving one’s own life, “feet are 
most honorable there.”152 Archilochus’s famous verses at once question the patriotic ideal of 
placing honor above one’s own life and they pinpoint perhaps the most human of all passions, or 
 
150 See Xen. Mem. 1.6.12. 
151 Archil. frag. 5. Douglas Gerber’s translation in Greek Iambic Poetry, 80-83. 
152 Frag. 233, my translation. 
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the most base desire: self-preservation. While the real man vies for honor and is willing to risk 
his life for the sake of praise, as a rule, most human beings would rather be dishonored than lose 
what is most precious to them.  
Not only in matters of life and death can human beings be inclined to put their own 
interest before the common good, it may be that without proper education, training, and laws, 
many human beings would prefer even trivial goods for themselves over the good or well-being 
of others, especially in dire situations. Even if the pristine nature of human beings were 
compassionate, as Plato’s Athenian Stranger and Rousseau could argue, it would not invalidate 
the fact that, as things stand, human beings are in need of both persuasion and compulsion to 
show concern for others, particularly when it is at the expense of their own good.153 The 
requirements of political life—the supreme form of association among human beings154—are in 
tension with the private life or with the life of individuals. Archilochus humorously, and 
blatantly, draws attention to this tension by exhibiting himself as a shameless pragmatist. 
The difficulty in, or the key to, dealing with political things is that human beings straddle 
between selfishness and generosity. As Socrates puts it: “by nature human beings have, on the 
one hand, inducements to friendship… and, on the other hand, inducements to hostility.”155 
Though contrary to each other, friendship and hostility are both essential parts of political life. 
The good of the city depends largely on friendship, that is, on the citizens’ willingness to 
cooperate with one another, and on their contribution to the common good. Hostility ought to be 
avoided within the city, although, properly channeled, it is useful and necessary to defend the 
city from enemy attacks. In any case, political life demands politically virtuous citizens, who will 
abide by the laws and will risk their lives for the fatherland if need be. Therefore, the ruler must 
 
153 See Pl. Leges 4.711c; Arist. Eth. Nic. 10.9, 1180a6-10. 
154 At least according to Aristotle, Pol. 1.2, 1252b28-35. 
155 Xen. Mem. 2.6.21. 
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be concerned with the best way to stimulate citizens to become politically virtuous, which seems 
to be a mixture of praise and honor, on the one hand, when they act nobly, and of punishment and 
fear, on the other, for those in need of coercion.156 While compulsion is inescapable, good rule 
must aim at conferring more honors than punishments, as well as at the appropriate conferring of 
honor—honor, to whom honor is due—for there lies the essence of good rule. 
Since we’ve said that the real man is characterized by his love of honor and praise,157 he 
would seem to be most useful to the city because he is most compatible with good political life. 
Yet most human beings are opposed to the real man and are as such either a burden or a threat to 
the city. As a rule, we can say with Aristotle, that “he who is without a city through nature rather 
than chance is either a mean sort or superior to man; ‘he is without clan, without law, without 
hearth,’” like Homer’s Polyphemus.158 Only life in the city is self-sufficient and can bring the 
numerous benefits that are required to ennoble their lives. The city is necessary to edify human 
beings.159 
However, to profit from the benefits that the city gives, men’s lives need to be molded 
from a rustic or semi-rustic form to a civilized or political one.160 For a founder truly to bring 
about the “greatest of goods,”161 it is not enough to found a city—it must be a healthy city, one 
that provides the right incentives for its citizens to become noble and act honorably, to be willing 
to risk their lives for the fatherland and place the common good before their own good. From the 
 
156 See Xen. Hiero 9.2-4, Cyr. 1.6.10; Pl. Rep. 3.411d-e, Leges 4.711b-c; see also Strauss, The City and Man, 64, for 
his remarks on justice. 
157 See Hiero 7.3. 
158 See Arist. Pol. 1.2, 1253a2-6; also Pl. Leges 3.680b-c. 
159 As Aristotle puts it, “he who is without a city through nature rather than chance is either a mean sort or superior 
to man; he is ‘without clan, without law, without hearth’” (Pol. 1.2, 1253a2-5). Most, if not all, human beings need 
the city to properly develop their human nature. Although at some point the city also sets a limit to natures who are 
exceptionally superior by their excess of virtue, it is doubtful that those natures would flourish without a city. See 
also the reference to Strabo in the following footnote. 
160 See Strabo 13.1.25. 
161 Arist. Pol. 1.2, 1253a32. 
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viewpoint of the city, thūmos is more important than erōs.162 Different human beings need 
different incentives to let go of their well-entrenched attachments or their strongest desires and to 
work in favor of the city. Whereas the real man may be quite comfortable with the demands of 
political life, unambitious private men are more likely to feel disturbed and unwilling to yield to 
those demands. “Lovers of gain,” in turn, will go with some of these demands, so long as they 
can reap some benefit for themselves. The tyrant will use the city to satisfy his own demands. In 
the following subsections we will focus on each of these kinds of men.  
 
PRIVATE MEN 
Plato’s Socrates, in the Republic, states that there are three primary classes of human 
beings: “wisdom-loving, victory-loving, gain-loving.”163 Many human beings, we may suggest, 
are neither victory-loving nor are they gain-loving, but rather something in between: they are 
good-natured and persuadable.164 Though not honorable, they are not necessarily dishonorable or 
base. They share with the philosopher his lack of ambition—they do not want to become rulers 
in the city—yet unlike the philosopher, their interests lie in their family and possessions rather 
than in the quest for truth. They live by opinion and are unable and unwilling to pursue truth 
because they cleave to all that is their own: their family, their property, and their freedom. With 
the real man, many such human beings share the view that pleasure leads to happiness; however, 
they do not identify pleasure with rule or power but with less abstract possessions. Because they 
are not interested in public life, the Greeks referred to them simply as “private” individuals. The 
term is idiōtēs, which may be used in opposition to public spirited men or rulers, in general, or to 
the tyrant in specific cases, for example, in most instances in Xenophon’s Hiero. The Greek 
 
162 See Strauss, The City and Man, 110-11. 
163 Rep. 9.581c. The Greek terms are philosophos, philonikos, and philokerdēs. 
164 See Strauss, The City and Man, 123. 
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idiōtēs also means “amateur” or unskilled, as opposed to a specialist or trained person.165 
The viewpoint of private men is well articulated by Aristippus in Xenophon’s 
Memorabilia: “it is quite senseless,” he tells Socrates, “that it not be enough for a human being 
to furnish himself with what he needs, although this is a lot of work, but instead to take on the 
additional task of procuring also for the rest of the citizens what they need.”166 Aristippus 
identifies himself as a human being, not as a real man, and he has no qualms about it. He does 
not seek honor and, in fact, he sees the pursuit of honor as an unnecessary hurdle to overcome in 
the path of pleasure. He prefers to live as easily and as pleasantly as possible as a private man, 
being only master over his slaves. He rejects all public effort and chooses neither to become a 
ruler in the city nor a slave: he deems himself free from political ties. 
When confronted by Socrates with the inescapable fact that those who choose not to rule 
are subdued by the stronger and become vulnerable to their abuses, Aristippus argues that he 
does not confine himself to any regime but is a stranger everywhere.167 Aristippus refuses to 
acknowledge what for Socrates seems clear, that there is no “middle way” between rule and 
slavery, for one has to either rule or be ruled. To be sure, coming from Socrates, who did not rule 
and thought of himself as freest among human beings,168 this assertion must be taken with a 
grain of salt. Socrates is not speaking in his own name but in the name of the city.169 
From the viewpoint of the city, Aristippus’s cosmopolitanism and his neglect of politics 
are detrimental, for the city is defined in no small part in opposition to its enemies and by the 
 
165 See Xen. Hiero 4.6 and Arist. Pol. 2.7, 1266a31-32; also Strauss, On Tyranny, 121 n. 3. 
166 Mem. 2.1.8. 
167 Mem. 2.1.9-13; see Arist. Pol. 7.2, 1324a16-17. 
168 Xen. Apol. 16. 
169 That Socrates acknowledges a middle way is apparent when he refers to the democrats’ ability to avoid ruling or 
being ruled in Pl. Rep. 8.557e-558a. As to why Socrates acts here as the spokesman of the city I believe has to do 
with his habitude of addressing different people in different manners; not every person is open to a philosophical 
education but can nevertheless profit from a civic education, which will in turn help keep or make the city healthy 
(see Xen. Mem. 4.1.3-5). This tells us much about Socrates’s benevolence, but also about his prudence, of which I 
will say more in chapter 3 (see below the section “Eros and Friendship,” pp. 121). 
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danger of war. As Heraclitus has it, “war is the father of all and the king of all.”170 If all human 
beings in a city were to follow Aristippus’s example, there would be no one to rule or to defend 
the city. They would easily fall prey to foreign attacks and all would be reduced to slavery. While 
Aristippus’s position could be considered plausible from the point of view of private, individual 
men—although Socrates, no doubt, would also question it—his way of life and character are 
politically undesirable, for no city can thrive without honor-seeking men. 
The ruler who aspires to rule a healthy city must count among his main duties to make its 
citizens love their fatherland in the same way that they love their kin. Likewise, he must work to 
make them friendly amongst themselves by straightening their judgment through speeches and 
by directing their actions toward noble deeds, for which he will grant prizes and honors. Far from 
moralistic concerns, what really ought to drive the ruler to guide the citizens in the direction of 
friendship and concord is political expediency, for a city where friendship and concord prevail is 
easier to govern and stronger against enemies.171 Moreover, it is not only beneficial for the 
political community but for the ruler as well, since those who are praised by the ruler will not 
only be persuaded by him but will also hold him in high esteem.172 If Aristotle is right when he 
asserts that “speeches appear to have the capacity to exhort and to incite those youths who are 
free, and to make someone who has a wellborn character and is truly a lover of what is noble 
receptive to virtue,”173 then rulers must try to turn as many citizens as possible to 
gentlemanliness (kalokagathia) so that loving what is noble they will be more easily directed to 
political virtue not through compulsion but through speeches alone. 
When a city is mostly made up of noble and good men there is less need of compulsion; 
 
170 Frag. 53. Laks and Most’s translation in Early Greek Philosophy, 168-169. 
171 See Xen. Mem. 4.4.16 and 2.6.27. 
172 See Xen. An. 2.6.20. 
173 Eth. Nic. 10.9, 1179b7-10. 
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friendship and concord prevail, citizens cooperate with one another and they are grateful to their 
ruler.174 But since the city must also be concerned with its defense against enemies, some 
inducement to hostility is also necessary.175 The ruler ought to encourage contests among citizens 
by inculcating them with love of honor (philotimia), by which they will be stimulated to compete 
against each other for prizes and try to become best at whatever they do, which undoubtedly 
redounds to the benefit of the city too.176 Not only does competition for honors prepare the 
citizens physically to face enemies but also, if the city fares well, men will be more willing to 
risk their lives for it. “Love of honor (philotimia),” Socrates says, “[is] the thing that especially 
spurs one toward what is noble and honored.”177 If all men were to vie for honors nobly, their 
city would soon improve in all areas, from military expeditions, to farming, commerce, choruses, 
or horsemanship.178 Love of honor is a political necessity because it helps to harmonize life in 
the city and makes it strong before its enemies. 
Nevertheless, to enjoin human beings to live a life of honor is problematic to the extent 
that the honorable life conflicts with private life. If in chapter 1 we said that statesmen deem 
philosophy unnecessary for the improvement of politics, and that political philosophy must be 
justified in the eyes of the political community; it could be said, analogously, that conjugal or 
familial life does not require politics, and that political life, accordingly, must be justified in the 
eyes of private men. As we saw in the case of Archilochus and Aristippus, there are unpatriotic 
human beings who are wholly unambitious and would prefer to live as far as possible from 
political life. Their very way of life calls into question Aristotle’s famous assertion that human 
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beings are by nature political animals.179  
As it happens, it could be adduced that Aristotle himself also says that “a human being is 
by nature more a coupling (syndyastikos) being than a political one, inasmuch as a household is 
earlier and more necessary than a city and the begetting of children is more common to 
animals.”180 Similarly, he also holds that “a human being is not only a political but also a house-
holding animal (oikonomikos),” and that among human beings “there would be partnership, and 
justice of a sort, even if there were no city (polis).”181 Conjugal life comes before political life 
and is therefore more necessary than politics. In the household, Aristotle adds, we find the 
springs of friendship, of regimes, and of justice.182 Therefore, for political life to be justified in 
the eyes of private men, it must be in accordance with private life.183  
How difficult it is to justify political life is manifest in Pericles’s funeral speech, which 
we find in Thucydides’s narration at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian War. Pericles 
is faced with the challenge to speak favorably of Athens to the survivors of the war, a war whose 
end is not near and in which they will soon be fighting again. Never is it more necessary to 
justify the political life than when citizens die for the fatherland. And never is it more difficult. 
Rulers are compelled to honor the dead in speech and in deed with extreme care not to offend the 
living who might expect either more or less.184 Funeral speeches often exaggerate the virtues of 
the dead, as Socrates sarcastically remarks in Plato’s Menexenus.185 Yet even exaggerations need 
to be handled with great care, for to praise someone for something he lacks constitutes an offense 
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rather than praise and makes the speaker hateful.186 In truth, it seems that no honor and no speech 
can justify the death of a son or husband to a bereft mother or wife. Whatever the speaker might 
say, “it is hard to speak properly upon a subject where it is even difficult to convince your 
hearers that you are speaking the truth,” Pericles acknowledges in his speech.187 But rulers, 
especially in the middle of war, are compelled to justify the death of valorous soldiers so that 
others will still be willing to die for the fatherland: Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. 
Like Pericles, rulers must praise not only the dead or the living but the city itself, to show 
the reasons why dying for one’s city is worth more than wealth or than any other personal 
blessings. Underlying Pericles’s praise of Athens is the need to make clear that without the 
sacrifice of some, nobody would be able to enjoy the privileges that make all Athenians superior 
to the rest of the Hellenes. Soldiers must therefore choose to die resisting or to live submitting.188 
And when the dangers of war are not imminent, rulers must still emphasize that a life of dishonor 
(atimia) is so unpleasant, so wretched, that it is better to die for the city than to live dishonorably. 
The primitive sense of the word “atimos” was more than mere dishonor: it implied a state of 
outlawry in which the “dishonored” could be killed with impunity.189 Though the legal 
punishment grew milder in time, to be an atimos in the time of Aristotle still meant a loss of 
political rights, and it was used to preserve good morals.190 Moreover, according to Aristotle, 
honor and dishonor were held to affect even a dead person.191 In short, when honor does not 
suffice to spur men’s courage, dishonor must be used to discourage cowardice. 
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LOVERS OF GAIN 
“For a real man, indeed, to become truly good / is difficult, in hands and feet and mind / 
four-square, wrought without blemish.” These lines, ascribed to Simonides by Plato,192 show 
how complicated it is to be a real man who is also noble and good (kalokagathos). If one can say 
that the majority of private men are not real men by defect, because they are not lovers of honor, 
it is also possible to assert that there are human beings who are not real men by excess, because 
they desire more honor than they deserve or—since their understanding of honor is distorted—
because they aim at getting honor from where they ought not or for the sake of something 
base.193 Having looked closely at private men in contrast to the real man, let us now focus on the 
tension between the noble and good real men and base human beings, who are hostile, not 
willing to cooperate with others, and who pursue their own good by any means available. 
While the ruler of the healthy city should try to make the citizens live by Aristotle’s adage 
that reads thus: “one ought not to be courageous (andreion) on account of compulsion but 
because it is noble to be such;”194 he should do so in full awareness that he will not be able to 
persuade either with speeches or prizes those who do not yearn for noble things and are hostile 
toward other members of their own political community. Lovers of gain have an ill-willed desire 
to acquire, they live by passion and pursue base pleasures. Since they are greedy for wealth and 
some also for power, they will promote seditions and make war to be lords of all things.195 It 
would be a mistake to try to exhort these men through a sense of shame or by pointing to the 
noble because, as Aristotle observes, “as for what is noble and truly pleasant, [the many] do not 
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have even a conception of it, never having tasted it.”196 
If the ruler is unable to straighten the judgments of the many through reason, he must use 
coercion, punishments, and above all, instill fear in them, for they cannot be compelled through 
shame but only through fear and to avoid pain.197 To cite Plato’s Athenian Stranger, “every real 
man should be of the spirited type, but yet also as gentle as possible. For there is no way to avoid 
those injustices done by others that are both dangerous and difficult, or even impossible, to cure, 
except to fight and defend oneself victoriously, in no way easing up on punishment.”198 The 
lesson for the ruler is that he must aim at friendship but also find the right balance between 
persuasion and compulsion. It is one of the lessons Socrates taught using Homer’s Odysseus as 
an example.199 
Base human beings cannot be called noble and good real men because, although they do 
want to be honored, to gain recognition they use any means available, whether honest or 
dishonest, and they do not seek to benefit the city but only themselves. More importantly, they 
identify honor less with respect or recognition than with the gifts, wealth, possessions and 
pleasures they can attain thereby, so that they are better described as lovers of gain (philokerdeis) 
than as lovers of honor (philotimoi).200 That calling them lovers of gain is potentially offensive is 
apparent from the fact that in Xenophon’s Hiero, Simonides is silent regarding love of gain.201 In 
contrast, in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus Ischomachus explains the distinction to Socrates thus: 
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“‘For it seems to me it is in this, Socrates,’ he said, ‘the lover of honor [anēr philotimos] differs 
from the lover of gain [anēr philokerdēs]—in his willingness to toil when there is need of it, to 
risk danger, and to abstain from base profits, for the sake of praise and honor.’”202 In other 
words, lovers of gain are not noble because they are unwilling to toil; they are not valiant 
because they do not take risks; and they are not virtuous because they are corrupt. 
In the final chapter of the Cyropaedia, after the death of old Cyrus, Xenophon portrays 
the bleak outlook of a political community made up mostly of men who, without the guidance of 
Cyrus’s rule, have become impious, treacherous, selfish, lawless, greedy, indolent, soft, 
cowardly, and unambitious.203 Through that pithy narration, Xenophon suggests that the springs 
that move human beings when their actions are not properly channeled toward the common good 
are utterly base, to the point that men are willing to betray not only their fatherland but even their 
own family for the sake of gain.204 Base human beings have a vulgar misconception about what 
is good for them and of what is good for the city. They share the view that Callicles attributes to 
the real man, that the greatest good is to satisfy one’s greatest desires, but, it almost goes without 
saying, they think that that good is largely based on bodily pleasures rather than on pleasures of 
the soul, such as love of honor or love of learning.205  
The critical aspect of this way of thinking is that it is dissociated from the common good. 
Whereas the aim of the good and noble real man—to rule over willing subjects—is associated 
with the well-being of the citizens, lovers of gain doubt or deny that there is such a thing as the 
so-called common good: the only good that exists is individual, selfish, and belongs to the 
strongest alone. We thus arrive at an insight of utmost political relevance: most base human 
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beings are unable to distinguish unjust violence from the necessary compulsion every ruler must 
implement. Therefore, they believe that to be tyrant is best for a human being and that tyranny 
itself is not different from any other rule over human beings, except for the number of people 
who exercise power. For that reason, when a lover of gain becomes a tyrant he does not hesitate 
to rule oppressively, trampling over his subjects to satisfy his own desires. The vulgar incapacity 
to distinguish just from unjust compulsion helps to explain why ancient philosophers chose to 
cover the imperfect and violent character of the law with a discreet veil of excellence—to admit 
the occasional need of violence may open the way to the indiscriminate use of violence, or to 
violence which is not used for the common good.206 
Xenophon knew too well the nature of political things to overlook it. Having lived 
several centuries before Virgil, he could not have read Dido’s words in the Aeneid: “Stern 
necessity and the new estate of my kingdom force me to do such hard deeds and protect my 
frontiers far and wide with guards,”207 but he surely would have agreed with them. By “hard 
deeds,” Dido refers to what was stated before, that she must curb haughty tribes with justice.208 
Xenophon’s Simonides, in the Hiero, teaches as much: no ruler can make his city thrive without 
punishments. But he takes it a step further, or maybe two: Simonides tells Hiero that while the 
ruler—not only the founder—ought to award prizes himself, it’s better to command others to 
punish those in need of coercion than to punish them himself.209 Simonides intimates that 
inducements to a life of honor are more credible and look better in a ruler with a good reputation 
and that the infamy of a ruler would prevent many from pursuing honors.  
It is of special interest too that, in contrast to the passage cited from the Aeneid, in 
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Simonides’s advice justice is not mentioned. To be sure, the word “justice” (dikaiosynē) is 
mentioned by Simonides a few lines below, but it specifically refers to contractual relations, that 
is, justice in the private, not the public realm.210 While Hiero laments that he cannot be genuinely 
honored because he is compelled to do injustices, Simonides is far from berating Hiero; on the 
contrary, he comforts him by teaching him when and how to safeguard justice. Hiero must see to 
it that justice in contractual relations alone is rewarded. As for public justice, Simonides leaves it 
open for Hiero to decide when and how to act. One is inclined to think that Simonides’s veiled 
suggestion is that rulers must act unjustly sometimes, with those in need of coercion. Simonides 
only adds that it is Hiero’s mercenaries who will be in charge of punishing those who commit 
injustice and aid those who are unjustly wronged.211 While Hiero will be able to enjoy a good 
reputation among the lawful, he will be feared by those in need of coercion, so that both sides of 
the equation will be considered. 
A ruler who only instills fear in citizens is infamous and hateful, yet one who cannot 
punish but only praise will not last as a ruler. In the Anabasis, Xenophon tells the story of his 
Boeotian friend Proxenus, who from adolescence wanted to become a real man, competent to do 
great things. Not wanting to do injustice and unable to instill fear in his soldiers, he was only 
held in good esteem among the noble and good, but the unjust conspired against him.212 
Speeches alone will never redirect the souls of lovers of gain,213 or as Sophocles has it, “he who 
is not afraid to do some great thing is not frightened by a word.”214 Laws, therefore, must have 
teeth in them: punishment is the counterpart—or sometimes the substitute—of persuasion. 
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Honors and praise are good and useful for the city so long as punishments are also justly 
distributed to those who deserve them. But even more important than punishments, the fear of 
punishment can truly transform or curb lovers of gain. 
Again, in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, Tigranes—who had been the pupil of a wise man215—
tells Cyrus that fear is a greater punishment than actual harm. According to Tigranes, it is less 
effective to inflict harm in deed than to show one’s power to inflict harm, for “fear especially 
subjugates souls.”216 If without fear lovers of gain are a threat to the ruler and to the city, when 
fearful, they even become useful,217 for “fear makes people more attentive, more obedient, and 
more orderly.”218 Therefore, it is more convenient for rulers to induce fear in lovers of gain than 
it is to offer them honors or prizes, for whereas honors foster hopes of aggrandizement in men, 
fear renders men moderate. Fear, indeed, is most necessary to keep lovers of gain in check. We 
mentioned above the fate of Cyrus’s empire after his death, at the end of the Cyropaedia. One 
does well to return to the beginning to ponder again what is told about Cyrus there: although he 
was admired by all, he managed to control such a vast empire through fear.219 
It must be noted here that Xenophon’s older Cyrus could be the sort of real man that 
characters like Plato’s Callicles praise, especially if we believe that his noble goodness is a 
façade. Cyrus would then be a special kind of lover of gain because he is able to exhort others to 
be noble and good by appearing to be noble and good himself, although a ruler of his stature is 
necessarily beyond kalokagathia.220 To sum up, if the inclinations of human beings call for 
political life to drive them away from a merely sensual and beastly life, the nature of political 
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things compels rulers to use both persuasion and compulsion to guide citizens toward the noble 
and the honorable. Fear and rewards are the two basic elements that a ruler must use to make 
human beings meet the requirements of political life.  
 
THE TYRANT 
The tyrant is among the lovers of gain one of a special kind: he already possesses what he 
desires. Having attained power, the tyrant is also close to the real man: he is praised and honored 
above all other human beings. The life of the tyrant appears to reach the pinnacle of human life, 
whether one seeks pleasures or power. Of all men, the life of the tyrant must be most blessed 
because he can both enjoy all pleasures and rule over subjects as he likes. But though the many 
deem the tyrant happiest, for he can enjoy all the pleasures they only dream of, can it be said that 
he is truly satisfied? Instead of houses, fields, or domestic slaves, a tyrant wants cities, extensive 
territories, harbors, and strong citadels.221 The tyrant’s insatiable appetites prevent him from 
being happy. 
Using Xerxes as an example, Cicero points to the necessary unhappiness of absolute 
rulers when their power is not counterpoised with moderation of desire: “though loaded with all 
the privileges and gifts that fortune bestows, he was not content with cavalry, with infantry, with 
a host of ships, with boundless stores of gold, but offered a reward to anyone who should 
discover a new pleasure: and had it really been found he would not have been content; for lust 
will never discover its limit.”222 Rather than finding more pleasures, it seems the only way for a 
tyrant to feel more satisfied is to make his tyranny better so as to rule over willing subjects and 
so be loved by them. For though we said that the tyrant is honored above all other human beings, 
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he is not honored for his virtue but for his strength and power, out of fear and compulsion rather 
than out of true admiration. He must therefore also be fearful of his subjects, for, so long as he is 
not benevolent, there will be more and more people seeking to end his tyranny. 
The tyrant has no friends, only slaves, “for whoever journeys to a tyrant is his slave, even 
if he was free when he set out.”223 The tyrant is thus compelled to secure his reign, especially 
against domestic enemies. Of course, this means that the tyrant may aim at being loved not 
because he is genuinely concerned about his subjects’ opinion about him but because he could 
make his tyranny more stable and less fearful for himself, on the one hand, and to defeat other 
tyrants by surpassing them, on the other. If the tyrant could live a genuinely honorable life, it 
would redound to the benefit both of his people and of himself. In other words, for the tyrant to 
be happy it seems necessary that he make his selfish pursuit coincide at least to some extent with 
the common good. 
The question then arises, whether the tyrant, who to attain power has committed 
innumerable crimes, can turn to a life of honor. Interestingly, among Aristotle’s remarks 
concerning honor and dishonor, he also says that they play an important part in the preservation 
of tyrannies. A tyrant who wants to preserve tyranny by making his rule more kingly ought to 
avoid dishonoring the ambitious (philotimoi), for “a slight involving dishonor bears heavily on 
the ambitious and the respectable among human beings.”224 The improvement225 of tyranny that 
Aristotle suggests is thus summarized: 
[The tyrant] should appear to the ruled not as a tyrannical sort but as a manager and a 
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kingly sort, not as an appropriator of the things of others but as a steward. He should 
pursue moderateness in life, not the extremes; further, he should seek the company of the 
notables, but seek popularity with the many. As a result of these things, not only will his 
rule necessarily be nobler and more enviable by the fact that he rules over persons who 
are better and have not been humbled and does so without being hated and feared, but his 
rule will also be longer lasting; further, in terms of character he will either be in a state 
that is fine in relation to virtue or he will be half-decent—not vicious but half-vicious.226 
What Aristotle proposes is not only a change in the tyrant’s form of ruling but something deeper: 
a change in the character of the tyrant himself. If he says that “the tyrant’s goal is pleasure; the 
goal of a king is the noble,”227 then the tyrant must rechannel his desires, turn to moderation 
(metriotēs), and become, if not virtuous, at least “half-decent.” Aristotle’s suggestion is that the 
tyrant should rechannel his efforts to seek the common good rather than his own, selfish good. To 
address this possible transformation of the tyrant, it is appropriate to return briefly to Xenophon’s 
Hiero for, as it happens, it depicts the conversation with a view to honor between a private man, 
the wise poet Simonides, and the tyrant Hiero.  
Even though the Hiero is a dialogue, before one can have access to the dialectical 
teaching of the text it is appropriate to read it as a rhetorical text, that is, not dialectically but as 
the exposition at length—oratio perpetua—of the two interlocutors. Let me state as concisely as I 
can what I mean by the contrast between a rhetorical and a dialectical reading of a text. I hold the 
view that some texts can be read both as rhetorical or as dialectical texts, as I assert is the case 
with Xenophon’s Hiero. What changes is the reader’s approach. For a rhetorical reading one 
needs to follow the argument continuously without stopping to notice contradictions, gaps, and 
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possible intentions of the speakers. The reader lets himself be driven by the “sails of eloquence” 
rather than rowing himself “with the oars of dialectic.”228 
Although a continued discourse can be delightful, as Cicero says, “when the exposition 
goes rushing on like a mountain stream in spate, it carries along with it a vast amount of 
miscellaneous material, but there is nothing one can take hold of or rescue from the flood; there 
is no point at which one can stem the torrent of oratory.”229 Since the aim of rhetoric is not to 
seek truth but to reach an agreement in consonance with common opinion, vulgar rhetoric “must 
necessarily sometimes be more superficial.”230 A rhetorical reading implies that one does not 
“stop point after point, and make out what each person is willing to admit and what he 
denies,”231 but allows oneself to get carried away with the flow of the text. Therefore, the one 
who unwittingly reads rhetorically assumes that common opinions are correct. In the words of 
Plato’s Socrates, “it escapes the notice of the many that they do not know the being of each 
thing.”232 
One can however choose to consciously read a text rhetorically and only provisionally 
accept what such a reading suggests. The rhetorical reading of a text may be just as valuable as 
the dialectical reading, especially if the former serves as a preparation for the latter. To go back 
to the Hiero, the rhetorical reading stresses its political aim, as opposed to its philosophical aim. 
Since rhetoric is based on opinions rather than on knowledge, its aim is, accordingly, to 
persuade, not to search for the truth. Indeed, the most superficial teaching of the Hiero has 
precisely this politically salutary purpose: to persuade the readers that private life is compatible 
with political life—even in a tyranny—and that honorableness is best. The Hiero shows that it is 
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possible even for a tyrant to turn to honorableness so as to transform his way of ruling from one 
based mostly on violence and fear to a more benevolent one, over willing subjects, which, 
although it does not give up compulsion, is balanced through persuasion. 
We said above in passing that Simonides tells Hiero that the good ruler uses prizes and 
punishments to help mold the people into behaving more honorably. It is better for a city to have 
selfish citizens who vie emulously for honors and a higher social status than selfish citizens who 
are wholly unambitious and lead ignoble lives. While the Hiero presents Hiero’s and Simonides’s 
points of view as two apparently opposed postures, in essence both postures are not only 
compatible but also belong to one and the same view of life, to the extent that their discussion 
revolves non-philosophic pleasure.233 Indeed, the conversation between Hiero and Simonides 
begins with the question about whether the tyrannical or the private life is superior as regards 
“human joys and pains.”234 Because the Hiero does not ask about the best way of life 
unqualifiedly but about the best way of life as regards pleasure, one comes to the conclusion that 
the Hiero is based on the vulgar premise that the good is pleasure. 
Notwithstanding its hedonistic appearance, in the conversation between Hiero and 
Simonides, it is possible to distinguish an ascent of sorts. The first part (chapters 1 through 7), in 
which Hiero leads the conversation, starts with bodily pleasures, but soon makes its way up to 
abstract pleasures, like friendship and love, peace, trust, and most especially honor, none of 
which, Hiero argues, can be enjoyed by the tyrant, mainly due to his constant fear of being killed. 
In the second part (chapters 8 through 11) Simonides takes the lead and speaks almost without 
interruption about the way in which Hiero can in fact enjoy these pleasures and be honored as he 
dreams, without fear, without envy and without danger. The transformation that Simonides 
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suggests is dependent on Hiero’s willingness to give up the pleasures he already enjoys—even 
though Hiero denies enjoying them—to replace them with the pleasure of being genuinely 
honored in the city. Moreover, it requires a shift in Hiero’s attitude toward the fatherland 
because, although Hiero desires to be loved by his subjects, he treats them as enemies. Simonides 
thus advises Hiero to “consider the fatherland to be your estate, the citizens your comrades, 
friends your own children, your sons the same as your life.”235 The honorable life requires that 
the ruler and the citizens alike extend the love they feel for their own, their family and friends, to 
the fatherland.236 
In this way, the rhetorical reading of the Hiero serves to educate the readers by placing all 
the emphasis on the refinement of pleasure with a view to honor and the entailing extension of 
love of one’s own to love of the fatherland. Nevertheless, since rhetoric is wholly dependent on 
common opinion, it cannot lead to a higher ascent. Read rhetorically, the Hiero does not educate 
in the highest sense because it does not transcend the boundaries of the hedonistic plane. It does 
not involve a genuine conversion on the part of the reader just as it does not involve a genuine 
conversion of the tyrant himself.237 Even so, the rhetorical reading of the Hiero has in and of 
itself valuable insights, necessary to understand the nature of political things, the low truth of 
politics. The rhetorical reading alone points to the necessity of persuasion and compulsion for 
successful rule. Also, if one sticks to the rhetorical reading of the Hiero, one can readily 
appreciate that it imitates political life, for it reproduces the reaches and limitations that the 
nature of political things inevitably imposes on human life. Carefully assessed, it obliquely 
unmasks the limitations of rhetoric when confronted with politics in general, but especially when 
confronted with tyranny. In political matters, the Hiero subtly suggests, persuasion is never 
 
235 Hiero 11.14. 
236 Consider Pl. Rep. 3.414e and 5.463b-c. 
237 See Strauss, The City and Man, 93. 
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enough: Hiero’s last response is silence. The rhetorical reading, even if only as an afterthought, 
raises the question as to whether Hiero or any other tyrant would in fact be able and willing to 
undergo the suggested transformation. It points to the need of a more careful analysis, which can 
only be done by reading the text dialectically.238 
One cannot conclude that Hiero’s silence means agreement or disagreement with 
Simonides. Yet his silence is meaningful because it opens, for the attentive reader, the question 
about the most choiceworthy way of life not only as regards base human pleasure but 
unqualifiedly. The wise man is obviously aware of the obstacles the tyrant would need to 
overcome and, more importantly, of the limitations that a beneficent tyranny, were it to come into 
being, would inevitably face. Even a beneficent tyranny should be compared not with private life 
simply, but with the private life of the wise man. One is thus prompted to pose the question of 
whether Simonides’s proposal is meant seriously. Or more precisely, one must wonder about 
Xenophon’s intention in writing this dialogue.239 It becomes necessary to look at the 
phenomenon of tyranny not from the viewpoint of the city but from the viewpoint of the wise 
man. What is clear, however, is that given the nature of political things, any discussion regarding 
the most choiceworthy way of life must consider the tyrant’s life as a serious option. 
For now it must suffice to suggest that the tyrant’s life as presented in the Hiero points to 
the limit, to the boundary that political life cannot transcend. Within that limit, perhaps the 
tyrant’s life, if he becomes benevolent, is after all the most choiceworthy way of human life. Yet 
all humans are by nature capable of thinking beyond the city and its inherent limitations. The 
perfection of human nature entails questioning and transcending political life. Just as the basest 
human beings without laws and education can fall well beneath the life of beasts, well-educated 
 
238 We offer such a reading in the next chapter. 
239 To cite Leo Strauss, “a pupil of Socrates must be presumed to have believed rather that nothing which is 
practically false can be theoretically true” (On Tyranny, 99). 
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human beings whose virtue is outstanding can aspire to be above the city’s laws, and become 
almost divine or partake of divinity by attaining wisdom, the greatest good of all.240 The most 
choiceworthy way of life need not be limited to the all-too-human. To round off with a few 
words from Aristotle, “such persons can no longer be regarded as part of the city. For they will 
be done injustice if it is claimed they merit equal things in spite of being so unequal in virtue and 
political capacity; for such a person would likely be like a god among human beings.”241 Such a 
person is the subject of the next chapter. 
 
Conclusions 
We have thus far seen that the most pleasurable life is the desire of the real man and of 
most human beings. We argued that pleasure, however, is not a good guide toward political life if 
it is base, and that, according to the ancients, pleasure ought to be refined for it to be compatible 
with political virtue. The sublimation of man’s passions results in the honorable life, the best life 
to which the city can aspire. Though imperfect, the honorable life is better than life without the 
laws and restrictions that the city imposes. While it is true that it demands the greatest sacrifice, 
to die for the fatherland, it also promises the greatest good available for the many, to be ruled 
honorably. The honorable life is very different from the philosophic life and even at odds with it 
at times, as we will see in the next chapter, yet ideally it may coexist with the philosopher and 
make it possible at least for some to follow the path of the theoretical life.242 Whether political 
life leads to that path or blocks it, political philosophy must all the same begin its pursuit by 
studying the nature of the city.  
 
240 Xen. Mem. 1.6.10; also Strauss, On Tyranny, 85 and 200. 
241 Pol. 3.13, 1284a8-11. 
242 If not themselves, then perhaps their sons might choose a philosophic path. This goes well with one of the 
definitions Leo Strauss gives of political philosophy, as “the attempt to lead the qualified citizens, or rather their 
qualified sons, from the political life to the philosophic life” (What Is Political Philosophy?, 94). 
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As we mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the study of the real man, of regular 
private men, of lovers of gain and of tyrants is not a detour from the study of wisdom but a 
necessary starting point. Our purpose in looking closely at all individuals that make up the city, 
with their desires and aspirations, their weaknesses and their limitations, is not to look down on 
them or to reprove them morally. Instead, our purpose is to understand without judgment the 
human things as they are and to know common opinions both to be able to benefit political 
communities and to have a solid starting point in the search for truth. The quest for truth is not 
dissociated from the effectual truth of things, and knowledge of the city, of men, of opinions, is 
already part of the truth that the philosopher seeks. In chapter 3 we will focus on this quest by 
looking at the life of the philosopher in comparison to the life of the tyrant from a philosophic 
standpoint. While we will address the problem of the most choiceworthy way of life, at the heart 
of our discussion, to continue our ascent, will be the investigation of tyranny not as a political 





THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE TYRANT 
 
There is no horror, so to speak, 
no suffering, no god-sent affliction, 
whose burden man’s nature might not bear. 
Euripides, Orestes 
 





In Plato’s Phaedo we learn about Socrates’s last words to his friends that were present at 
the sweet-and-sour scene of Socrates’s death and who witnessed as he drank the cup of hemlock. 
Though Phaedo relates that during their last conversation he experienced a strange mix of 
pleasure and pain, when the final moment came, all, except for Socrates, were burdened with 
sadness and burst into tears—even the assistant of the Eleven, the executioner who was in charge 
of preparing the poison and of commanding the sentenced to drink it, left crying.243 The contrast 
between Socrates’s undaunted poise and the resigned despair of his companions forcefully 
portrays the difference between the political and the philosophic way of life. Only the 
philosophic way of life is truly free and blessed. Yet it’s disconcerting to call Socrates’s life 
either free or blessed precisely at the moment when his life was cut short because he was 
unjustly sentenced to die. How could he be free if he spent his last days in prison? Likewise, no 
one in their right mind would call such a man blessed, especially when in the eyes of regular men 
 
243 Pl. Phd. 59a, 115d-118a; compare the death of Theramenes in Xen. Hell. 2.3.47-56. 
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he had lived a wretched life.244 The Socratic or the philosophic way of life cannot be properly 
assessed from the standpoint of the city. 
In order to assess the philosophic way of life, it is necessary to turn to Socrates’s 
philosophic teachings. Since Socrates did not leave us any writings, to have access to his 
teachings we must resort to the teachings of his pupils, namely, Plato and Xenophon. But anyone 
familiar with their writings knows that they are filled with political lessons, for Socrates 
constantly conversed about “human things,” which for him entailed the discussion of political 
life and of all things concerned with the city.245 To be sure, the political and the philosophical 
appear as intimately intertwined, but for the purpose of analysis it is possible to separate the two 
realms by discerning the difference between their goals. The highest goal of the city or the aim of 
politics is the well-being of the political community—even in the case of tyranny for, as we have 
seen, the happiest tyrant must concern himself with the common good. Philosophy, in turn, is the 
quest for wisdom and its highest goal is to attain truth. If in chapter 2 we have looked at 
philosophy from a political perspective, in this chapter we will center our attention on the 
philosophic way of life, for which we shall study the city from a philosophical perspective.  
A question that might immediately arise is, why should a philosophic pursuit begin with 
the study of the city? Or why should the center of our investigation be to understand the way of 
life of the philosopher, a practical matter, rather than a theoretical one about higher things? To 
answer this question, we must remember Socrates’s philosophical approach. The quest for 
wisdom is the quest for knowledge of the whole or the quest for knowledge of the nature of all 
things.246 Socrates became aware that knowledge of the whole must begin with knowledge of 
 
244 See, for example, Xen. Mem. 1.6.2-3; also Pl. Phd. 65a. 
245 See Xen. Mem. 1.1.16. 
246 See Strauss What Is Political Philosophy?, 11. 
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oneself, and that knowledge of oneself entails knowledge of the human things.247 Since the aim 
of Socrates’s investigations is not the human things for themselves but with a view to the whole, 
he sought to understand the natural hierarchy that exists within the human things as well as the 
place that human things occupy within the whole.248 For Socrates, a proper investigation of the 
human things cannot disregard the distinction between good and bad, and more importantly, it 
cannot overlook the relation between the high and the low.249 
Socrates’s quest for wisdom is inextricably tied to knowledge of human things, hence 
also to political life. If we can trust Diogenes Laertius’s testimony of how Socrates “hunted” 
Xenophon, then it is likely that Socrates sought young men to teach them how human beings 
become noble and good.250 Xenophon himself depicts his Socrates as “not inexperienced in the 
hunting of human beings” and willing to teach Critobulus how to “hunt after those who are both 
noble and good.”251 According to Xenophon, Socrates believed that knowledge of the human 
things “makes one noble and good.”252 Therefore, although we aim at understanding the 
philosophic way of life, the study of the political way of life is not only unavoidable but also 
indispensable from a Socratic viewpoint. 
 
247 See Xen. Mem. 4.2.24-31, Cyr. 7.2.19-24, Cyn. 12.16; also Pl. Phd. 96e-100b, Phdr. 229e-30a. 
248 See Strauss, Natural Right and History, 122-24. 
249 See Xen. Mem. 3.1.9, 4.2.26, 4.5.12, 4.6.1; also Arist. Eth. Nic. 7.11, 1152b3. To be sure, Xenophon does not 
mention “high and low” explicitly, but he does say that for Socrates “conversing was named from the collective 
deliberation of those who come together and discriminate affairs according to class” (Mem. 4.5.12). To discriminate 
according to class implies not only separating (as the active verb dialegō primarily suggests), but also ordering 
things. Both the verb dialegō and especially the expression kata genē have a connotation of “order” which is only a 
small step away from rank (see Xen. Oec. 8.9). In Mem. 3.1.7-9, the adjective taktikos and the verb tattein are 
explicitly used; while they seem to refer simply to the “tactics” of a general and his “ordering” of troops, Socrates’s 
criticism of the general’s teachings is that he did not teach the most important “ordering,” namely, the distinction 
between good and bad or between noble and counterfeit, where there is an obvious hierarchy. In connection to this 
use of tattein, see also emprosthen tetaktai physei and takteon in Pl. Leges 1.631d, with special attention to the 
modifier physei, “by nature.” 
250 See Diog. Laert. 2.48. 
251 Mem. 2.6.28-29. 
252 Mem. 1.1.16. The Greek is kalos kagathos, which is generally translated as “(perfect) gentleman,” or, more 
literally, also as “beautiful and good.” Although I will not translate kalos as “beautiful” here, one must not forget 
that kalos also carries that meaning. 
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Awareness of Socrates’s inclination toward the study of human things helps explain his 
interest in noble and good human beings and could justify why a philosopher would accede to 
help found, in speech, the best regime. However, such awareness does not by itself unveil the 
place that noble goodness—that is, kalokagathia—occupies within the philosophic mindset. It 
also does not suffice to explain why the philosopher, although he does not wish to engage in 
political affairs himself, considers it both reasonable and desirable to make others fit for political 
affairs.253 More importantly, however, awareness of Socrates’s interest in the human things fails 
to explain why Socrates, through his allegedly noble teachings, won the enmity of the city to the 
point of being sentenced to death. Why would a man, so praised by his companions, be accused 
of teaching them “to be doers of mischief and skilled at tyranny”?254 
There are reasons to suspect that Socrates’s teachings have a stronger connection with 
tyranny than what appears at first or than one would be easily willing to accept. The 
commonplace perception that philosophy is supposed to be politically educative and that it must 
be primarily concerned with the common good has played a part in misconstruing Socratic 
philosophy, with the result that our approach to the ancients is biased. Until we explore the city 
in terms of the quest for truth, we will be unable to unveil the sincere judgment of political things 
from the philosopher’s point of view. And unless we look at the philosopher’s life from his own 
perspective, we will remain ignorant of the true status of political life from the point of view of 
wisdom. This means that we shall look at the regimes not from a political perspective but from a 
theoretical perspective, to study the way of life that each of them represents. 
Consequently, our purpose in this chapter is twofold. In the first section, we wish to 
explain the philosopher’s view of the city to understand the status of political life at its best from 
 
253 See Mem. 1.6.15, 3.7.9. 
254 Mem. 1.2.56. 
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a philosophical perspective. Political life at its best entails the study of the virtuous life, a way of 
life without which there can be no good city, as well as its link to the noble. By emphasizing that 
the virtuous life of the city is a concession, we want to point to the limits of the political life—
even at its peak—and to the superiority of the philosophic way of life. In the second section, we 
will look at the philosopher’s view of tyranny to show the traits that distinguish the philosophic 
from the tyrannical nature, as well as the traits they share in common. Having established the 
link between tyranny and philosophy, we will look back at the philosopher’s way of life to 
evaluate whether he is truly blessed and to shed light on his relation to the city. 
 
I. The Virtuous Life  
DIFFERING TRUTHS 
“I, who know the good, will speak to you, Perses, you great fool: / To choose Vice, even 
in abundance, is easy; / for the road is smooth, and she lives nearby; / but before Virtue the 
immortal gods have set sweat, / and the path to her is long and steep, / and rough at first—yet 
when one arrives at the top, / then it becomes easy, difficult though it still is.” Hesiod dedicates 
these words to his brother Perses to persuade him to choose the strenuous but noble path of 
Virtue rather than the easy and ignoble path of Vice.255 Xenophon’s Socrates cites some of these 
lines in his dialogue with Aristippus and observes that noble and good works are only attained 
through endurance.256 Plato’s Adeimantus also cites them after saying that speeches in prose and 
by poets alike “with one tongue they all chant that moderation and justice are fair, but hard and 
full of drudgery, while intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire, and shameful 
 
255 Op. 286-292. 
256 Mem. 2.1.20; see also Cyn. 12.18. 
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only by opinion and law.”257 So rough is the path to virtue that a life of vice would seem to be 
more natural for most human beings. 
Likewise, both the prevalence and recurrence of vice point to its apparent naturalness. 
Just as it is natural for plants to grow or for fire to burn, without laws and compulsion human 
beings seem to be naturally vicious. In Plato’s Laws, however, the Athenian Stranger—ahead of 
Rousseau—argues to the contrary. He alludes to the naïve simplicity of pre-political men, and to 
their seemingly natural goodwill toward each other.258 But then again, the reason why those men 
keep peace among them is that they rely on an economy of plenty. Their good mutual disposition 
is owed to the fact that they live neither in wealth nor in poverty, both of which breed insolence 
and injustice. While it is true that a favorable environment positively affects human behavior, the 
view that nature determines the characters of human beings denies freedom of human action. It 
disregards the most significant trait of human beings, that we possess reason, and that we are in 
consequence free to choose a path of vice or virtue, regardless of the circumstances. 
But whether vice or virtue are natural is difficult to ascertain, because there is no 
complete agreement as to what is natural when it comes to defining human nature. That the 
natural can be defined as that which is not made or caused by human intervention reveals the 
potential opposition between the natural and the human. The concept of human nature is 
problematic to define precisely because it is not always in accordance with nature or, more 
exactly, because reason is natural in human beings but reason may guide actions that are against 
nature.259 In view of this, Aristotle recognized that sound human reason stands above nature: 
“For men act in many ways contrary to their habituation and their nature through reason, if they 
 
257 Rep. 2.363e-64a and 364d. 
258 Leges 3.679a-c. 
259 Though, of course, men may act against nature as a consequence of imperfect reason (which I believe is a 
characteristic trait of modernity, in its eagerness to dominate nature), here I mean that even informed reason can do 
so too, but with a higher and correct end in mind, namely, to enhance or perfect human nature. 
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are persuaded that some other condition is better.”260 To stand above nature, however, does not 
mean that reason is always against nature. It means that human beings do not have to conform 
themselves with nature if they judge, through correct reason, that a better option is available.261 
The very fact that we can judge, not by nature but by reason, what is better or worse sets 
us apart from the rest of the animals, which are non-rational. Whereas “a brute animal has neither 
vice nor virtue,”262 human beings are capable of virtue and vice because we can tell the 
difference between good and bad. For classical political philosophers, the determination of good 
and bad was ultimately grounded in reason, with a view to human telos. They believed “it is best 
to be taught the good from nature itself,”263 and they thought of human nature as the fulfilling of 
our end, and “reason and intellect are the end of our nature.”264 Though neither Plato nor 
Xenophon ever defined human nature in such terms, they are of the same mind in regard to 
Aristotle’s teleological understanding of man. In other words, they agree that the human good is 
defined with a view to the correct ordering of the human soul, which by necessity, if it can be 
accomplished, results in having a good life as a whole. 
From the teleological understanding of human nature a hierarchy of goods can be derived 
and, with it, also a hierarchy of ways of life.265 Since for classical political philosophers human 
telos is grounded in reason and good things are defined with a view to it, they held that the 
greatest good is wisdom and the best way of life is one devoted to the pursuit of wisdom or the 
 
260 Pol. 7.13, 1332b6-8. 
261 See Arist. Eth. Nic. 2.1, 1103a18-26. For the rendering of orthos logos as “correct reason,” see Bartlett and 
Collins’s note 4 to Eth. Nic. 2.2, 1103b32. Besides this first use of that expression, I have traced six other passages 
of Eth. Nic. where it appears: 3.5, 1114b30; 3.11, 1119a20; 6.1, 1138b20-35; 6.13, 1144b24-30; 7.4, 1147b3-4; 7.8, 
1151a12. 
262 Arist. Eth. Nic. 7.1, 1145a15. 
263 Xen. Cyn. 13.4. Michael Ehrmantraut and Gregory A. McBrayer’s translation in The Shorter Writings. 
264 Arist. Pol. 7.15, 1334b15; see also 1.8, 1256b21-22. 
265 See Pl. Leges 1.631b-d, 7.803a-b; Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, 139. 
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search for truth, whereas a life without toil, devoted to ill-suited pleasures is by nature worst.266 
Aware of the greatest human truth, they were nevertheless not blind to the apparent truth 
imposed by the brutal reality produced by unscrupulous and ambitious men. They could not deny 
that only very few natures are in actuality apt for the pursuit of wisdom,267 and that human life is 
much more often stamped not by wisdom but by base desires. Furthermore, they were aware that 
as a result of our failure to perfect human nature, most human beings are bound to disbelieve or 
outright deny our teleological nature as well as the consequent inequality that exists among 
human beings. 
The prevalence of base ways of life implicitly denies the natural telos of human beings 
and refutes that wisdom is the greatest good. For one, Plato’s Gorgias—who is the representative 
of a widespread opinion—deemed that the greatest good “in truth” is rhetoric, for it is “the cause 
both of freedom for human beings themselves and at the same time of rule over others in each 
man's own city.”268 Gorgias, like Polus and Callicles after him, equates the good with power, not 
with wisdom. Power as such is indifferent to vice or virtue. While Gorgias’s assertion is called 
into question by Socrates, it nevertheless unveils the affections that more often drive human 
beings.269 It uncovers the nature of political things—more bluntly expressed by Callicles—
according to which human life is guided by passion and toward action rather than by reason and 
toward thought. The nature of political things powerfully confronts the truth that “all human 
beings by nature stretch out toward knowledge.”270 The political realism that Gorgias stands 
for—which modernity would embrace as the “effectual truth”—questions the truth of 
philosophy. Political philosophy is the battleground where these differing accounts of truth might 
 
266 See Xen. Mem. 4.5.6, Cyn. 12.15. 
267 See Pl. Rep. 6.491a-b. 
268 Gorg. 452d. 
269 See Arist. Eth. Nic. 3.1, 1111b1-3. 
270 Arist. Met. 1.1, 980a21. Joe Sachs’s translation (2002). 
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be reconciled. 
Going back to Hesiod’s passage regarding the contrast between virtue and vice, we may 
see that the philosophic truth, which stretches out toward wisdom and is grounded in virtue, 
stands above the nature of political things and may illuminate life in the city. At the same time, 
however, we are compelled to accept that, though inferior, the political reality is stronger at least 
insofar as it is more prevalent.271 Therefore, it cannot be ignored or neglected or erased. Plato 
and Xenophon accepted it as the inevitable reverse side of their own truth. However, they 
thought it wiser to be as silent about its inevitability as possible, on the one hand, while they 
found a noble way to attenuate it, on the other. That way is the path of political virtue that leads 
to noble goodness or gentlemanliness (kalokagathia), which we will address below. Let us speak 
first of the refinement of political virtue. 
 
POLITICAL VIRTUE AND THE NOBLE 
“You have heard in Homer what the Sirens chanted to Odysseus,” says Socrates to 
Critobulus, “which begins somewhat as follows: ‘Come here, much-praised Odysseus, great 
glory of the Achaeans.’” To Critobulus’s ensuing question, whether the sirens chanted this 
incantation to other human beings too, Socrates responds: “No, but they chanted in this manner 
to those who love the honor accorded to virtue.”272 Though the Greek may be rendered 
differently, as Amy Bonnette notes in her translation, the essence of the passage is the same: not 
all honor is gained through virtue. That this is true is apparent from the fact that there are corrupt 
cities and bad regimes that honor vicious men as long as they are willing to gratify and flatter the 
 
271 See Pl. Leges 3.690b. 
272 Xen. Mem. 2.6.11-12. 
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rulers of such cities and contribute to the preservation of their regimes.273 Corrupt and dissolute 
cities breed and honor corrupt and dissolute citizens. Even disreputable tyrants can be 
“distinguished in honor from other human beings.”274 Honor per se is not a reliable standard for 
goodness because the standard for honor is not philosophic. 
We have said that only life in the city is self-sufficient and apt to ennoble the members of 
the political community, and that honor is the cornerstone of political life. Although honor “is 
pretty much the end of the political life,” from the standpoint of philosophy honor is primarily a 
means to cultivating virtue. For decent men, it does not suffice to be honored simply but they 
need in addition “to be honored by the prudent.”275 Virtue is higher than honor. Or, as Aristotle 
also says, “honor is the prize of virtue and is assigned to those who are good.”276 The good city 
must therefore aim at teaching virtue alongside the inculcation of honor, for only with a view to 
virtue can honorableness constitute something more than mere partisanship. The overarching 
character of virtue helps to moderate the view that justice is what a part of the city says is its own 
advantage; it redirects justice toward the common good. The guidance of virtue contributes to the 
right orientation of the city’s goals just as it helps order the different parts of the human soul. 
Although in extreme situations rulers might not be able to rely solely on noble acts to 
foster the good of the city—enemies might constrain cities to commit atrocious deeds—for the 
most part rulers should direct their citizens toward nobility. In the words of Aristotle, “the 
political art… exercises a very great care to make the citizens of a specific sort—namely, good 
and apt to do noble things.”277 A minimum of decency is necessary to make the individual private 
good compatible with the common good to some degree. However, the problem arises that while 
 
273 See Pl. Rep. 4.426c. 
274 Xen. Hiero 7.4. David K. O’Connor’s translation in The Shorter Writings. 
275 Arist. Eth. Nic. 1.5, 1095b24-26, 28-30; see also 8.8, 1159a22. 
276 Eth. Nic. 4.3, 1123b35-36. 
277 Eth. Nic. 1.9, 1099b30-32. 
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rulers can promote virtue, they cannot prevent citizens from using alleged virtue for depraved 
ends. In Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, we even witness Cyrus encouraging his soldiers to practice 
virtue and sacrifice present pleasure to acquire wealth and enjoy more pleasures in the future. He 
tells them that he doesn’t “think that human beings practice any virtue in order that those who 
become good have no more than do the worthless.”278 If those who fail to recognize wisdom as 
the highest good choose to pursue virtue it will be with a view to utility alone (toward wealth, 
power, or pleasures), with the result that their purported virtue can hardly be considered genuine. 
While human beings who are guided by ambition or by opinion—as opposed to correct 
reason—may seem virtuous because they can endure pain and are willing to make great 
sacrifices, such as those that war demands, nothing guarantees that their sacrifices will be made 
for the sake of being virtuous or for the common good. It is true that from the viewpoint of the 
city it is of little or no importance what the inner motivations of the citizens are, so long as the 
city fulfills its purpose. But can the city fulfill its purpose if citizens only seek their own 
advantage?279 According to the classics, to see virtue as a means is dangerous—unless virtue is 
directed toward wisdom—because those who aim for virtue will do so to gain advantage over 
friends.280 Since most human beings do not live for the sake of becoming wise, it is best to teach 
political virtue as an end in itself and not as a means for something else. 
Perhaps nothing can be done in the city to ensure truly virtuous behavior and only the 
philosophic way of life can turn souls in the right direction. Since political virtue is insufficient 
when it comes to procuring the right ordering of the human soul, one must rest satisfied with 
however much the city can attain. But even if no city will ever hit the mark, a good city must aim 
at virtue, for the good life in the city cannot be attained without it. Even though very few human 
 
278 Cyr. 1.5.7-9. 
279 Only in modernity would such a view gain prevalence. 
280 Although virtue is not mentioned there, see Menon’s example in Xen. An. 2.6.21-28; see also Cyr. 1.6.32. 
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beings are apt or willing to turn to a philosophic way of life, the alternative need not be the 
opposite extreme. Fortunately, such is human nature that, notwithstanding limitations, human 
beings are moved by the desire for improvement. Human beings are willing to cooperate with 
one another for the sake of a better life. In the words of Bartlett and Collins,  
if the political community habituates us to accept the view that the preservation of its 
good is ”nobler and more divine” than the attainment of our own, it must be said that we 
are creatures peculiarly open to such habituation; we are by nature “political animals,” in 
part because we can be deeply moved by considerations of what is noble and divine.281 
Therefore, the political community that wants to turn the city into a good city can take advantage 
of human sociability and nourish the inclination toward the noble and the divine. By tying honor 
to virtue and virtue to the divine, the city can aspire to a life that comes closer to the best way of 
life. 
Having shown a way in which political virtue may attenuate the force of the nature of 
political things, now we must add that while political life civilizes human beings, it is unable to 
educate them to the highest degree. However refined political virtue might come to be, the 
improvement it furthers is one of degree only: political virtue will never match the virtue of the 
philosopher. Political virtue at its best points to the noble, and while the noble is akin to 
philosophic virtue, we must keep in mind that political and philosophic virtue belong to different 
realms because the former is determined by the end of the city, whereas the latter owes its 
character to the end of man.282 
 
281 Bartlett and Collins, interpretive essay to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 250. 
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As far as the refinement of political virtue goes, what must be aimed for is to cause the 
greatest benefits to friends and the greatest harms to enemies. Although from the standpoint of 
philosophy producing harm belongs to vice rather than virtue, to produce harm to enemies is not 
altogether vicious when the good of the city is at stake. Especially for the sake of fighting 
enemies, the city should strive to make its citizens good and noble, for good and noble enemies 
are more difficult to fight against.283 Moreover, harming enemies may indeed be noble if it 
produces in them a change for the better. For enemies may even assist other human beings if they 
choose to act more as correctors, making them prudent, than as enemies.284 Indeed, unlike vices, 
noble and good enemies can prove to be beneficial to human beings: 
Enemies, when they are gentlemen and have enslaved others, have in fact compelled 
many to become better by moderating them and have made them live in greater ease in 
the time remaining to them; but these mistresses285 never cease to plague the bodies, the 
souls, and the households of human beings as long as they rule over them.286 
The greatest enemy of man and city is vice. Because the end of political virtue is the good of the 
city as a whole but the city exists for the sake of individuals, and not the other way around, 
political virtue must consider as well, though indirectly, the good of individuals. Political virtue 
cannot turn citizens to philosophic virtue, but it must seriously try to make citizens noble and 
good. In this final sense, political virtue shows simultaneously the limit of political life as well as 
its connection to philosophy, its connection to the human good beyond the boundaries of the city. 
The greatest refinement of political virtue constitutes, as it were, a new, higher virtue, which is 
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called kalokagathia: “kalokagathia is perfect virtue.”287 
 
KALOKAGATHIA AS PEAK AND CONCESSION 
Kalokagathia is the peak of political life because it supersedes the view of the real man—
which is based on strength or on mere desire for power. The gentleman or kalokagathos seeks 
honor like the real man, but he is in addition law-abiding, noble and good. From the standpoint 
of philosophy, the actions of the perfect gentleman stand above those of the real man but below 
the actions of the philosopher.288 The noble goodness of the gentleman is not identical to the 
noble goodness of the philosopher: what the city holds to be noble and good does not always 
coincide with what others deem noble and good.289 Kalokagathia as a political teaching differs 
from the noble goodness of the philosopher primarily because the philosopher’s virtue is of a 
different kind. But it is also different because the philosopher is not ambitious; the philosopher’s 
kalokagathia is not sought with a view to honor. The philosopher is not an honor-seeking anēr, 
but a noble and good anthrōpos simply. Unlike real men or gentlemen, the philosopher does not 
hope to be honored by the city but only to pursue the truth. The perfect gentleman, in contrast, is 
necessarily guided by accepted opinions, not truth. The way of life of the gentleman is “held in 
highest repute by the cities, for it seems to provide the best and best-willed citizens to the 
community.”290 He is noble and good not as a human being but as a citizen. 
While it is true that most people are very unlikely to attain virtue in the highest sense, 
political philosophers do not for that reason renounce the world. On the contrary, they try to 
engage with political life differently. Aware of common human limitations, Plato and Xenophon 
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each found in kalokagathia a way to actively encourage the virtuous life. They understood that 
what the virtuous life looks like for most must differ from the virtuous life of the philosopher. At 
the same time, they acknowledged the challenge that lovers of gain pose to the pursuit even of a 
politically virtuous life. Because they recognized that from a philosophical perspective there 
need to be inducements, different from compulsion, to lead a good and noble life, in writing 
about virtue they sought to displace sordid desires with loftier passions and to confront and 
replace base opinions with other, nobler opinions.291 The role of civic kalokagathia is thus to 
educate citizens by inspiring longing and action. 
Building on Socrates’s teachings, Plato and Xenophon contrived a way to inspire noble 
actions and to substantiate, in the eyes of the many, the claim that the life of gentlemen is most 
choiceworthy. Though the style and tactics of Plato differ from those of Xenophon, I hold that 
their views of philosophy are compatible and that at bottom they coincide in their approach to 
politics. In fact, one could say that at some point their tactics overlap. They both agree that to 
make peace with political life, the philosopher must become friends with statesmen or reach an 
agreement, so to speak, with the real man. The implication of having to make this compromise is 
that, in their writings, philosophy as such recedes into the background, awaiting the scrutiny of 
other seekers of truth who will question the assumptions that the philosophers make or the 
conclusions they arrive at. Superficially, however, both authors seem to favor the politically 
salutary view of gentlemen according to which there is a harmonious cosmos: gods exist and 
keep a watchful eye over human affairs, there is a unity of mankind, and human life is best under 
laws dictated by gods or inspired by them.292  
To use an anachronistic but perhaps useful term, kalokagathia is the Weltanschauung of 
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the gentleman, that is, provided we look at Weltanschauungen with a critical eye, as inferior 
alternatives to philosophy.293 As a Weltanschauung, kalokagathia fulfills the task for which it 
was contrived: to provide a view of life useful for those human beings who, unlike philosophers, 
“need some kind of system to live by.”294 But just as other Weltanschauungen, kalokagathia is 
not philosophy and it certainly does not represent the view philosophers had about the whole or 
even the human whole. Unlike philosophy, kalokagathia relieves human beings from the 
anxiousness produced by the disharmony that exists within the whole, or by the absence of gods 
or their disinterest in human things. At the same time, pious belief in divine retribution may help 
to correct wrongful actions of lovers of gain. More importantly, this view of the world helps form 
in men the idea that by cultivating noble goodness they help fulfill the purpose of the whole to 
which they belong: they contribute to the perfection of the world. Citizens become law-abiding 
not because of compulsion but because they hold the conviction that noble goodness is most 
choiceworthy. 
To repeat, one ought not confuse what political philosophers defend publicly with what 
they believe characterizes the best life. When they chose to promote a political life of noble 
goodness, it was because that was most beneficial to the political community and because by 
educating and ennobling the city they could hope to make the citizens more friendly toward 
philosophy and bring them as close as possible to philosophy.295 Moreover, by promoting 
kalokagathia they also managed to conceal those philosophical precepts that threaten the stability 
of political life: kalokagathia is part and parcel of philosophic politics. It is worth citing Leo 
Strauss’s full definition of “philosophic politics,” which, he asserts, consists “in satisfying the 
city that the philosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate everything sacred to the city, 
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that they reverence what the city reverences, that they are not subversives, in short, that they are 
not irresponsible adventurers but good citizens and even the best of citizens296.” Philosophers are 
compelled to coat their teachings with a pious and patriotic, law-abiding veneer. Philosophic 
politics is a necessary resource for philosophers that leads to a certain political action that is 
reconcilable with the higher truth of philosophy. 
Against this view of kalokagathia, it could be argued that the classics did not distinguish 
the noble goodness of the philosopher from the noble goodness of political men. They never 
refer to what I have called above “civic kalokagathia.” Admittedly, they did not make that 
distinction explicit. I, however, contend that both Plato and Xenophon intimated the inferior 
character of men who are commonly called kalokagathoi. To show the plausibility of this claim, 
if not to prove it, one must show that the noble goodness of political men is not only imperfect 
but inferior to the philosophic life. Likewise, one must evince that, although in a way it points to 
the higher truth of philosophy, civic kalokagathia is subject to the constraints of prevalent and 
accepted opinions. Though the figure of the perfect gentleman serves in Plato as a subtle 
criticism that reminds us that his true convictions lie elsewhere, perhaps the most significant trait 
of his philosophic politics is the use of abstraction, which is indeed politically inspiring but 
whose radicalness ought to raise red flags for the most attentive readers. Xenophon’s philosophic 
politics, in turn, focuses more on the perfect gentleman, whose perfection he qualifies through 
apparently insignificant nuances and omissions that are easy to overlook. 
Plato’s subtle criticism of gentlemen follows in the steps of Socrates’s inconspicuous 
insult of real men during his trial. One cannot help but notice a tinge of sarcasm when, at his 
trial, Socrates addresses the jury as “andres” dozens of times, while he also reproaches them 
 
296 On Tyranny, 205-6. For a more detailed and eloquent discussion of philosophic politics as a part of political 
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because, he indirectly suggests, “they’re not interested in the things they should be and think 
they’re something when they’re worth nothing,”297 a feature of his speech that is perhaps echoed 
by Shakespeare’s Marc Antony, whose growing sarcasm is manifest as he repeatedly calls Brutus 
an honorable man.298 In a similar vein, Plato’s Socrates refers to gentlemen as “surely the most 
charming of all” men.299 In the passage that leads to that purported praise, Adeimantus had 
suggested that it isn’t worthwhile to dictate laws to gentlemen (andrasi kalois kagathois), for 
they would easily find the required legislation for themselves. Socrates agrees but adds a strong 
caveat: “provided, that is, a god grants them the preservation of the laws we described before.” 
While Socrates grants that gentlemen strive to write good laws “to set a limit to wrongdoing,” 
their ignorance prevents them from succeeding.300 
Socrates and Adeimantus argue that, charming as gentlemen may be, they are “sick” due 
to licentiousness. Socrates intimates that gentlemen will remain ignorant of what is best so long 
as they continue to see in the man who tells the truth their greatest enemy, this man being he who 
denounces their decadence and debauchery. Although they may be honored and held as good and 
wise in cities whose regimes are similarly decadent, being praised by the many does not make 
them truly statesmen. In other words, noble and good men may be decent according to the many, 
but their soul is maimed. Yet Socrates concludes the cited passage by asking Adeimantus not to 
be harsh on them for they are bad only due to their ignorance. Nonetheless, in another passage, 
Socrates picks up the topic of ignorance and describes the man who hates the willing lie ”but is 
content to receive the unwilling lie,” as a swinish beast that is not vexed by its ignorance but 
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wallows in lack of learning.301 Socrates’s harsher rebuke of gentlemen’s ignorance reveals that 
knowledge is more important than moral behavior—although in the case of Socrates the former 
implies the latter. Moral goodness does not suffice to make spurious men lovers of learning. 
Plato thus adumbrates the superiority of the philosophic way of life. 
Xenophon speaks more favorably and more conspicuously about gentlemen than Plato.302 
Xenophon’s qualification of kalokagathia becomes apparent only when we focus on its 
limitations as regards political life itself or its drawbacks as regards philosophy. A first remark 
we ought to make, however, is that since the tag “noble and good” was adopted in Athens in the 
fifth century BC to describe rulers or aristocrats regardless of their true qualities as citizens or 
human beings,303 its use especially in historical texts can be expected to be formulaic—though 
not necessarily free from criticism. For example, when dealing with Theramenes’s death under 
the government of the Thirty Tyrants of Athens (of which Theramenes was part), almost every 
time Xenophon uses the expression “noble and good” he does so solely with reference to 
them.304 It goes without saying that if anyone was unworthy of that title it was precisely the 
Thirty Tyrants, at least in that very context in which their injustice and cruelty is emphasized.305 
Aside from the formulaic usage of the term, Xenophon’s efforts are directed to make 
kalokagathia appear as the peak of life (without the specification “political”). Therefore, to 
reveal its true status from the viewpoint of philosophy it is crucial to pay heed to context and 
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weigh each word with the same care with which Xenophon surely chose them. Xenophon 
unobtrusively conveys the status of kalokagathia—as we stated above—by qualifying it through 
nuances and omissions that are easy to overlook. A few examples will suffice to illustrate this.  
According to Xenophon, Socrates was competent to turn others to gentlemanliness and 
“showed himself to his companions to be noble and good.” He also thought that those who 
weren’t gentlemen could be rightly called slavish.306 Xenophon’s positive remarks about 
kalokagathia and its closeness to Socrates should not prevent us from taking notice of the 
qualifications he makes. In one of the two dialogues between Socrates and his pupil Aristippus, 
Socrates makes clear that one cannot speak of things noble and good in absolute terms. What is 
noble and good for one thing is bad and shameful for another.307 If nothing else, readers should 
ask themselves, for what things is noble goodness well-suited and for what things is it ill-suited? 
In the Anabasis, Xenophon gives us an example of the latter, when he speaks of his friend 
Proxenus’s death, whom we mentioned in chapter 2. From Xenophon’s description, we can 
conclude that Proxenus was a gentleman, for he avoided doing shameful or unjust things and 
because he was held in high esteem by noble and good men. The “unjust,” however, “plotted 
against him as against someone easily manipulated.” Xenophon immediately adds that “when 
Proxenus was killed he was about thirty years old.”308 While it seems that those who killed him 
are not the same men who plotted against him, the lesson about kalokagathia remains the same: 
kalokagathia is not helpful when it comes to ruling unjust men or saving one’s life. Kalokagathia 
is ill-suited to deal with brutes. 
Xenophon also hints at the limits of kalokagathia in the Cyropaedia when Cyrus’s father 
tells his son that to get an advantage over his enemies he “must be a plotter, a dissembler, wily, a 
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cheat, a thief, rapacious, and the sort who takes advantage of his enemies in everything.”309 
Cyrus’s father outspokenly, if indirectly, reveals to his son that gentlemanship is insufficient to 
attain justice if indeed justice requires one “both to lie and not to lie, to deceive and not to 
deceive, to slander and not to slander, to take advantage and not to do so,” as a man—who is 
highly reminiscent of Socrates—once used to teach. The ready lesson is that kalokagathia might 
be well-suited for pursuing domestic justice310 but is surely ill-suited in dealing with enemies. 
However, an even more significant insight can be derived from this passage, for Cyrus’s father 
also asserts that that man also taught “that it was just to deceive even one’s friends, at least for a 
good [result], and to steal the belongings of friends for a good [result].”311 Xenophon subtly 
points to a superior kind of justice that transcends the legal. Furthermore, he intimates that the 
city cannot teach that kind of justice lest one with a “natural gift” for love of gain take advantage 
of his fellow citizens.312  
Linked to the justice of the city, kalokagathia proves insufficient to face ruthless enemies 
but also and more importantly inadequate to pursue a philosophic education. Just as the nature of 
the perfect gentleman is unfit to preside over other human beings, especially over lovers of gain, 
it is also unsuitable for pursuing wisdom. Since civic kalokagathia is based on noble lies, the 
perfect gentleman is unable to see wisdom as the highest good and has a hard time dealing with 
wrongdoings attributable to the nature of political things: he does not “spend his life considering 
the just and the unjust things.”313 On the one hand, he is repulsed by unscrupulous men who seek 
power, wealth, honor and pleasure by all means available, and because he is morally impeded 
from using their methods, he cannot rule over them through compulsion. On the other, he cannot 
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pursue wisdom because his horizon is limited by whatever the law of the regime dictates, 
especially his piety. Indeed, the gentleman believes to be true what the city holds to be true, 
including the gods, for he knows that a gentleman shall gratify the gods “by law of the city.”314 
Although Xenophon does not explicitly say that piety is a noble and good possession for 
a real man—and not necessarily for human beings in general or the philosopher in particular—he 
hints at this when, right after a chapter devoted to piety, he begins by saying that perhaps 
continence too is a noble and good possession for a man (anēr).315 Unlike the philosopher, who 
is noble and good through virtue, because it is right to be so according to reason, the perfect 
gentleman owes his noble and good behavior to the belief that the gods signal what should and 
should not be done, as well as to the conviction that the law of the city is just.316 Perfect 
gentlemen are not guided by truth but by a virtuous untruth that is necessary to ameliorate life in 
the city. Consequently, though their thoughts are at odds with the philosophic way of life, their 
actions come closer to the actions of the philosopher.  
Perhaps philosophers would be willing to grant that in politics action is more important 
than thought. If that is the case, it would help explain why despite their seeing kalokagathia as a 
concession they preferred it to the view of the avaricious real man or to the view of the selfish 
private man. Kalokagathia, we said at the beginning, is the peak of political life because it 
supersedes the view of the real man. Through their writings, philosophers shore up the way of 
life of gentlemen as they help perfect it, so that public life may become at once nobler than 
common opinion and kindred to it. While the low nature of political things cannot be neglected 
or erased, the philosophers’ outward support of the noble and good life shows that it can be 
tamed. By instilling kalokagathia in the youth, philosophers manage to make the untruth true in 
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the noblest way. Although based on noble lies, kalokagathia spurs actions that are more 
compatible with the way of life of the philosopher and is the most palpable expression of the 
philosopher’s humanity.  
At the same time, the philosophers’ support of civic kalokagathia goes against the public 
indifference of private men who evade or avoid public responsibility. We may once again take 
Socrates’s way of life as an example. Against Aristippus, who chose a “middle way” that freed 
him from engaging in political affairs, Socrates thought that one ought to be concerned with 
doing good to one’s fatherland no less than to one’s friends or household. While Socrates 
refrained from engaging in political affairs directly, his public-spiritedness is apparent in that he 
sought to make others competent to engage in them and exhorted to get involved in politics those 
he thought measured up to the task just as he tried to discourage those whom he judged 
incompetent.317 Through kalokagathia, the majority of human beings whose nature shies away 
from the philosophic way of life can reach out for an incomplete but reasonable form of 
happiness that benefits them and their community. 
To conclude, we must add that since kalokagathia is largely based on common opinion, 
education in gentlemanliness necessarily varies in time and from one place to another. In other 
words, gentlemanliness as presented by the classics may cease to be useful as the circumstances 
of a given city change. Unlike the theoretical insights of classical political philosophers, 
gentlemanship does not have a universal or permanent character. It is the best political solution 
that the classics found and offered, but it was not meant as a definitive solution to the political 
problem. Needless to say, another education is necessary to have access to the universal 
teachings of philosophy. In the following section we will discuss what constitutes a philosophic 
education, as opposed to education in kalokagathia, and who is apt to receive it. 
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II. The Blessed Life 
THE MOST CHOICEWORTHY WAY OF LIFE 
On his deathbed, Xenophon’s older Cyrus asks his two sons not to forget this last piece of 
advice, that by benefiting their friends they will be able to punish their enemies.318 For Cyrus this 
seems to be the key to leading a happy life. At bottom he suspects that unless, or even if, he tells 
this to his sons, after his passing they will have inducements to hostility. Aware of this 
possibility, Cyrus tries to persuade them that they should nourish their mutual friendship, if not 
out of respect which they owe to their father’s soul then maybe for fear of offending the gods. 
Cyrus is particularly conscious that Tanaoxares, his younger son, is more likely to turn against 
Cambyses, Cyrus’s firstborn, driven by envy and a desire to have more. To dissuade Tanaoxares 
from becoming his brother’s enemy, Cyrus tells him that he bequeaths to him “a happiness more 
free from pain,” for ruling is accompanied with toil, anxieties, war, competition and fear, all of 
which “provide many interruptions to the leisure needed for taking delight.”319 In appearance, 
Cyrus is of a like mind with the philosopher, who does not desire to rule. 
It is hard to believe that Cyrus is being completely honest with Tanaoxares. Had Cyrus 
been in the place of his younger son, would he have followed his own advice? Besides the 
obvious fact that Cyrus’s life aimed at becoming an absolute ruler, being a real man, he must 
certainly hold the view that the greatest good is to rule over other human beings despite the 
“interruptions” that come with ruling.320 To enjoy the benefits of ruling without the subsequent 
pains is possible but does not befit real men: it does not yield true happiness. Indeed the 
punishment Cyrus inflicted upon Croesus after defeating him was the prohibition to engage in 
battles and wars. Croesus responds that he will thereupon be able to live a blessedly happy life, 
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just as his wife had done, enjoying all the good things Croesus had but without the troubles.321 A 
blessedly happy life without worries is becoming of women, not of real men. Croesus’s alleged 
happiness, from the standpoint of the real man, is not comparable to Cyrus’s blessedly happy 
life.322 True happiness belongs to the real man, whose way of life is highest. 
It is precisely in the expression “blessedly happy” that the life of the beneficent tyrant is 
confronted with the life of the philosopher. Either the tyrant or the philosopher can claim to have 
a blessedly happy life, but both cannot be right. Judging by how their lives came to an end, 
Cyrus’s way of life seems superior: a tranquil death due to old age in one’s own bed is better than 
being sentenced to die in prison. But whether they led just and happy lives must be considered as 
well. Whose way of life is most choiceworthy depends ultimately on what one deems to be the 
greatest good. The philosopher takes his bearings from looking up to wisdom, whereas the 
tyrant, from the power to rule over human beings. Since we’ve asserted that from the standpoint 
of philosophy perfect gentlemen are superior to real men because the actions of the former are 
more compatible with the way of life of the philosopher, it can be readily inferred that the 
philosophic way of life is supreme. But since real men hold that the greatest good is not wisdom 
but to rule over other human beings, nothing prevents them from asserting the contrary, that the 
philosopher is in truth inferior to the kalokagathos, and obviously below the ruling tyrant, whose 
way of life they deem most choiceworthy.  
Just how difficult it is to settle this question is apparent from the fact that Socrates 
himself (who allegedly “dealt as he wished with all who conversed with him”323), failed to 
persuade Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias—one of the dialogues devoted to the art of persuasion—
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about how to be happy in life and when death comes.324 That Callicles is not moved by 
Socrates’s exhortations is made explicit by Callicles himself, who just wants the conversation to 
be over.325 Although the confrontation with Callicles might be no more than a feigned 
representation concocted by Plato, it is also said that Socrates was unable to govern his wife 
Xanthippe,326 and it is well-known that he did not persuade the jury who sentenced him to die. 
Whether because of people’s blind acceptance of common opinions or because the brutal 
harshness of reality prevents many from accepting the philosophic truth, the philosopher’s appeal 
to reason as ultimate arbiter cannot but fail in the court of public opinion. 
Socrates was plainly aware of the limits of reason in a world governed by opinion. Not 
only did he think no speeches can go counter to the opinion of the many and prevail but he also 
held that the attempt would be a great folly.327 Yet to see the philosopher’s way of life as superior 
to every other way of life is a necessary premise to see things from the right perspective. And 
only from the right perspective is it both safe and profitable to study the tyrannical way of life 
and to establish connections between tyrannical and philosophic natures. In what follows we will 
highlight the resemblances between these two natures, but we will also show the tension and 
contrast that exists between them. It is by looking at the two ways of life and the tensions that 
arise therein that we can see in the proper light the full problem that constitutes the essence of 
classical political philosophy. We will now try to decipher the tyrannical teaching of the classics 
and explain why it is so important. Then we will speak of the possible connections between the 
philosopher and the tyrant, and we will conclude by explaining the relation of the philosopher to 
the city. 
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TYRANNIKOS OR “THE SKILLED TYRANT” 
“Give me a tyrannized city… and let the tyrant be young, possessed of an able memory, a 
good learner, courageous, and magnificent by nature.”328 Tyranny per se is not rejected by the 
philosopher, at least in theory. If the tyrant were to possess these qualities and work together with 
an eminent lawgiver, then the strongest tyranny would be the swiftest and easiest means to 
establish a good regime. The most direct argument in favor of beneficent tyranny—though not in 
so many words—is given in Plato’s Statesman, when the Eleatic stranger argues that the rule of 
the wise and good man for the good of the citizens, with or without persuasion, must necessarily 
stand above any law or tradition.329 Xenophon too intimates that tyranny is not altogether bad. In 
the Memorabilia, he seems to judge it as neutral or ambiguous when he asserts that, for Socrates, 
the outcome of tyranny, like that of playing dice or of a battle is unknown.330 In other words, the 
outcome of tyranny could be good. Likewise, in a very interesting passage of the Cyropaedia 
whose deeper analysis we must leave aside, Cyrus adumbrates that bestowing tyranny upon 
human beings, among other goods, reveals what sort of people they are.331 Tyranny helps to see 
clearly the nature of any given person. 
The rhetorical reading of Xenophon’s Hiero, we suggested at the end of chapter 2, also 
enables one to see beneficent tyranny more sympathetically because it leads to the hopeful 
prospect of making the aim of tyranny coincide with the common good of the city. Due 
consideration of the fact that tyranny may be good opens up the possibility of a more nuanced 
interpretation of the Hiero. Read dialectically, one is compelled to reject all facile interpretations 
and be skeptical about them before drawing any conclusion. We must wonder what Hiero’s real 
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posture is or how he may have reacted to Simonides’s proposal of turning his cruel, self-serving 
tyranny to one focused on the good of his subjects. It is highly unlikely that Hiero was both 
skillful and willing enough to accept Simonides’s proposal without further ado. Since one must 
assume that any thoughts Hiero might have had, the wise man, being wise, must have considered 
too, one must also wonder what Simonides’s deeper intention was in giving such advice to Hiero. 
Whether we assume Hiero is a real man or we identify him more with a lover of gain 
because he is more concerned with bodily pleasures than with honor “and hence perhaps not a 
‘real man,’” Hiero certainly does not consider wisdom to be the greatest good.332 Since he is a 
tyrant it is very likely that he deems the greatest good to be to rule over other human beings. 
This, however, does not prove that he would reject Simonides’s proposal: he could have 
welcomed Simonides’s advice wishing not only to rule over others but to do so well. But if ruling 
well means to take into account others’ well-being rather than satisfying his own desires 
exclusively, then such rule does not befit tyrants who would appear as weak by yielding to the 
needs of others. However that may be, Hiero’s personality alone suggests that despite his efforts 
to condemn tyranny, he takes a perverse pleasure in harming others, picking quarrels, and even 
killing!333 It could be said that Xenophon’s Hiero incarnates justice as presented by Plato’s 
Callicles.334 Therefore, from Hiero’s viewpoint, Simonides’s proposal is unacceptable because to 
follow his suggestions would amount to becoming slavish. 
More intriguing than Hiero’s posture is Xenophon’s interest in portraying the 
improvement of tyranny, in the way that he does, and through the mouth of Simonides. What 
could Simonides’s intention be in presenting noble teachings to a man who laments being unable 
to openly gloat over others’ misfortunes? Just as it is not reasonable to think that Simonides takes 
 
332 Strauss, On Tyranny, 60; Xen. Hiero 5.1-2. 
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Hiero’s indictment of tyranny at face value, it is also not reasonable that he would present his 
teachings to Hiero with the naïve belief that Hiero would find in them the necessary inspiration 
to become a beneficent ruler. It is therefore likely that there is more to Simonides’s proposal than 
what appears at first. An indication that it is plausible to think there are ulterior motives behind 
Simonides’s advice is the very fact that the wise man who gives the advice is not Socrates. 
Xenophon’s choice of Simonides—who was famous for his greed—as the representative of the 
wise man is not fortuitous.335 Simonides could voice thoughts that would be unbecoming of a 
philosopher like Socrates to express. 
According to Leo Strauss, the tyrannical teaching of the Hiero “is not more than a 
forceful expression of the problem of law and legitimacy.”336 To recall what we treated more 
extensively in chapter 1, the interplay between law and legitimacy poses the problem that all 
regimes are in a sense tyrannical to the extent that every regime must impose its laws at least on 
part of the citizenship, that is, rule over them without their consent. With the problem of law and 
legitimacy in mind, there seems to be no essential distinction—at least in theory—between 
tyranny and other regimes but only a difference in degree, on the one hand, and in the ability to 
persuade citizens to obey, on the other. But we cannot leave it at that. As we saw in chapter 2, 
Xenophon had presented the problem of law and legitimacy in the dialogue between Pericles and 
the young Alcibiades that appears in the Memorabilia. What is the use of expressing this same 
thought in such a bold way as he does in the Hiero? To find out, let us reflect more carefully on 
the implications of Simonides’s teachings in the Hiero. 
Beneficent tyranny, if it were to exist, would correct the faults of tyranny as we know it. 
Adequately managed, it could surpass all other existing regimes. But since it is doubtful that 
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Hiero would follow Simonides’s advice, we must wonder, what effect will Simonides’s teachings 
have on the tyrant? What Hiero could take Simonides’s advice to mean is that the tyrant can 
ensure good fame so as to persuade his subjects that it is in their own interest—and not his—that 
he rules. Simonides’s teachings can potentially help the tyrant preserve all the pleasures he 
already enjoys, including the perverse pleasures of harming others, picking quarrels, and killing, 
so long as he is able to do so under the guise of honorableness and patriotism. The tyrant can 
justify his criminal deeds by commanding “others to punish those in need of coercion” in the 
name of the common good.337 There is no need for the tyrant to undergo a true conversion; it 
suffices that he appears to do so. Hiero’s view would seem to indicate that the hidden suggestion 
in Simonides’s advice is that the common good be used as a façade! 
The tyrant’s takeaway makes manifest the extremely bold but veiled suggestion of the 
Hiero that, despite Hiero’s criminal deeds to become a tyrant and preserve his tyranny, he is not 
bad but perhaps only unskilled and therefore unintelligent. Indeed Hiero, being power-hungry 
even as he retains his tyranny, would interpret Simonides’s advice as an invitation not to become 
a beneficent king but rather a skilled tyrant. Though from a perverse perspective, the tyrant’s 
view encapsulates the philosophic truth according to which the individual good can aim higher 
than the common good. Both the skilled tyrant and the philosopher see the common good as 
indispensable but inferior. Through the tyrannical teaching Xenophon intimates with utmost 
caution that the common good is not the highest good but politically salutary at best. Most 
importantly, however, he alerts us (more forcefully than in the dialogue between Pericles and 
Alcibiades) to the dangers of grounding a regime on the common good alone. Paradoxically, to 
set the common good as the supreme rule and ultimate standard of right government opens the 
door to tyranny. 
 
337 See Hiero 9.3-10; Strauss, On Tyranny, 70. 
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To return to the standpoint of philosophy, one ought not mistake the tyrant’s takeaway for 
the takeaway of the reader. What the dialectical reading of the Hiero ultimately points to is the 
true place that the common good occupies from the philosopher’s viewpoint. What is deemed the 
common good is not the highest good because it does not involve a genuine conversion to the 
philosopher’s way of life.338 So long as people are guided by base desires or by spiritedness 
rather than by reason, the realm of the city will not be transcended. All efforts to move in the 
direction of the highest good will be like thrashing about in the darkness or like cutting off the 
heads of a Hydra.339 The common good, desirable and necessary as it is, falls short of the highest 
human good. Therefore, those who seek to be blessedly happy must transcend the idea of the 
common good. They must gain victory over the city without destroying the city.340 In short, what 
would seem to be an invitation to be impious, to disrespect the law, to gain victory over friends 
and enemies alike, to seek to become tyrants, is only so from the viewpoint of the petty tyrant 
who takes pleasure in exploiting others. The tyrannical interpretation of the philosophic truth that 
the common good is no more than a politically salutary façade fails to grasp the all-important 
fact that the philosopher does not wish to rule. 
 
EVERY KIND OF TRUTH 
Plato’s Athenian Stranger succinctly reveals the inferior place human things occupy 
within the larger whole when he says that “of course, the affairs of human beings are not worthy 
of great seriousness; yet it is necessary to be serious about them. And this is not a fortunate 
thing.”341 At the same time, these words highlight the inescapable character of human things. The 
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philosopher must concern himself with them although or because he is devoted to “the 
contemplation of all time and all being.”342 Human things are not the highest of things,343 but 
they constitute the best part of what we can know. The philosopher thus approaches the human 
things but not without contempt. Unlike the perfect gentleman, whose knowledge is guided by 
the precepts of the city and admires its laws, the philosopher questions the law of the city and 
transgresses—in speech, rather than in deed—all political principles. In his contempt for human 
things, the philosopher comes closer to the tyrant than to the kalokagathoi. 
The actions of the tyrant set him apart from the philosopher, but the philosopher and the 
tyrant are in a way bound together by their knowledge of human things. Cognizant of the nature 
of political things, the philosopher admits what the tyrant sees as the highest truth, that most 
human beings are not guided by reason but by passion and desire. The difference is that whereas 
the tyrant takes his bearings from the nature of political things and either ignores or outright 
rejects any higher truth, the philosopher is not satisfied with knowledge of base things. The 
philosopher is a lover of learning and “must from youth on strive as intensely as possible for 
every kind of truth.”344 Whereas the tyrant aims for action and wishes to rule, the philosopher 
aims for thought and wishes to know. The tyrannical man cannot give credit to the philosopher’s 
unwillingness to rule. He simply cannot believe that the philosopher is not envious of the ruling 
tyrant.345 Although the nature of the tyrant is close to the nature of the philosopher, the tyrannical 
man who becomes a ruling tyrant is no longer able to approach philosophy due to his lack of 
proper education. 
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While it is true that “knowledge is intrinsically good, whereas action is not,”346 partial 
knowledge in combination with human passion or under the control of vicious desires cannot be 
considered good.347 Partial knowledge may lead to perverse actions if it is not complemented 
with another, higher form of knowledge. The philosopher rejects the idea that the nature of 
political things ought to determine human life not because he doesn’t believe it to be true but 
because he seeks to counteract it. The nature of political things may be blinding. It can prevent 
human beings from recognizing that human life is faced by a whole gamut of possibilities. 
Furthermore, recognizing only the basest forms of human life can prevent us from discerning the 
status of the human things within the larger whole. Awareness that partial knowledge of the truth 
might be worse than having no knowledge of it at all is what pushes the philosopher to openly 
favor generally accepted opinions that are noble and to show so much circumspection when 
dealing with the truth.348 Knowledge of the nature of political things alone may lead to cynical 
and violent behavior. Therefore, whenever the nature of political things is known, the 
philosopher thinks it is necessary to complement it with the higher truth of philosophy as an 
antidote to brutish behavior. 
But the reverse is also true: just as knowledge of the nature of political things without 
knowledge of the higher truth is unlikely to lead to judicious actions, so too the higher truth can 
prove prejudicial if it neglects the nature of political things.349 Idealism is as dangerous and 
undesirable as crude realism. Therefore, knowledge of base human things is crucial to the proper 
understanding of the human whole. Philosophic natures must strive to know base things while 
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being able to judge them from the right perspective.350 This helps explain the philosopher’s 
insistence on considering whether it is profitable to do injustice and be unjust351 even after such 
an inquiry—having adopted the viewpoint of philosophy—has become ridiculous. Why the 
philosopher stoops to discuss the human things (both deviant regimes and unruly souls) is 
explained by the fact that precisely when one has adopted the philosophic point of view, it is 
most profitable to consider base things.352 It is of the essence of classical political philosophy to 
deal with the tension produced by these two contrasting positions. The tyrannical teaching is as 
important as the philosophic one, and it is undesirable to learn one without the other.  
Yet most human beings are unable or unwilling to go through the education required for 
philosophy, let alone live according to the highest human truth. Unlike political life, the 
philosophical way of life demands radical and, for most people, outrageous changes to their 
private lives. In Plato’s Republic, Glaucon and Adeimantus, with Socrates’s help, found a city 
which is not only friendly toward philosophy but is commanded by a philosopher king. However, 
as counterintuitive as it might seem, rather than paving the way for philosophy, the foundation of 
kallipolis at once alerts us to the dangers beneficent tyranny could bring—be it in the name of 
wisdom or whatever is deemed to be the greatest good for the city—on the one hand; and, on the 
other, it makes manifest to what degree the turn to a philosophic way of life is more difficult than 
the turn to civilized, political life. It is more difficult precisely because, unlike political life, 
philosophy offers no compromise: the philosophic way of life demands that individuals give up 
what they love most and replace it with love of wisdom. The philosophical way of life requires 
greater detachment from one’s own than does political life.353 
 
350 cf. Arist. Met. 12.9, 1275b25-34 and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 70.9. 
351 For the distinction between doing injustice and being unjust, see Arist. Eth. Nic. 5.6, 1134a17. 
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In book 6 of the Republic, Socrates proposes that philosophy be left as the single most 
important occupation for the elderly. Instead of teaching philosophy to the young, dedication to 
philosophy should be gradually intensified as citizens grow older. It is not easy to imagine old, 
law-abiding citizens contemplating the possibility of questioning their traditions, let alone their 
being willing to give them up for the sake of learning every kind of truth. It is more likely that 
they will object to the study of philosophy because they believe to be true and wise only what 
accords with their way of life.354 Or they might simply refuse to philosophize because they feel 
pressed to do their civic or religious duties (consider how Cephalus leaves the conversation to 
look after the sacrifices and hands down the argument to younger Polemarchus, his son).355 
There is a greater probability to find a disposition toward the pursuit of wisdom among 
the young because the young do not frown on questioning authority and because they tend to be 
less attached to traditions and duties.356 But such a disposition does not make the turn to 
philosophy any easier. Eager as the young might be about pursuing wisdom, their interests lie 
less in the pursuit of wisdom in itself than in acquiring knowledge for the sake of glory or 
pleasure. As Thomas Pangle has said in his interpretive essay to Plato’s Laws, “very few men 
live mainly for the sake of knowledge; most are tempted to use knowledge as a means to other 
desires.”357 Consequently, from the point of view of the young, the demands of philosophy are 
much more exacting than the demands of any regular city—even if the latter entail the possibility 
of sacrificing one’s life! To recall Dostoevsky’s bold insight, the young are more prompt to 
sacrifice their lives for the sake of wisdom than to devote several years of hard and tedious study 
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to serve the truth.358 The turn to philosophy among the young is all the more unlikely if its study 
entails not postponing but permanently forgoing their base desires. To sum up, most human 
beings are not by nature gifted for the knowledge that a philosopher must possess.  
 
DIVINE DEHUMANIZATION 
In Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, Socrates held that just as stronger wine must be diluted 
with more water, stronger human beings should be given to carry a greater burden, and “all 
weaker things should be ordered to do less.” His suggestion arises from Ischomachus’s teaching 
that less seed must be put in weaker earth, whereas stronger earth can hold more seed.359 The 
philosopher is bound to carry the greatest burden, to give up what ordinary human beings cherish 
most. According to this teaching, only very few human beings are capable of such a life.360 What 
could be read as an offensive air of superiority on the part of the philosopher is rather a sign of 
the philosopher’s realism and an instance of his remarkable generosity. Despite his contempt for 
human things, the philosopher will unhesitatingly seek to benefit others by teaching what is best 
for each, according to his capacity, and without betraying his own convictions. 
To benefit everyone in the manner and the measure possible with reference to each,361 
Socrates made a clear distinction between ordinary and extraordinary natures.362 Among the 
ordinary natures, he found human beings who were good at learning, had a good memory, and 
were both shrewd and quick, and full of youthful fire and magnificence. He believed they would 
be well-suited for philosophy if they didn’t lack orderly, quiet and steady lives, or if the city 
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hadn’t tried to coopt them.363 Others, who show the steadiness that the former lack, are 
courageous and trustworthy because they are not easily changeable. But they too are ill-suited for 
philosophy because they are “hard to teach, as if they had become numb, and are filled with 
sleep and yawning” in the face of studies.364 Ordinary natures possess great attributes that prove 
in one way or another beneficial to the city but that are not sufficient to pursue a philosophic 
education. Education in civic kalokagathia is thus most suitable for ordinary natures. 
For their part, great natures participate in the positive attributes that make one well-suited 
for philosophy, and only they are by nature gifted for the pursuit of wisdom. It is thus only 
among those best natures that the philosopher finds suitable companions with whom to share 
“the treasures of the wise.”365 Yet the philosopher does not limit himself to educate only his 
associates but seeks to educate everyone, for “the philosophers are sharers and friends with 
all.”366 However, the philosopher does not educate everyone in the same manner but adapts his 
teachings to different characters and to different situations. For example, Xenophon says that 
while Socrates “produced by far the most agreement in his listeners” when he led an argument by 
himself, he directed those who contradicted him toward the truth by bringing the entire argument 
back to its hypothesis.367 Just as those held to be best by nature become “hardest to restrain and 
quite lowly” without a proper and timely education, the truly best natures become “worst and 
most harmful.”368 Because “the best nature comes off worse than an ordinary one from an 
inappropriate rearing,”369 proper rearing is especially important for guiding the erōs of the best 
natures in the right direction. 
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The severe demands and the strangeness of the philosopher’s way of life make an 
education in wisdom undesirable for most. Since the demands of the philosopher’s way of life by 
far exceed the demands of life in the city, imposing the philosophic way of life on everyone 
would be not only prejudicial but even cruel in most cases.370 It is therefore best to guide 
ordinary natures to a noble and good political life instead, which is beneficial not only for them 
but also for philosophy, if indirectly, because without a city philosophy can hardly exist. 
Education in wisdom is thus reserved for the very few who possess the best natures and are in 
most need of such an education, lest they, “not understanding how to decide what they should 
do,” become harmful, as Xenophon suggests. “Since they are grand and impetuous they are hard 
to restrain and hard to turn back, which is why the bad things they do are very many and very 
great.” Without a philosophic education, the best natures will not only turn out to be most 
wretched but will make others wretched as well.371 
Both philosophers and tyrants possess a great nature. That the one who is to become a 
philosopher has an extraordinary nature is explicitly stated in Socrates’s description of the 
philosophic nature, but that the tyrant also possesses a great nature becomes especially apparent 
only when one reads that same description against the portrait of the ruling tyrant. In book 6 of 
Plato’s Republic Socrates says that “the best natures become exceptionally bad when they get 
bad instruction” whereas “a weak nature will never be the cause of great things either good or 
bad.”372 Since in book 9 he says the ruling tyrant is the worst man, one who “will stick at no 
terrible murder, or food, or deed,”373 it must be the case that the tyrant has a great nature because 
he is capable of causing the greatest harms. At bottom, one is inclined to conclude, the 
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philosopher and the tyrant share the same nature, for Socrates subtly suggests that the main 
difference between the philosopher and the tyrant is that in the tyrant desires and pleasures are 
not accompanied by intelligence and right opinion—an outcome that could be prevented if only 
tyrannical souls were properly reared.374 
The best education need not be provided by others. Truly exceptional natures, like 
Socrates, do not require to be educated by others because their innate love of wisdom leads them 
in a path of self-education. While education is indispensable for all, Socrates was apparently able 
to educate himself spontaneously.375 His self-education consisted mainly in carrying out the 
maxim inscribed on the temple at Delphi: “Know thyself.” Socrates said that self-knowledge 
leads to wisdom, whereas ignorance of oneself and thinking to know things one ignores leads to 
madness or insolence: wisdom is the opposite of madness and insolence.376 Unlike the vast 
majority of human beings, Socrates was able to discover through his own effort who he was, not 
in absolute terms but in relation to the rest of the beings.377 By knowing himself he was able to 
obtain good things for, according to him, “human beings experience most good things due to 
knowing themselves.”378 Since the vast majority of human beings are not endowed with 
Socrates’s qualities, what determines in most cases whether a great nature will turn out to 
become philosophical or tyrannical is proper education provided by one who truly knows the 
good. 
The proper education for the best natures certainly teaches how to foster civic 
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kalokagathia but, unlike the education of perfect gentlemen, it also points beyond it, toward 
wisdom. The turn toward the pursuit of wisdom can be done only when the best natures have 
reached a point from which to judge properly the hierarchy of beings and are able to recognize 
wisdom as the greatest good. The education of the one who is to become a philosopher requires 
the ability to look down on all human things, for “to an understanding endowed with 
magnificence and the contemplation of all time and being,” even human life is nothing great.379 
Strictly speaking, wisdom lies beyond the human plane. Thus, the pursuit of wisdom does 
violence against human beings because it demands that they give up what most human beings 
ordinarily love most or what is ordinarily thought to be most human. In doing so, in a way that 
resembles tyranny, it casts a shadow over tradition, law, religion, family—in sum, over 
everything by which the city stands or falls. 
Nevertheless, the pursuit of wisdom cannot be detached from human things but must 
embrace them, as can be inferred from the life of Socrates, who spent most of it conversing about 
the human things. The path that leads to the world outside the cave is built with elements from 
within the cave. Or, if I may use another hackneyed image, philosophy is like the lotus flower 
that grows out of the mud and mire of politics. To be sure, though from the standpoint of 
philosophy it would seem as if the human things undeservingly spattered philosophy with mud, 
the philosopher is aware that it is the philosopher who upsets human things by looking down on 
all we cherish.380 The philosopher is the true anomaly. Against the grain of the way of life of 
tyrants and gentlemen alike, the philosophic way of life challenges the most prevalent order of 
things. Yet the philosopher will not engage in subversive deeds. He will do everything in his 
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power to benefit the political community he lives in. 
At the beginning of this chapter we said that the philosophical and the political could be 
separated for the purpose of analysis but that, at bottom, they are intimately intertwined. By 
artificially separating the philosophical from the political one may arrive at the conclusion that 
philosophy, just as tyranny, is a selfish pursuit. It is not surprising that from the viewpoint of the 
city the philosopher teaches “his companions to be doers of mischief and skilled at tyranny.”381 
This assertion is not altogether mistaken: while it is true that in despising the low philosophy 
helps to elevate one’s existence and to make life most blessed, the process necessarily brings 
about a dehumanization—a divine dehumanization, to be sure, but a dehumanization 
nonetheless. Then again, if the philosopher directs his companions in the way of tyrants, who 
stick at nothing to rule over others, he does so with the opposite end in mind: not to help them 
become tyrants but to rid them of the desire to rule. Since philosophy is not separated from 
politics but grows out of it, as it were, it is necessarily concerned with the betterment of political 
things.  
Philosophical education thus presupposes the citizens’ education in kalokagathia—
materialized in the figure of the perfect gentleman—but goes beyond and even contradicts it. 
Indeed, contrary to what pious gentlemen might believe, all efforts made in the city in the 
direction of moral virtue and nobility to attenuate the stark political reality only serve to prove 
that the high often fails to rule over the low, despite the odes philosophers often sing to the rule 
of the high over the low.382 The view of the gentleman, directed to curb the ignoble, the 
shameful, and the base does not refute but confirms the most prevalent condition of human 
beings. The ruling tyrant, as it were, embodies that condition, which stresses the low nature of 
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human beings. In contrast, the education proposed by the philosopher consists in providing the 
young with correct knowledge that will make them both wise and good.383 To be wise and good 
the young must transcend the realm of the city, which means to let go of their personal 
attachments and their political ambitions. To be wise is to rule over political things, not in the 
manner of the tyrant who wishes to rule over all, but in the way the philosopher does, by making 
the high stand above the low.  
To make this turn, the philosopher-to-be must undergo a genuine conversion. He needs to 
learn what the good is and, in the words of Xenophon, “it is strongest to be taught the good from 
nature itself, second from those who truly know something good.”384 It is meaningful that 
Xenophon does not say best (aristos) but strongest (kratistos). The most widespread condition of 
mankind needs to be confronted with the strongest, exceptional truth of philosophy. The 
tyrannical man, however, is not willing to entertain this possibility. To live like the philosopher 
seems to him like yielding to the power of the many. The uneducated tyrant thus chooses to rule 
over others instead.385 In choosing an ignoble way of life, he forgoes the pleasure that comes 
with wisdom.386 As a result, the tyrant is irreversibly tied to the low. His happiness does not 
depend on himself but on those he rules. For this reason, since the philosopher is truly free, the 





383 See Xen. Cyn. 13.7. 
384 Cyn. 13.4. 
385 See Pl. Grg. 510a. 
386 See Pl. Rep. 9.582c. 
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EROS AND FRIENDSHIP387 
“For—whatever human beings I desire—loving them, I set out with complete intensity to 
be loved by them in return, and, longing for them, to be longed for in return, and, desiring to be 
together with them, to have them desire in return to be together with me.”388 Having argued that 
the philosopher looks down on human things, this passionate confession does not seem befitting 
of a philosopher. And yet it is Socrates who addresses these words to Critobulus after offering 
him help to hunt after those who are noble and good. Of course, they could easily be explained 
by arguing that they are part of Socrates’s effort to make of Critobulus a perfect gentleman and 
not a philosopher. Nevertheless, his words seem to be sincere. Moreover, it is not the only place 
where Xenophon refers to Socrates’s love of human beings, not to mention Plato’s depictions of 
a loving Socrates.389 How can one account for the philosopher’s philanthropy? 
We have discussed why the philosopher would stoop to discuss human things, such as 
deviant regimes and unruly souls. We have said too that the philosopher, for politically salutary 
reasons, is a teacher of gentlemanliness and that he benefits each according to their capacity. 
What has not been made clear yet is how the contemplation of all time and all being is 
compatible with the love of noble and good human beings, whom Socrates hunts down. 
Moreover, we are told that Socrates both tested human beings to see whether their nature was apt 
for dialectics and taught how to use them nobly to “procure the good things and guard against the 
bad ones.”390 Depending on the point of view we adopt, the philosopher’s attitude toward others 
could be seen as slavish, to the extent that he does not rule over them and lives poorly, or else as 
 
387 I am aware that a title so promising as “Eros and Friendship” is likely to raise the readers’ expectations far 
beyond what we can offer here (parturient montes, nascetur ridiculus mus). To give a satisfactory account of either 
of these topics would require no less than a book-length study. Rather than treating these topics in themselves, my 
intention here is only to suggest what I see as plausible explanations for Socrates’s philanthropy. In the pertinent 
places below I will point to different books that do treat these topics extensively. 
388 Xen. Mem. 2.6.28. 
389 See Xen. Mem. 1.2.8, 1.2.60, 4.1.2; Pl. Alc. 103a-b, Symp. 213c, Grg. 481d. 
390 Mem. 4.2.26, 2.6.6-7, 4.8.11; Pl. Rep. 7.537c-d. 
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abusive, to the extent that he is selfish and transgresses the precepts of the city.391  
From the viewpoint of the philosopher himself, he is not a slave of human beings. The 
philosopher only serves wisdom. How he interacts with other human beings is not dictated by the 
laws of the city or by others’ desires, but only by what the pursuit of wisdom demands. He 
cannot be called slavish because he willingly obeys what is for him most worthwhile.392 It could 
be said, however, that he is an exploiter of human beings because he uses them for his own 
personal benefit. Yet the philosopher’s character, his orderly soul and his lack of base ambition 
make it possible for him to use others in the most noble way, in a way that is beneficial both for 
himself and for others. Whereas the tyrant does away with the best men and is compelled to 
make use of the rest, inferior men, to the detriment of both himself and others, the philosopher 
makes use of the best with the result that both he himself and those he uses become better.393 The 
philosopher can use others nobly on account of his virtue. 
Indeed, the philosopher’s intellectual pursuit cannot be dissociated from his virtue. The 
philosopher understands that an important requirement for the pursuit of wisdom is to be virtuous 
and to help others become virtuous too. For the philosopher, virtue is not an end in itself. But 
unlike lovers of gain that seek virtue for the sake of future pleasure in the form of wealth or 
honor,394 the philosopher belongs to the noble and good human beings who do not seek virtue 
due to ambition or love of honor, unless by ambition we mean ambition in the highest sense, 
ambition to be wise,395 and by honor, posthumous glory. The philosopher hunts those human 
beings whose nature makes them apt to become kaloi kagathoi anthrōpoi (not andres), that is, 
 
391 See Xen. Mem. 1.6.2 and Cyn. 13.15-16. 
392 See Xen. Cyr. 8.1.4. 
393 See Xen. Hiero 5.2, 8.9-10; Mem. 1.2.8, 48, 61, 64. 
394 See Cyr. 1.5.9. 
395 See Strauss, On Tyranny, 199. 
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the noble and good man or woman who can be happy without honor.396  
It is noteworthy that Socrates refers to a noble and good woman (gynaika), because the 
expression kalokagathos is everywhere else reserved for men (andres) alone. Like his recurrent 
oath “by Hera!,”397 an invocation mostly used by women, his casual acknowledgment of noble 
goodness in women is very telling because it points to the fact that Socrates identifies himself 
with both women and men. It emphasizes the kinship between his courage and his moderation, 
which are masculine and feminine attributes, respectively.398 Socrates thus embodies philosophy, 
which is “the highest form of the mating of courage and moderation.”399 The philosopher’s 
courage is manifest in his willingness to question even the most authoritative opinions no less 
than in his willingness to give up his life for truth.400 The courage of the philosopher is not 
grounded in fear or shame but intimately related to his prudence and, thus, to reason.401 The 
philosopher’s moderation, in turn, is apparent both in the harmony of his soul—attained without 
compulsion—and in the “achievement of harmony between the excellence of man and the 
excellence of the citizen.”402 But to be more precise, Socrates identifies himself as neither male 
nor female; he is not an anēr and not a gynē but an anthrōpos: he is a human being tout court.403  
Attention to Socrates’s “sexlessness” is important because it brings out both his humanity 
and his inhumanity. As a human being, he loves mankind, especially his friends, even over his 
 
396 See Pl. Grg. 470e. 
397 See e.g., Pl. Apol. 24e, Grg. 449d, Phdr. 230b; Xen. Mem. 1.5.5, 3.10.9, 3.11.5, 4.2.9, 4.4.8, Oec. 10.1, 11.19, 
Symp. 4.54. In her translation of Xenophon’s Memorabilia  (158 n. 116), Amy Bonnette notes that in Aristophanes’s 
Ecclesiazusae 155-56 and 189-90, “women attempting to disguise themselves as men are chastised for continuing to 
use” this oath. 
398 See Pl. Leges 7.802e-803a. 
399 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy?, 40. 
400 See Allan Bloom, interpretive essay to The Republic of Plato, 456 n. 16. Compare Pericles’s definition of 
happiness as freedom and of freedom as courage (Thuc. 2.43), where courage means to be willing to die for the 
fatherland. 
401 See Pl. Leges 12.963e and Lach. 199d; Strauss, The City and Man, 113 with n. 44. 
402 Strauss, What Is Political Philosophy, 32. 
403 See Strauss, On Tyranny, 190. 
122  
own family.404 As one who surpassed many human beings,405 his “first friend” is wisdom.406 
Socrates’s erotic desire for human beings does not make him want to rule over them, as is the 
case with the political man. Socrates is happy in the company of friends but his happiness does 
not depend on others. It is not by chance that in the Cyropaedia, a text that tells the life of the 
most excellent political man, Xenophon would reserve the use of the expression “blessedly 
happy” for women or men who do not wish to rule or who have ceased to do so.407 In a similar 
vein, Socrates seems to fit the definition of the happy man, whose words he attributes to a 
woman who did not rule, Pericles’s wife Aspasia: 
For if a man depends on himself for everything or nearly everything that brings happiness 
and does not depend on other human beings, upon whose doing well or badly his own 
fortunes would be compelled to wander, he is the one who is best prepared to live. This 
man is the moderate one, and so also the courageous and prudent one. When his wealth 
and children come into being and perish, then most of all will this man obey the proverb, 
for since he relies on himself, he will be found neither taking joy nor grieving too 
much.408 
 
404 See Pl. Phd. 116a-b; Strauss, On Tyranny, 200. 
405 See Xen. Apol. 15. Robert Bartlett reads pollōn instead of pollōi; if the latter were correct, it would give a slightly 
different sense to the sentence and say that Socrates “by far excelled the rest of mankind.” In any case, both readings 
go well with our interpretation. 
406 See Pl. Lysis 219d. Although it is not explicitly stated as such, I take wisdom to be the “first friend” (prōton 
philon) Socrates refers to in this passage. For a fine study of the problem of friendship in Plato’s Lysis and of 
friendship in the classics more broadly, see Smith Pangle, Aristotle and the Philosophy of Friendship. 
407 The expression “blessedly happy” is Wayne Ambler’s rendering of the Greek verb makarizō. If I am not 
mistaken, this verb appears twice in the Cyropaedia, one in reference to the woman who was going to be the wife of 
a young handsome man, the other in reference to Cyrus, who desires to be remembered as having been blessedly 
happy (Cyr. 5.2.28 and 8.7.9). There are five occurrences of the adjective makarios: 7.2.28 (twice), both in reference 
to Croesus’s wife; 8.3.39, 48, in reference to Pheraulas, who gives away his wealth to have leisure; and 8.7.25, 
where Cyrus asks “what is more blessedly happy than being mingled with the earth….” See also Mem. 1.6.9 with 
1.6.14; Pl. Rep. 7.519c, 7540b; Arist. Pol. 7.2, 1324a25. 
408 Pl. Menex. 247e-248a. For the translation see Susan Collins and Devin Stauffer, Plato’s Menexenus and 
Pericles’s Funeral Oration: Empire and the Ends of Politics. 
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One cannot help but notice a certain analogy between Aspasia, the wife of the most prominent 
political man in Athens, and the “blessedly happy” wives mentioned in the Cyropaedia. Socrates, 
who was close to men in power but did not rule himself, resembles these women more than he 
does political men. 
We are now better able to state than we were at the beginning the relation between the 
divine and the human or between the high and the low. We have spoken enough about the 
disorder that characterizes the whole due especially to the prevalence of the low, to the political 
brutality that often dominates human life. Whereas gentlemen are persuaded to believe that there 
is a close connection between the divine and the human and that the gods are omniscient and 
care for human beings, from the standpoint of philosophy, that is no more than a noble lie. There 
is indeed a connection between the high and the low but not in the way that perfect gentlemen 
believe it to exist. The only and true connection between the two realms is the philosopher 
himself. Only those who follow the path of the philosopher will make the high rule over the low. 
The philosopher, like a great daimōn, acts as a bridge that binds mortals to the eternal. The erōs 
of the philosopher, his love of human beings, turns him into a daimonic intermediary between the 
human and the divine. In other words, Socrates takes the place of Eros.409 
In his conversation with the sophist Antiphon, Socrates holds “that to need nothing is 
divine, that to need as little as possible is nearest to the divine.”410 That Socrates approaches the 
divine is thus suggested by himself when he speaks of his justice. He asserts that he is “so well 
adapted to his present possessions as not to need in addition any of the possessions of others.”411 
 
409 See Pl. Symp. 202d, 204b. In his insightful book, Eros and Socratic Political Philosophy, David Levy argues that 
Socrates’s praise and blame of eros are both qualified. Interestingly to us, he links the praise of eros to the role it 
plays in knowledge of oneself. Moreover, he intimates that eros may reflect both the low longings of human beings 
and our highest concerns (110, 126-28, 151-52). For a broad study of political eros in antiquity, see Paul Ludwig, 
Eros and Polis. 
410 Xen. Mem. 1.6.10; cf. Hiero 7.4. 
411 Xen. Apol. 16. For other places where it might be suggested that the philosopher is akin to the divine, see Pl. Rep. 
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Needing very little, he can be just also in another sense, namely, by not harming anyone and by 
benefiting those he dealt with to the greatest extent.412 It is ultimately Socrates’s justice that helps 
explain his philanthropy. But since his justice would not be possible without courage and 
moderation, and since all three parts of virtue are in him directed toward wisdom, we must say 
that not a part of the philosopher’s virtue but rather the unity of virtue in the philosopher 
accounts for his blessed way of life and his love of human beings. Whereas Socrates’s death 
represents the result of the starkest confrontation between philosophy and politics, Socrates’s 
life—which is the embodiment of his own daimōn—represents the greatest correspondence 
between the philosophical and the political, or the connection between the human and the divine. 
 
Conclusions 
We began our inquiry by asking what is tyranny, from the standpoint of political 
philosophy rather than from the standpoint of the city, noting that whereas tyranny is for all 
practical purposes undesirable, it is nevertheless theoretically useful. We then spoke of the 
possible defense of tyranny as necessary to understand the nature of political things. 
Furthermore, we contrasted the view of classical political philosophers with that of the moderns 
to argue that modernity has abandoned the quest for wisdom and neglected the interplay between 
the nature of political things and human nature as conceived by the classics. We argued that the 
demands of the city against private life call for the education of rulers and citizens in political 
virtue and arrived at the conclusion that civic kalokagathia is a concession on the part of the 
philosopher, but a concession that stems from his selfless generosity and from his desire to 
benefit all to the greatest extent possible. We noted that education in kalokagathia may cease to 
 
6.500c-d, 9.590c-d, Leges 2.666d-e; Xen. Apol. 15, Oec. 21.11; Arist. Eth. Nic. 10.7, 1177b27. 
412 See Xen. Mem. 4.8.11; also Pl. Rep. 1.335b-e. 
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be useful and thus may need to change in time. The solutions that political philosophy may offer 
have a temporary, contingent character, whereas the theoretical insights of the classics (the 
understanding of the problems) have a universal, unchanging character. 
As we have seen in these concluding pages, Socrates was happy right before drinking the 
hemlock because his death would be the emblem of his subversive thinking, of his daring 
speeches, of his life of questioning, of knowing: it would show that he was truly virtuous, that 
the high truth of human nature is confirmed because in him the high rules over the low. 
Socrates’s exceptional character showed that it is possible to reconcile political actions with the 
higher truth of philosophy. From the all-embracing viewpoint of philosophy, it becomes clear 
that Socrates, by using his way of life as an example, sought to educate everyone, to impede 





MODERN TYRANNY OR MACHIAVELLI’S RESTORATION OF PHILOSOPHY 
 




I should begin by saying that some of the claims that I make in this chapter, namely, that 
Machiavelli is both a philosopher and a Socratic one, are difficult to demonstrate, especially 
given the breadth and complexity of the topic and the limited space we have here. Although I 
admit that proving these claims is a tall order that would require no less than a book-length 
analysis, I do not believe a smoking gun is necessary to think more deeply about Machiavelli and 
the issues he raises. My wish in standing by these ambitious claims is both to sound the depth of 
Machiavelli’s thought and to show some viable directions in which future research might go. 
“Never believe that the things that depart from the ordinary modes are done by chance; 
and if you were to believe that they do so to be more beautiful, you would err. For where strength 
is necessary, one does not take account of beauty.”413 Thus Fabrizio Colonna speaks to Batista 
della Palla in the seventh book of Machiavelli’s Art of War. If these words are in some way 
descriptive of Machiavelli’s own enterprise, we can begin to understand what made Machiavelli 
part ways with the ancients, at least in what concerns things beautiful. The word “beautiful,” as 
we saw in chapter 3, is one of the meanings of the Greek word “kalos,” which we have rendered 
above as “noble.” Machiavelli was compelled to deliberately abandon beauty or nobility in 
political things because strength had become more necessary. A great and continuous malignity 
 
413 Niccolò Machiavelli, Art of War, 7.52 (148). 
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of fortune, as he describes it,414 had posed to him the challenge of finding a way to preserve or 
restore the heart of philosophy while doing away with its noble teachings. 
Machiavelli believed to have found the solution to the problem facing his time in the 
radical subversion of conventional morality, which he would seek to replace with a wholly new 
understanding of morality. But Machiavelli’s new morality called for new political standards that 
could give sufficient force and hopes of durability to his enterprise. Along with his critique of 
morality, especially of Christian morality, he needed to propose a new best regime that would not 
lie in the afterworld or in men’s imagination, and whose attainment would not have to be left to 
chance or fortune. Machiavelli’s politico-philosophical project, if it were to take root, entailed a 
“spiritual warfare,”415 which itself required a defense of tyranny. Therefore, if one is to speak of 
modern tyranny, one must refer to Machiavelli’s oeuvre. With Machiavelli as the leading 
philosopher of his time, tyranny would become the ultimate bulwark of philosophy. And real 
men who, we have seen, are otherwise opposed to philosophy, would become, if unwittingly, its 
defenders.416  
To explain more in detail what Machiavelli’s project consists in seems less pressing than 
to explain how the defense of tyranny can in any way be considered necessary for the restoration 
of philosophy. That tyranny is not only a solution but also the best or the only possible solution 
for the recovery of the core teachings of classical political philosophy is perversely 
counterintuitive, to say the least. Though the ancients could not deny that there is a certain 
kinship between tyranny and philosophy and that the careful study of tyranny is a most useful 
way of pointing to the problem of law and legitimacy, they nevertheless referred to tyranny 
 
414 Machiavelli, Prince, Epistle Dedicatory (2). All references are to Leo Paul de Alvarez’s translation. 
415 For an account of Machiavelli’s “spiritual warfare,” see Leo Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli, 35, 102, and 
especially 171-2. 
416 I believe that in his Restatement, Leo Strauss also arrives at this conclusion, of which we will speak more in the 
next chapter. 
128  
discreetly and explored the tyrannical way of life with the sole intention of pointing beyond it, 
toward the acquisition of philosophical knowledge. Philosophical knowledge, they believed, 
must be accompanied by full awareness of the limits that political life poses to human perfection. 
They never thought of tyranny as a practical proposal, whereas Machiavelli’s aim was precisely 
to propound tyranny as the best political solution. Moreover, for Machiavelli, the defense of 
tyranny would be in accordance with his philosophical pursuit. To restore the heart of philosophy 
Machiavelli found a seemingly heartless solution. 
How is it that tyranny turned from being theoretically useful or an inquiry worth 
exploring merely as a thought experiment to being desirable, sought and promoted as a practical 
solution? This is one of the questions I wish to answer in this chapter. But perhaps more startling 
than that is the fact that I consider Machiavelli a philosopher who espoused the main tenets of 
classical political philosophy or, in other words, that Machiavelli was a Socratic. Although I am 
not the first to make this claim,417 I wish to show in what ways and to what extent Machiavelli 
may be considered a Socratic philosopher and how, on the basis of what I have argued in the 
previous chapters, it is possible to square Machiavelli’s way with that of the ancients. 
Admittedly, Machiavelli’s utter discretion and almost absolute silence about his philosophic 
inclinations make it very difficult to prove that he was a philosopher, let alone to define what 
kind. Nevertheless, I consider it to be a worthwhile endeavor. To gauge the extent to which 
Machiavelli was a Socratic it is helpful to understand the universal and permanent character of 
classical political philosophy. 
 
417 Although I try to follow in Leo Strauss’s footsteps, who comes closest to saying that Machiavelli was a Socratic, 
I wish to make Machiavelli’s link to the ancients more explicit than he does. While Strauss concludes that 
Machiavelli’s teaching “is obviously opposed to that of classical political philosophy or of the Socratic tradition (see 
Thoughts on Machiavelli, 290), I want to show in what sense this is true and to what extent it is not. Besides Leo 
Strauss, Erica Benner has argued that Machiavelli is a Socratic but her assessment is based on a view of philosophy 
that differs from mine, for she conceives of philosophy as both public spirited and in harmony rather than in tension 
with politics (see Machiavelli’s Ethics, esp. 50-51). See also Catherine Zuckert, “Machiavelli: A Socratic?” 
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The greatest obstacle to gaining access to Machiavelli’s political philosophy are his 
prominent silences and omissions, of which we will say more below. In what follows, we will 
first treat Machiavelli’s rejection of pious cruelty in favor of cruelty well-used, which shows his 
inclination toward the common good. We will then address Machiavelli’s teaching of effectual 
truth which, I contend, replaces the ancient teaching of kalokagathia. In the second part of the 
chapter we will speak of Machiavelli’s silences and deliberate omissions, of his understanding of 
arms as knowledge, to conclude with what I have called his “philosophical state.” By uncovering 
the philosophical dimension of Machiavelli’s teachings, we will be better able not only to see 
Machiavelli as a Socratic philosopher but we will reassert the fundamental tenets of classical 
political philosophy. 
 
I. The Tyrannical Life 
The works of Machiavelli can be understood in their own terms, without the need for 
recourse to the writings of other authors. However, they are best or more easily understood in the 
context of what, by the time he lived, can be called the philosophical tradition. Machiavelli is an 
inheritor as much as he is a founder. Despite his claim to be radically original,418 and despite his 
remarkable silences regarding the ancients, his writings are part of the long conversation about 
God, the world, and man, that takes place over the centuries. While he might have joined that 
conversation had he lived many centuries before or after, it was his fortune that he should be 
born in a time when philosophy as he understood it had been abandoned and the possibility to 
restore it was in his hands. The need to bring about that restoration forced him to become a 
founder. He could not be a re-founder of ancient orders for a return to the past, to the original 
 
418 In the Discourses, Machiavelli declares to have taken “a path as yet untrodden by anyone.” See Book I, Preface 
(5). 
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form of classical political philosophy, would have been either impossible or fruitless.419 
Machiavelli was compelled to introduce new modes and orders, but, as I will try to show, the 
desire to restore the past permeates his work. Readers of Machiavelli must therefore be prepared 
to read him both by himself and in conjunction with the political philosophy of the ancients, on 
whose old foundations he builds his new edifice. 
By reading Machiavelli’s works on their own, we learn why he was compelled to 
introduce new modes and orders. We learn what, in his view, had so changed in the world as to 
require the shocking boldness of his teachings. While it is true that his critique also reaches the 
ancients, I contend that his critique of the ancients is less severe than the critique against the 
spirit of his time. Whereas his critique of the ancients is aimed at adapting their philosophic 
politics to fulfill its purpose in the context of Christianity, the critique of his time is aimed at 
demolishing Christian political philosophy. Certainly, a superficial reading of Machiavelli’s 
Prince leaves us with the impression that he attacks both the truth of the ancients and the truth of 
Christianity by putting forward the effectual truth as, so to speak, an instrument of universal 
measure. However, I will argue below, Machiavelli’s effectual truth is intended to take in his own 
political philosophy the equivalent place that kalokagathia occupied within the larger frame of 
classical political philosophy. It is therefore crucial—not to be blinded by effectual truth, or in 
order to overcome its shocking effect—to distinguish between Machiavelli’s philosophic politics 
and his political philosophy, especially if one reads him on his own. 
But why was Machiavelli compelled to introduce new modes and orders? More 
specifically, what compelled Machiavelli to teach and defend the art of tyranny? If one truly 
believes that Machiavelli wanted to restore classical political philosophy, it becomes necessary to 
 
419 See King Agis’s failed attempt to re-found Sparta, and the result of Cleomenes’s futile success in Discourses 
1.9.4 (32), examples which perhaps gave pause to Machiavelli and contributed to shaping his own enterprise; see 
also Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 114 and 172. 
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understand what change had occurred that made a full return to the classics both desirable and 
impossible. Moreover, it forces one to think, what could make the defense of tyranny necessary? 
The only reasonable way to explain Machiavelli’s defense of tyranny is that he recognized that a 
worse kind of tyranny than the one he was forced to propose loomed large over the world. He 
seems to have reached the unfortunate conclusion that only through the promotion of outspoken 
tyranny could other forms of tyranny be stopped while making his own tyrannical project prosper 
in the way he contrived. In other words, I contend that he did not defend tyranny unqualifiedly: 
he defended and promoted a specific kind of tyranny against other, more undesirable kinds. This, 
of course, does not make his approach to tyranny or his evil or wicked teachings any less 
shocking. Nevertheless, looking into his teachings in this way might help us gain a broader 
perspective. 
Before we embark on this challenge, I must say a word regarding Machiavelli’s “evil” 
teachings, lest I am accused of defending tyranny myself. For those who are willing to give 
Machiavelli the benefit of the doubt it is necessary to wonder about his intentions in presenting 
his teachings thus. Machiavelli must have chosen to present his wicked teachings so openly and 
in his own name for a reason. If we manage to get past their shocking effect—without growing 
numb to the staggering coldness of Machiavelli’s remarks but weighing every word—we might 
find a deeper meaning in his advice. Just as with the classics we were invited to look beyond the 
highest political good, aimed at through kalokagathia, toward the highest human good, with 
Machiavelli’s writings we are pressured to look beyond the brutalization to which he subjects his 
readers toward the sub-human. Machiavelli’s purpose in leading us in that dreary direction, I will 
argue, is no other than to restate the hierarchy of goods (which coincides to a great extent with 
that of the classics) in his own terms, that is, focusing on the lowest steps on the ladder. With 
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these reservations in mind, let us contrast Machiavelli’s tyranny with those other forms of 
tyranny that he most forcefully rejected. 
 
CRUELTY AND PIOUS CRUELTY 
The commanding authority has the power to impose an obligation binding not only to external but also to internal 
and spiritual obedience. 
Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum 
 
 
An indication that Machiavelli does not promote every kind of tyranny is that he also 
does not promote every kind of cruelty or, at any rate, he does not promote cruelty for its own 
sake. In the Prince, Machiavelli gives advice on the proper use of cruelty and provides examples 
both to support his view of well-used cruelty and to show that he finds fault with cruelty badly 
used. A memorable example of cruelty well used is that of Cesare Borgia, who first used the 
truculent governor Remirro de Orco (Ramiro de Lorqua) to bring order to the city and then had 
him executed, sawn in half, and his bisected body exposed in the public square. Cesare Borgia 
thus made the people believe that “if any cruelty had been done, it had not come from him,” and, 
Machiavelli concludes, “the ferocity of that spectacle left the people at the same time satisfied 
and stupefied.”420 Machiavelli further illustrates well-used cruelty with the example of 
Agathocles, whose brutal cruelty proved his virtue, except that, in his case, he acquired imperium 
but failed to acquire glory.421 Through these examples, Machiavelli conveys that cruelty may be 
used so long as it does not tarnish the image of the prince. 
What is remarkable about these qualifications on the use of cruelty is that the prince 
needs to take into account the effects his cruelty will have on the people, even if only to take care 
of his image, which is an indispensable measure to maintain his state. Aware that a tyrant might 
 
420 Prince, ch. 7 (45). 
421 Prince, ch. 8 (52). 
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not be concerned with the common good, Machiavelli manages to make “princes” care for the 
common good out of selfish considerations. Despite his criticism of the character of the 
people,422 Machiavelli insists that “it is necessary for a prince to have the people friendly,” for 
although the people is insufficient to sustain the prince if he is oppressed by enemies or by 
magistrates, without the people “he does not have a remedy.”423 Accordingly, well-used cruelties 
are “done at one stroke for the necessity of securing oneself, and which are afterwards not 
continued within, but converted to the greatest possible utility of the subjects.”424  
Machiavelli also insists that a prince ought not take away his subjects’ property or 
women, for if he does, he would make himself hated and would not have the people’s support.425 
In short, by suggesting that cruelty well used must make his state stronger without making him 
hated, Machiavelli sets a limit to the cruelties that a prince can use. By addressing cruelty, a 
common trait among tyrants, in this peculiar way, Machiavelli is able to make those tyrannies 
that are somehow tied to the common good more desirable than tyrannies that revolve around the 
wishes of the prince alone. In other words, if cruelty must ultimately redound to the benefit of 
the subjects so that they will be useful for the prince, then Machiavelli promotes what we may 
call beneficent tyranny. By showing himself as an utterly unscrupulous man, Machiavelli is more 
likely to gain the favor of tyrants, who might follow his advice to the letter. If this interpretation 
is correct, it would confirm Leo Strauss’s suspicion that “it is precisely Machiavelli’s perfect 
understanding of Xenophon’s chief pedagogic lesson [of the Hiero] which accounts for the most 
 
422 See Prince, ch. 17 (101): “For one can say this generally of men: that they are ungrateful, fickle, hypocrites and 
dissemblers, evaders of dangers, lovers of gain; and while you do them good, they are wholly yours, offering you 
blood, goods, life, and sons, as has been said above, when need is far off; but when it approaches you, then they 
revolt.” 
423 Prince, ch. 9 (59). 
424 Prince, ch. 8 (54). 
425 See Prince, chs. 17 (101) and 19 (111). 
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shocking sentences occurring in the Prince.”426 
But Machiavelli does not leave it at that. He does not seem content with the condition to 
satisfy the people that the prince is not cruel or that his cruelties are necessary for the common 
good or justly deserved. After all, people can be easily deceived. As he asserts in chapter 18 of 
the Prince, “men are so simple, and so obedient to present necessity, that he who deceives will 
always find one who will let himself be deceived.”427 To set a limit to cruelty by appealing to the 
people’s approval is insufficient. Therefore, what determines whether cruelty is well or badly 
used must be linked to the end for which it is used as well as its success in reaching that end. If 
the end in sight is not meritorious, or if the cruel deeds to attain it will fail to meet their purpose, 
then that cruelty is badly used and ought to be avoided. Although we are dealing with the base 
topic of cruelty, this classification already points in an interesting direction. Besides keeping the 
people friendly, Machiavelli intimates that the prince ought to be concerned with an end that lies 
beyond the people’s approval. Machiavelli is concerned with the common good, not as the 
people might conceive of it, but as a virtuous prince, or as he himself, conceives of it. 
This leads to the fairly obvious question, what is the common good for Machiavelli or 
what ends are according to him laudable and which ones are worthy of reproach? The most 
obvious answer is that the end is marked by whatever the prince’s wishes are. His most important 
concern is to satisfy his own desires. And it is likely that the prince’s first desire is the same as 
what according to Machiavelli is most people’s desire, the desire to acquire, for “it is a thing 
truly very natural and ordinary to desire to acquire.”428 That such an end would set a limit to the 
prince is difficult to see unless one also considers that for Machiavelli not every acquisition is 
beneficial. Indeed, acquisitions are harmful if the one who acquires does not proceed according 
 
426 Strauss, On Tyranny, 56; see also Thoughts on Machiavelli, 82. 
427 Prince, ch. 18 (108). 
428 Prince, ch. 3 (17). 
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to virtue—that is, according to Machiavelli’s understanding of virtue—or if his dominion is not 
well ordered.429 Virtuous princes and well-ordered dominions are those in which the people are 
so strong that they demand an even stronger prince. 
Whence it follows that those dominions that do not make their people strong are not well-
ordered, their acquisitions are harmful, and the cruelties committed to preserve them are very 
likely to be badly used. Although Machiavelli does not say explicitly that King Ferdinand’s 
cruelty is badly used, there are indications that suggest that his “pious cruelty” falls into that 
category. For even though Machiavelli describes King Ferdinand almost as a new prince 
“because from a weak king he became by fame and glory the first king of the Christians,” he also 
says that a more “miserable and rare example” of pious cruelty cannot be found than when he 
drove the Marranos out of his kingdom and despoiled them. It is not King Ferdinand’s cruelty 
per se that Machiavelli calls into question but the end which the king pursued. Machiavelli says 
the king turned to pious cruelty “in order to undertake greater enterprises, always serving 
religion.”430 King Ferdinand did not serve the people nor did he seek to make them stronger but 
served religion instead. In his case, this is particularly prejudicial because the religion he served, 
unlike Roman religion, weakens the people by praising humility and demanding not to sin. 
King Ferdinand’s religion contrasts with Roman religion in many ways. According to 
Machiavelli “the religion introduced by Numa was among the first causes of the happiness of 
that city. For it caused good orders; good orders make good fortune; and from good fortune arose 
the happy successes of enterprises.”431 Christian religion did the opposite, for it promoted orders 
that made the people servile. A king or prince who persecutes and despoils his subjects on 
account of their purported internal and spiritual disobedience weakens them. And a weak people 
 
429 See Discourses, 2.19 (172-3). 
430 Prince, ch. 21 (132-3), my emphasis. 
431 Discourses, 1.11.4 (35). 
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is doomed to live servilely. It follows that pious cruelty is badly used because it does not help to 
introduce good orders. Instead, it punishes men for their thoughts rather than their actions; it 
persecutes on account of sins committed in thought and fails to take notice of military sins, the 
only sins which according to Machiavelli ought to be avoided or punished.432 
If a weak people is doomed to a life of servility, it follows that all regimes must be 
concerned with making their people strong, not weak. The sin of Christianity is to have made the 
people weak and to pride itself on it. From the viewpoint of Machiavelli, that sin is worse than 
the alleged sins of a tyrant, for a weak people cannot defend itself and is bound to fall prey to the 
first enemy that confronts it.433 Therefore, Machiavelli asserts, “it is more true than any other 
truth that if where there are men there are not soldiers, it arises through a defect of the prince and 
not through any other defect, either of the site or of nature.”434 Machiavelli accused Christianity 
of aiming too high because, as a consequence, it failed to benefit men not only to the greatest 
extent possible but even less than a reasonably humane tyranny would! By “humane tyranny” we 
mean one in which the tyrant “is not some barbarian prince, a destroyer of countries and waster 
of all the civilizations of men,” but one who “has within himself human and ordinary orders”;435 
a tyrant who despite his selfishness or because of it will make his people strong. 
After pondering the effects Christianity had on humanity, Machiavelli seems to have 
reached the conclusion that so long as the tyrant is intelligent enough to make his subjects strong, 
that tyranny is preferable to a free republic whose subjects are weak. For it is naïve to believe 
that a republic or principate can live a peaceful life without being subjected to the power of a 
 
432 Prince, ch. 12 (72); see also Discourses, 2.18, and Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 159. 
433 Machiavelli intimates that as an indirect consequence of the Church’s debilitation of Italy, “Charles, King of 
France, was allowed to take Italy with chalk.” Prince, ch. 12 (72). On the attribution of that expression to Alexander 
VI, see Leo Paul de Alvarez’s note 5 (76). 
434 Discourses, 1.21.1; see also Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 178. 
435 Discourses, 2.2.4 (133). 
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stronger one. In a passage that is highly reminiscent of Socrates’s conversation with Aristippus in 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Machiavelli asserts that 
it is impossible for a republic to succeed in staying quiet and enjoying its freedom and 
little borders. For if it will not molest others, it will be molested, and from being molested 
will arise the wish and the necessity to acquire; and if it does not have an enemy outside, 
it will find one at home, as it appears necessarily happens to all great cities.436 
Therefore, the main concern of a prince or republic ought to be to make their people strong. 
Christianity does the opposite because, concerned about the souls of men, it makes them humble 
and resistant rather than strong. 
“Our religion,” says Machiavelli, “has glorified humble and contemplative more than 
active men. It has then placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and contempt of things 
human,” so that “this mode of life thus seems to have rendered the world weak and given it in 
prey to criminal men, who can manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go 
to paradise, think more of enduring their beatings than of avenging them.”437 Machiavelli was 
more concerned about what he saw as the tyranny of thought of Christianity than about tyrannies 
of openly ambitious, selfish princes. Faced with those two options, he was compelled to make a 
prudential choice between them. Prudence, indeed, according to Machiavelli, consists in 
knowing how to choose between inconveniences, for one is never able to avoid one without 
running into another.438 Open political tyranny is preferable to the veiled tyranny of thought that 
Christianity represented, because whereas the latter has no remedy, the former one can try to 
transform so as to make it beneficent. 
 
436 Discourses, 2.19.1 (173); see Xen. Mem. 2.1.14. 
437 Discourses, 2.2.2 (131). 
438 Prince, ch. 21 (135). 
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EFFECTUAL TRUTH439 
We ought not to hesitate nor to be abashed, but boldly to enter upon our researches concerning animals of every sort 
and kind, knowing that in not one of them is Nature or Beauty lacking. 
Aristotle, Parts of Animals 
 
 
Classical political philosophers were conscious of all kinds of tyranny. They, however, 
did not feel the necessity to choose between them. But if they had to choose one, they would 
have chosen the tyranny of the philosopher, which is nothing else than the rule of the 
philosopher-king as depicted by Socrates in Plato’s Republic. The tyranny of the philosopher is 
the only regime that is truly beneficent because it is concerned not with the common good in the 
political sense but with the common good simply, for mankind not as citizens but as human 
beings.440 The classics knew, however, that the conditions necessary for a philosopher-king to 
rule would never be met, and that to have the philosopher-king rule by compulsion would go 
against the nature of the philosopher and would defeat the purpose of his rule. Therefore, as Leo 
Strauss argues, in political terms the classics gave up the simply best regime and opted for the 
practically best regime, “the rule, under law, of gentlemen, or the mixed regime.”441 
Among the classics, perhaps Xenophon alone would have chosen beneficent tyranny (in 
the political sense) as a desirable solution to the political problem. Indeed, his Cyropaedia seems 
to be a panegyric on beneficent tyranny. The disappointing endings of Xenophon’s non-Socratic 
works are not necessarily meant as a critique of the political solution they offer but, as Eric 
Buzzetti has rightly pointed out, they are meant as a critique of politics as such in comparison to 
the philosophic way of life; they indicate that “the life devoted to politics is ultimately a 
 
439 Many articles have treated the topic of Machiavelli’s “effectual truth” more extensively than I do here. For two 
brief but useful accounts, see Harvey Mansfield’s “Strauss on the Prince,” and “Machiavelli’s Enterprise.” 
440 See Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 284. 
441 Strauss, Natural Right and History, 143; see also On Tyranny, 76. 
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disappointment.”442 But in strictly political terms, it is not absurd to suggest that Xenophon 
contrived the Cyropaedia as the political solution par excellence. However, even if we leave 
aside the disappointment at the end of the Cyropaedia to focus on Xenophon’s praise of Cyrus, 
the Cyropaedia is still disappointing throughout because the solution it puts forward is difficult, 
nay, impossible to replicate. To realize the unlikeliness of an enterprise like Cyrus’s to occur, it 
suffices to think of the conditions that had to be met for someone like Cyrus (a Persian who was 
also the righteous heir to the Median throne) to receive the education he received and become the 
perfect prince he grew up to be. Though a rule like that of Cyrus is not as unlikely as the rule of a 
philosopher-king, Xenophon still thought of its coming about as highly dependent on chance.443 
It was Machiavelli who thought that it was possible, if not to replicate Cyrus’s life, at 
least to produce beneficent tyrannies without relying on chance. Since, as we have seen, he felt 
compelled to choose among different kinds of tyrannies, it was absolutely necessary for him to 
find a safe way to attain the practically best tyranny. Only by putting forward the practically best 
tyranny would he be able to, on the one hand, replace and thwart in the future tyranny of thought 
and, on the other, transform petty tyrannies into beneficent ones. If any part of classical political 
philosophy was to be restored, Machiavelli had to face the formidable and unpalatable task of 
establishing the conditions for this new, practically unforeseen type of tyranny. Machiavelli’s 
beneficent tyranny is thus intended to preserve the core principles of philosophy by doing away 
with its peripheral teachings. 
But was beneficent tyranny in the form Machiavelli contrived truly new and unforeseen? 
In chapter 1 we saw that every regime is in a sense tyrannical, even those regimes that seek the 
common good, because all rulers are compelled to impose themselves over some part of the 
 
442 Buzzetti, Xenophon the Socratic Prince, 294. 
443 See Strauss, On Tyranny, 75. 
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city.444 Rather than discovering a wholly new form of government, Machiavelli seems to have 
focused on the tyrannical aspects that all regimes share, especially when they are founded. What 
characterizes Machiavelli’s enterprise is less his discovery of a new manner of governing than 
his effort to make beneficent tyrannies replicable or, at any rate, more likely to happen. His 
originality lies in the boldness with which he treated human nature to attain that goal.  
Here lies Machiavelli’s starkest break with the ancients. Unlike the ancients, who always 
pointed to the perfection of human nature, Machiavelli proposed to exploit human nature without 
aiming at its perfection. Whereas the ancients always strived for virtue even though they 
acknowledged that few, if anyone, would ever be perfectly virtuous, Machiavelli—as regards his 
political solution—abandoned the prospect of perfect virtue altogether. Or, to be more precise, he 
replaced ancient virtue with his own virtù, a form of virtue deprived of nobility and which was 
valuable not in itself but as a means to acquire. As I argued in the previous chapter, the ancients 
saw gentlemanship or kalokagathia as the best political solution. They were fortunate enough to 
have found a way to make common opinion nobler and to a certain extent compatible with the 
philosophic way of life. Machiavelli was compelled to reject that solution. Machiavelli breaks 
with the ancients but this break is partial to the extent that he is guided by the same awareness of 
the problems that inspired the classics’ thought. 
In contrast to the classics, Machiavelli could not succeed in his enterprise by aiming at 
the ennoblement of common opinion because the very idea of noble things had been assimilated 
to Christian principles. Indeed, though in medieval times classical nobility had been adapted to 
fit a noble warrior society which clashed with Christian virtues, in time, that warrior society 
managed to conform to the most important of those virtues, especially mercy (misericordia), 
 
444 See above, pp. 18, 22, and 32-33. 
141  
humility (humilitas), and clemency (clementia).445 Since, as we argued above, Christianity had 
placed the highest good in humility, abjectness, and the contempt of human things, Machiavelli 
could not be victorious in the spiritual war against Christianity by promoting nobility. To the 
contrary, he was forced to transform common opinion to make it ignoble or base. In fact, 
Machiavelli was compelled to cut all ties with anything deemed superior—philosophy included. 
It was inevitable for him to separate wisdom from moderation. For if the political realm was to 
regain its force it was necessary “to go behind [drieto] to the effectual truth of the thing,”446 so as 
to make worldly courage the highest good. Machiavelli refused to be guided by appearances and 
went under the classical veil of excellence to touch the truth. 
Leaving aside for the moment the place that the teaching of effectual truth occupies 
within the larger frame of Machiavelli’s political philosophy, let us try to understand what that 
teaching consists in. To look at the effectual truth means to pay attention to how things are rather 
than to how things ought to be. This teaching gives more weight to the well-being of people’s 
bodies, so to speak, than to the well-being of their souls. It focuses on the necessary conditions 
for a society to thrive in terms of possessions, wealth, arms and strength rather than on the 
cultivation of more abstract goods. It is marked by the urgency to deal with political things in the 
best manner possible. By promoting a society that could thrive economically, people would be 
more able to withstand enemy attacks and to defend their freedom. Both in the Prince and in the 
Discourses, Machiavelli shows, in what may be called his prophecy of modern economy, what 
such a society might look like. Let us look first at the Prince: 
 
445 See Gerd Althoff, Die Macht der Rituale, 106-119. 
446 Machiavelli, Prince, ch. 15 (93). I here follow Leo Paul de Alvarez’s translation of the word drieto, which I 
believe he correctly renders as “behind,” in contrast to other translators who have translated it as “directly.” See 
Florio's 1611 Italian/English Dictionary: Queen Anna's New World of Words, s.v. “Driéto”; also Machiavelli’s use 
of drieto elsewhere, e.g., Mandragola, Act 2, Scenes 3 and 5 (in Tutte le Opere, 2236); and John Najemy, Between 
Friends, 189-90. 
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A prince should also show himself a lover of virtue, giving welcome to virtuous men, and 
honoring the excellent in an art. Next, he should encourage his citizens, enabling them 
quietly to practise their trades in merchandise and in agriculture and in every other trade 
of men—so that this one is not afraid to embellish his possessions for fear that these 
might be taken from him, nor this other to open a traffic for fear of taxes.447 
One cannot say that Machiavelli revives ancient kalokagathia because he does not allude and 
indeed avoids referring to anything noble. But in a way that reminds one of Simonides’s advice 
to the tyrant Hiero, Machiavelli keeps honors as a way to persuade men to make the city better. 
In other words, he maintains love of honor (philotimia) as the driving force that makes the city 
prosper. The teaching of effectual truth replaces the classical teaching of kalokagathia.  
To build his new edifice, we said above, Machiavelli could not merely use the prevailing 
opinions of his time but needed to transform common opinion. Machiavelli knew that he did not 
have to conform himself to the existing common opinion because he had learned that lesson from 
Christianity itself. Indeed, Christianity had managed to change common opinion without 
compulsion and in such a striking manner that it even contributed to the fall of the Roman 
empire. In the words of Leo Strauss, “Christianity conquered the Roman empire without the use 
of force, merely by peacefully propagating its new modes and orders. Machiavelli’s hope for the 
success of his venture is founded on the success of Christianity.”448  In accordance with this, 
Machiavelli further suggests that a prince should, at the right times, keep people occupied with 
feasts and spectacles. He thus sought to change the paradigm people had of their private well-
being and, consequently, their idea of the common good, now tied to safety, entertainment, 
wealth; in sum, to the economic rather than the spiritual prosperity of the city as a whole. Unlike 
 
447 Prince, ch. 21 (135). 
448 Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 172-3. 
143  
the ancients, who saw the desire to acquire in excess as ill-willed, Machiavelli, as we mentioned 
above, made that desire not only acceptable but even commendable.449  
Maybe Machiavelli would have agreed with Thomas Aquinas’s phrase, “et tamen 
minimum quod potest haberi de cognitione rerum altissimarum, desiderabilius est quam 
certissima cognitio quae habetur de minimis rebus,”450 but he realized that any consideration of 
higher things is not possible if the most certain knowledge of low things is lacking or neglected. 
Though less desirable, to attend to political things is more feasible, more necessary, and more 
urgent because only thus can one hope for political freedom. And political freedom, as 
Machiavelli saw it, was the first step to attain freedom of thought. 
Turning now to the Discourses we can see more clearly the close connection Machiavelli 
found between freedom and the increase of wealth: 
For it all comes from the free way of life then and the servile way of life now. For all 
towns and provinces that live freely in every part… make very great profits.… He does 
not fear that his patrimony will be taken away, and he knows not only that they are born 
free and not slaves, but that they can, through their virtue, become princes. Riches are 
seen to multiply there in larger number, both those that come from agriculture and those 
that come from the arts. For each willingly multiplies that thing and seeks to acquire 
those goods he believes he can enjoy once acquired. From which it arises that men in 
rivalry think of private and public advantages, and both the one and the other come to 
grow marvelously.451 
 
449 See Xen. Mem. 2.6.21; Machiavelli, Prince, ch. 3 (17). 
450 ST Iª q.1 a.5 ad 1, “yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than 
the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things”; see also Arist. Part. an. 1.5, 644b, and Strauss, What Is 
Political Philosophy?, 11. 
451 Discourses, 2.2.3 (132); the emphasis is mine. 
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I want to point to the importance Machiavelli places on rivalry over friendship. Like the classics, 
Machiavelli recognized that both friendship and hostility are essential parts of political life. But 
whereas the classics, in accordance with the practically best regime they promoted, put all the 
emphasis on friendship while they were quieter about hostility, Machiavelli did the reverse: he 
promoted hostility and was quieter about friendship.452 Friendship in the city, desirable as it 
might be, was incompatible with the tyranny Machiavelli was pushing for. For although in theory 
friendship ought to make the city stronger, in practice, and especially in the Christian context, 
friendship reinforced values that were incompatible with a well-ordered regime in Machiavellian 
terms. Friendship promotes moderateness in property and wealth, gratefulness and mutual trust, 
all of which are good qualities in themselves but are undesirable to the extent that they allow 
both domestic and foreign enemies to take advantage of the good-willed. It is not friendship but 
hostility that breeds the kind of competition that will make a city safe against lovers of gain 
precisely by promoting that all become lovers of gain without shame. 
It is only natural that Machiavelli should turn to the art of war as the best remedy against 
weakness. Knowledge of the art of war helps avoid the afflictions produced by the confrontation 
with ignoble enemies, which are precisely the afflictions that pious cruelty leads to. To return to 
the Prince, Machiavelli there asserts that “a prince, then, ought to have no other object nor any 
other thought, nor take anything else for his art, but war, its orders and its discipline; for this is 
the only art awaiting one who commands.” And again, that “he ought, therefore, never to lift his 
thought from the exercise of war, and he ought to exercise more in peace than in war.”453 
 
452 See Xen. Mem. 2.6.17-21; see also chapter 2 above, p. 91-92. I believe that a thorough study on the topic of 
friendship in Machiavelli’s oeuvre would be a most worthwhile endeavor. Aside from the explicit references to 
friends in, for example, the Prince, the Discourses, and The Art of War, one would have to look at Machiavelli’s 
correspondence as well. Although I believe that such a study could strengthen my argument that there is a close 
connection between Machiavelli’s philosophic stance and classical political philosophy, unfortunately, we cannot 
treat that topic more extensively here. 
453 Prince, ch. 14 (88-89). I omit mentioning here Machiavelli’s Art of War, a fragment of which we used at the 
145  
Machiavelli thus resembles Severus, who acted as a ferocious lion and most astute fox to win his 
state. Severus was both feared and revered by everyone, and he was not hated by the armies. His 
reputation, even as a “new man,” protected him from being hated by the people for being 
rapacious.454 As much can be said of Machiavelli, but if that is the case, one must wonder, what 
does his state look like, if he was a prince without a kingdom? 
In the next part of this chapter we will try to answer that question as we explore the 
possibility of seeing Machiavelli as a philosopher. Because if Machiavelli comes close to 
Severus as he tries to win his state, he is no less close to Marcus Aurelius—a warrior, 
philosopher, and Roman emperor—as he tries to preserve it.455 
 
II. Machiavelli, a Socratic Prince 
Each one spends his time in philosophy, but when his turn comes, he drudges in politics and rules for the city’s sake, 
not as though he were doing a thing that is fine, but one that is necessary. And thus always educating other like men 




As the best translator of the Odyssey into Spanish once said, Homer is not naïve when he 
repeatedly intensifies verbs of speech by adding the phrase “with words,” as when he says “she 
spoke and addressed Odysseus with winged words,” or “ so he came near and spoke to him 
winged words,” or  “questioning me with words, she said.” Homer is not naïve because he knew 
that there are non-verbal ways of communication, as when his Odysseus retells the experience 
with the sirens thus: “So they spoke, sending forth their beautiful voice, and my heart desired to 
 
beginning of the chapter, because the form of that book seems to me to speak more of friendship than of rivalry. 
Although he does not say it explicitly, I believe Christopher Lynch intimates as much in his interpretive essay (see 
especially 179 and 224-5). 
454 Prince, ch. 19 (117-8). 
455 See Prince, ch. 19 (116). 
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listen, and I commanded my comrades to free me, nodding to them with my brows.”456 
Odysseus’s words could not be heard, so he resorted to making gestures. In another passage, 
Homer makes Antinous’s anger apparent before we hear his words: “So he spoke, and Antinous 
became the more angry at heart, and with an angry glance from beneath his brows spoke to him 
winged words.”457 When we pay close attention to the details Homer offers, we confirm that not 
everything is said with words. This is an especially important consideration when one tries to 
make out Machiavelli’s deepest intentions. 
At times, Machiavelli was compelled to be silent; at other times, he deliberately chose to 
omit treating specific subjects. We know the latter because he explicitly says so in several 
places.458 But whether he freely decided to omit something or felt obligated by the situation to do 
so, what his readers must be heedful of is that not everything Machiavelli wants to say is 
conveyed explicitly or “with words.” Could Machiavelli be nodding with his eyebrows as he 
wrote? I here argue that that is the case and it happens more often than one might suspect. Yet 
anyone familiar with Machiavelli’s writings might find it difficult to accept that Machiavelli is 
the type of writer who would show any kind of restraint when writing. If Machiavelli can give in 
his own name and shout from the rooftops the advice no one before dared to give—or those who 
dared, did so with utmost discretion—what can there be that Machiavelli cannot say? How can 
one square Machiavelli’s audacity and blunt cynicism with this purported circumspection? 
The first reason is that any reference to higher things ran the risk of being associated with 
what he saw as the erroneous view of Christianity or with what happened with medieval warrior 
nobility; those “higher teachings” could be assimilated to Christianity. Consequently, to avoid 
 
456 Pedro C. Tapia Zúñiga, “Cosas y Palabras, Textos y Traducciones” (lecture, Coloquio Internacional: La 
Traducción de los Textos Clásicos, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, September 6, 2019). 
457 Od. 12.193-94 and 17.458-9. 
458 See Prince, chs. 2 (8), 9 (59), 12 (71), 15 (94) and 19 (119); and, for example, Discourses, 3.1.6 (212). 
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any misinterpretation of his thoughts, Machiavelli, as Leo Strauss says, “expresses his 
disapproval of common opinion most effectively by silence.”459 Since according to common 
opinion, in Machiavelli’s time, those things were true which Christianity held as true, we may 
conclude that Machiavelli’s silences are intended as a rejection of Christian thought. His 
blasphemous silences direct our thoughts to the core of his political philosophy. For when one 
thinks about Machiavelli’s silences in this way, one discovers that his goal is not merely political. 
He does not wish to establish beneficent tyrannies only for the sake of benefiting mankind in the 
political realm. Machiavelli’s goal is more ambitious and more profound. Machiavelli wishes to 
debunk Christian principles for the sake of philosophy as well, if not primarily. In other words, 
Machiavelli openly taught political tyranny to bring down what he saw as the tyranny of God. 
Unfortunately for him—and for those of us who want to know his philosophic inclinations—
however much he might have wanted to speak of philosophy, he was impeded from doing so by 
the prevailing opinions regarding things high. 
The boldness of Machiavelli’s enterprise, once understood, evinces a second reason why 
he chose to be so cautious. For how could he be explicit about the conspiracy he was weaving 
without making himself hated or without putting himself in harm’s way? As we will see below, 
the establishment of Machiavelli’s new modes and orders amounts to founding a new state, and 
“new states are full of dangers.”460 That he was not unmindful of the dangers his enterprise 
entailed and of the possibilities of failure is apparent when he laments how undeservedly he 
bears “a great and continuous malignity of fortune.”461 Machiavelli could not merely be an heir 
as he might have wished, but he also had to incur hardships and dangers as a founder. Therefore, 
 
459 Thoughts on Machiavelli, 31. We should note that although Machiavelli expresses disapproval by silence, not all 
silences mean disapproval. 
460 Prince, ch. 17 (100); see also Discourses, Book 1, beginning of the preface (5). 
461 Prince, Epistle Dedicatory (2). 
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he often resorts to an array of allusions and telling silences to let us know that there is something 
important of which, for some reason or another, he cannot speak openly, especially when he 
wishes to point in the direction of something higher, that is, philosophy. 
Once one recognizes Machiavelli’s impediments to speaking freely, it is not difficult to 
see him often, as it were, nodding to the readers with his eyebrows to indicate that there is 
something more to his thought than what is said explicitly. As a rule, he refuses to share any 
transpolitical teachings directly, and he becomes most secretive when it comes to discussing 
anything that departs from the effectual truth. Therefore, it would be a mistake to interpret his 
silences as ignorance or forgetfulness because “the silence of a wise man is always 
meaningful.”462 Of course, one would have to grant that Machiavelli is a wise man to give such 
weight to his silences. But if one grants that Machiavelli was wise or, at any rate, that he was a 
philosopher in the strictest sense of the term, then his silences become all the more striking and 
his allusions turn eloquent. Machiavelli’s secretiveness can then be easily equated to the 
ancients’ discretion about the highest truths. 
 
ARMS AS KNOWLEDGE: MACHIAVELLI’S IMPLICIT PHILOSOPHICAL CONVICTIONS 
When arms speak, the laws are silent. 
Cicero, Pro Milone 
 
If to make clear the truth concerning each thing belongs to the philosopher, as Aristotle 
says,463 how can Machiavelli, who deliberately omits the discussion of the highest things, be 
considered a true philosopher? If we were to judge Machiavelli based only on a superficial 
reading of his works, it would seem that rather than Socrates or Xenophon, he resembles Hiero 
 
462 Thoughts on Machiavelli, 30. 
463 Eth. Nic. 3.8, 1279b13-16. 
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the Syracusan, who “lacked nothing other than the principate to be a prince.”464 Indeed, although 
Machiavelli lacked a principate, his knowledge of political things is such that he can be easily 
considered a prince. But can he be considered a philosopher? And how is it possible to assert not 
only that he was a philosopher but even a Socratic one? The main reason to affirm that 
Machiavelli was a Socratic philosopher is that he shares the core principles of classical political 
philosophy or, to state the same thing differently, the pursuit of wisdom is what guides his 
thought. 
To be sure, to see Machiavelli as a Socratic philosopher requires that we first grant that 
there is a dehumanizing aspect of philosophy. Let us not forget that although the philosopher 
genuinely cares for mankind, when absorbed in the highest kind of thought he cannot help but 
see all human things with contempt. Philosophy, as we argued in chapter 3, comes closest to 
tyranny when it is strictly defined as the pursuit of wisdom. Philosophy, we said, does violence 
against human beings because it demands that they give up what most human beings ordinarily 
love most or what is ordinarily thought to be most human.465 That wisdom guides Machiavelli’s 
thought can be known by looking closely at his works, for, even though they treat mostly 
political things, they are based on certain philosophical assumptions which reveal Machiavelli’s 
most profound convictions. Moreover, it is for the sake of the restoration of those very 
principles—among which the preeminence of wisdom is paramount—that he undertook the hard 
and dangerous task of innovating by introducing new modes and orders, as we will try to show 
below. 
There are questions that must be raised in the interest of the city but whose answers 
nevertheless escape the political realm. To mention one among the most important, anyone 
 
464 Machiavelli, Discourses, Dedicatory Letter (4). 
465 See the section “Divine Dehumanization” in chapter 3, above, especially pp. 115-16. 
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interested in the well-being of the city and of its citizens must raise the question, what constitutes 
true happiness? Of course, to speak of the well-being of a community is one thing, but to speak 
of the happiness of the individuals that make up that community is another. How one answers the 
question of human happiness has direct implications for the political actions one defends or 
pursues for the well-being of the community. As Leo Strauss argued, “the partial human goods 
cannot be known to be goods except with reference to the highest or the whole human good,” but 
“the whole human good cannot be known to be good except with reference to the good simply, 
the idea of the good.”466 Because Machiavelli knew that from one’s political positions can be 
inferred one’s philosophic inclinations, compelled to be silent about the latter, he chose to reveal 
his own thought only through very subtle and scattered allusions. I therefore contend that paying 
attention to those allusions and reflecting upon what he defends and rejects politically, one can 
find the clues to Machiavelli’s philosophic path.  
Of course, we cannot hope to show here all the dimensions and elements that make up 
Machiavelli’s philosophic thought. Again, as Leo Strauss suggests, “we must turn to the books of 
the ‘Averroists’ in order to complete Machiavelli’s inclinations and to fill the gaps between the 
seemingly unconnected denials without which his political teaching as a whole would be 
baseless.”467 It must suffice here to state that Machiavelli’s thought need not and, indeed, ought 
not be circumscribed to the political alone. For it is not until one sees beyond the political that 
wisdom appears as Machiavelli’s guiding principle. And it is only when one has recognized the 
pursuit of wisdom as Machiavelli’s central goal that his works reveal their full meaning. Let us 
then briefly reflect upon Machiavelli’s tactful but stark rejection of Christianity to try to find not 
his political but his philosophical stance and the place knowledge and wisdom occupy in his 
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thought.  
At the root of Machiavelli’s disagreement with Christianity lie implicit his philosophical 
convictions about human nature, the nature or origin of the world, and the question about God or 
wisdom, all of which are reaffirmations of what the classical thinkers believed to be true. Though 
he will never openly question the Christian views on these metaphysical matters, both that he 
was mindful of them and that he disagreed with them is adumbrated by Machiavelli when, for 
example, he briefly addresses the eternity of the world.468 Although at first he might appear to 
side with the creation of the world, other scattered assertions seem rather to confirm, if not his 
direct rejection of the creation of the world as such, at least that both creation and the afterlife are 
futile considerations for human life.  
For example, Machiavelli asserts that “whoever considers present and ancient things 
easily knows that in all cities and in all peoples there are the same desires and the same humors, 
and there always have been.” Likewise, he also says that “men are born, live, and die always in 
one and the same order,” and that men “have and always had the same passions and they must of 
necessity result in the same effect.”469 Again, Machiavelli does not confront Christian beliefs 
forthrightly, but his striking silences regarding original sin or the multiple covenants God had 
with Noah, Abraham, Moses or David—not to say the coming of Christ—seem at once to 
dismiss the Christian account of God and of the world and is an open invitation to rethink human 
nature in different terms. Machiavelli’s treatment of human nature as permanently fixed and 
determined by the passions—though comparable to the Christian account of fallen man—
suggests that, for all practical purposes, that view constitutes the whole of human nature. In other 
words, he presents human nature as wholly determined by this-worldly life. Then again, 
 
468 Discourses, 2.5 (138). For Strauss’s discussion of this and the following passages cited in the next paragraph, see 
Thoughts on Machiavelli, 201-2 and 333 n. 65. 
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Machiavelli exaggerates the role of the passions more to debunk Christian principles than to 
express his own view of human nature. As I will argue next, in Machiavelli’s thought, it is not 
the passions but knowledge and wisdom that take the place of God. 
Machiavelli’s most direct references to the preeminence of knowledge appear in the 
Dedicatory Epistles of his two main works. In the Prince, he says that what he holds “most dear” 
among his (military) equipment is “the knowledge of actions of great men.”470 Since, as we have 
said above, in political matters action is more important than thought, this assertion unveils that, 
for Machiavelli, political things have an inferior place when compared to thought or knowledge. 
Admittedly, it could be argued that Machiavelli here does not refer to knowledge unqualifiedly 
but specifically to knowledge of actions of great men. Still, it is not the actions but the 
knowledge of the actions that he holds most dear. The qualification of knowledge could be 
explained by Machiavelli’s reluctance to speak of transpolitical matters. Moreover, precisely 
because he is not able to speak freely, this assertion concerning just how much he esteems 
knowledge should make us wonder about the scope of the work he is writing. While he speaks of 
the actions of great men, it is to his knowledge of them that we should pay more attention. 
Machiavelli’s presence behind the actions he describes ought never be forgotten. 
Machiavelli says that he has not found among his equipment (suppellettile) anything he 
esteems more. Let us not be misled by the expression suppellettile, a word which has a warlike 
or military connotation: Machiavelli’s arms are his knowledge. Indeed, besides the fact that 
generals must be acquainted with the distinction between the good and the bad,471 Machiavelli’s 
discussions of arms can often—if not always—be also thought of as discussions of knowledge, 
as can be gathered from his use of the expression “armed legions” in the Dedicatory Letter of his 
 
470 Prince, Epistle Dedicatory (1). For the translation of suppellettile as military equipment, see Leo Paul de 
Alvarez’s introduction (xxiv) and Epistle Dedicatory, n. 5 (4). 
471 See Xen. Mem. 3.1.9; also 4.2.31. 
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Florentine Histories, where he appeals to Pope Clement VII’s understanding. “I come happily to 
the task [of writing these histories],” Machiavelli says, “hoping that just as I am honored and 
nourished by the humanity of Your Blessedness, so will I be helped and defended by the armed 
legions of your most holy judgment.”472 Machiavelli’s use of suppellettile at the beginning of the 
Prince, rather than weakening our argument, strengthens the idea we adumbrated at the 
beginning of this chapter, that his pursuit resembles war, or is spiritual warfare.473 It is a war that 
is fought with knowledge.474 
In connection to Machiavelli’s language of arms, let us add that Machiavelli appears as 
an unarmed prince only if we take his words literally. But upon considering that Machiavelli’s 
arms are his knowledge, which he has in no small part inherited from the ancients, one comes to 
realize that Machiavelli is not unarmed. The figurative meaning of arms as knowledge in the 
Prince may add to our understanding of why one ought not use others’ arms. Especially the 
knowledge that is not acquired by oneself but inherited from others ought to be adapted to, or 
assimilated by oneself before it can be of any benefit. It is well known that the strength of 
David’s arms against Goliath resided more in David’s wit than in the arms themselves. “In fine,” 
says Machiavelli, “the arms of others either fall off your back, weigh you down, or constrict 
you.”475 Machiavelli thus suggests that to use others’ knowledge in a profitable manner it is 
necessary to strive to understand until you have made that knowledge your own, as he indicates 
in one of the few allusions to wisdom in the Prince: “a wise prince should found himself on that 
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which is his, not on that which is dependent upon others.”476 For that reason, too, Machiavelli 
says that the most excellent brain is one that understands on its own, and an excellent brain one 
that discerns that which others understand, whereas the brain that neither understands on its own 
nor through others is useless.477 
In the Discourses, Machiavelli says that “men wishing to judge rightly have to esteem… 
those who know, not those who can govern a kingdom without knowledge.”478 Machiavelli 
wishes to be judged not on account of his political actions or the political actions he promotes, 
but on account of his knowledge. Although he is cautious never to cite Xenophon’s Socratic 
writings,479 whereas he shows that he is well acquainted with the non-Socratic ones, it is likely 
that he knew both. If this is true, then it is not far-fetched to suggest that Machiavelli thought of 
himself as a king or ruler in the Socratic sense, by which I mean the teaching Xenophon ascribes 
to Socrates: “he said that kings and rulers are not those who hold the scepters, nor those elected 
by just anybody, nor those who obtain office by lot, nor those who have used violence, nor those 
who have used deceit, but those who understand how to rule.”480 Machiavelli considers himself 
an heir and a prince on account of the knowledge he has acquired, and a founder and a virtuous 
prince on account of his restoration of wisdom in the context where he lives. 
As in the Prince, in the Dedicatory Letter of the Discourses, Machiavelli states as well 
that in this book he has expressed as much as he knows.481 Again, the emphasis is not on actions 
but on knowledge. But even more importantly for our present discussion, let us note that the 
emphasis is not on God either. Wherever Machiavelli’s philosophic convictions may lie, he gives 
 
476 Prince, ch. 17 (103). 
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479 See Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 291. 
480 Xen. Mem. 3.9.10; see also Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 83. 
481 In the Epistle Dedicatory to the Prince he says that he has reduced into that little volume “all that I, in so many 
years and in so many hardships and dangers, have come to know and to understand” (1-2). 
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every indication that they are at odds with Christianity or with any other religion because, unlike 
religion, he does not identify the highest good with God but with human wisdom. It almost goes 
without saying that he did not identify God with wisdom or, at any rate, he did not consider 
God’s wisdom to be important for human affairs for it cannot be grasped by the human mind.482 
It’s not that the demands of Christianity are foreign to the philosopher but that from a Socratic 
viewpoint they should not be imposed on everyone as a political goal. Individuals are certainly 
free to accept those demands for themselves, but to impose them as the goal of one’s state will 
not only fail to make individuals better, and their communities are likely to perish as a 
consequence of such a measure. It is based on those convictions, which he shares with the 
ancients, and for the sake of philosophy thus understood, that Machiavelli founded his new state. 
Machiavelli’s emphasis on knowledge ought to make us reflect upon his seemingly total 
break with the ancients. That this break is only intended as superficial becomes apparent when 
we realize that his political teaching lacks a compelling theoretical framework. There is a gap 
between Machiavelli’s treatment of human nature and the higher way of life that I here contend 
that he pursued and defended. Admittedly, critics of Machiavelli can easily attribute this 
shortcoming to his inability to forge a cogent theoretico-political account or to the absence of any 
higher element in Machiavelli’s thought. In What Is Political Philosophy?, Strauss says that 
“Machiavelli’s scheme was open to serious theoretical difficulties. …he assumed, but did not 
demonstrate, the untenable character of teleological natural science. He rejected the view that 
man must take his bearings by virtue, by his perfection, by his natural end; but this rejection 
required a criticism of the notion of natural ends.”483 However, Strauss also asserts that 
Machiavelli was a philosopher and treats him accordingly, as anyone familiar with his Thoughts 
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on Machiavelli knows well. As a philosopher, Machiavelli could not simply assume the truth of 
something he could not demonstrate. 
If Machiavelli was a philosopher, as we here hold that he was, it is more plausible to 
think of the discordance between his political and his theoretical account as yet another clue to 
his more profound thought. The boldness with which he treats human nature was necessary for 
political reasons, and it would result in the indirect restoration of philosophy. But this anti-
teleological view of human nature was meant to be used only as a political solution. In other 
words, the shortcomings of Machiavelli’s theoretical account reveal that he did not intend to 
replace the theoretical ground of the ancients. Strauss clearly states that there is a hidden kinship 
between the “new natural science” and Machiavelli’s political science, but he does not allude 
there to Machiavelli’s philosophical pursuit.484 For Machiavelli, it was necessary to introduce the 
view that rejects Aristotelian teleology for his new political modes and orders to succeed, but that 
view did not necessitate a solid theoretical base to support it because its aim was merely 
practical. 
Moreover, because Machiavelli did not take the step to make his theoretical framework 
match his political scheme, we can gather that he did not see the theoretical implications of his 
political scheme as a serious or correct proposal. In harmony with the ancients, he was 
comfortable with the inconsistency between philosophy and politics. It was the wish to make 
philosophy and politics fully compatible that made the moderns, starting with Bacon, fill the gap 
that had been intentionally left open by Machiavelli. Although Machiavelli paved the way for 
this modern enterprise, we cannot wholly blame him for it. To ascribe to Machiavelli the 
theoretical implications that others developed as a result of his political proposal is a mistake 
equivalent to seeing the world-view of the kalokagathos as the core or the basis of the thought of 
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Xenophon, Plato, or Aristotle.485 
 
A PHILOSOPHICAL STATE 
Once we recognize that wisdom is the leading feature of Machiavelli’s whole enterprise, 
it is possible to see Machiavelli’s political proposal as only one and inferior part of his more 
ambitious project, which includes a transformation of common opinion to restore the 
fundamental tenets of classical political philosophy. Moreover, as we discover that despite 
focusing on the lower steps on the ladder Machiavelli’s hierarchy of goods is in essence the same 
as that of the ancients, we are able to justify his drastic measures concerning philosophic politics 
because of the high status of his goal. Only because in the eyes of Machiavelli the pursuit of 
wisdom itself was at stake did he dare to part ways with the ancients—and even then, he did not 
break with the core of their thought but only with the periphery of their teachings. By 
“periphery” I mean the ancients’ teaching of kalokagathia as opposed to those philosophical 
precepts that threaten the stability of political life.486 When read in this manner, Machiavelli’s 
understanding of the state and even his memorable teaching of the effectual truth take a different 
color, as we will see below. 
According to Leo Paul de Alvarez’s analysis of Machiavelli’s use of the word stato, “one 
should understand the state as the extent to which the will of the prince is imposed upon the 
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matter which is given him.” Machiavelli’s stato, de Alvarez continues, is “the greatest 
manifestation of the virtù or excellence of a man,” it is “the realization in act of the will of 
someone.”487 Like any other virtuous prince, Machiavelli wished to acquire state. Unlike the 
state of ordinary princes, however, Machiavelli’s stato is best defined not in political but in 
philosophic terms, as the attainment of knowledge or the pursuit of wisdom. If princes are 
committed to the defense and welfare of their fatherland, Machiavelli’s fatherland is philosophy 
itself. Indeed, just as his discussion of arms may be understood as a discussion of knowledge, 
Machiavelli’s broad understanding of the word “state” allows for a philosophic interpretation of 
it as well. Whereas a state is most of the time and most clearly manifested in political terms as 
the power a prince exerts over his subjects, and in his relative independence from foreign power, 
a philosophical state is the greatest manifestation of philosophical virtue or the mastery of the 
prince over himself and only over himself.  
Indeed, if the state is the realization in act of the will of the prince, the state’s genre is 
then defined in accordance with the will of the prince. If the prince’s will is simply to satisfy his 
lowest desires, then his state is of a base kind. But if the prince’s will is perfected through self-
knowledge and knowledge of human and non-human things, the state of such a prince belongs to 
a much more elevated category, a philosophical rather than a political one. The philosophical 
dimension of the state is not external but internal; accordingly, the primary requirement to 
acquire such a state is self-knowledge and dominion of oneself.488 If, politically speaking, the 
province is the matter into which the prince introduces the form he wishes,489 according to our 
figurative reading of stato as philosophical, the matter the prince must give form to is not the 
province but the prince’s will itself. To acquire such a state, it is the will of the prince that must 
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be mastered and sublimated—not the will of others. It is primarily in this philosophical sense 
rather than in a political one that Machiavelli’s teaching according to which the end justifies the 
means must be understood.490 
To illustrate this, I wish to study the beginning of chapter 11 of the Prince, in which 
Machiavelli’s odd remarks are hardly intelligible if one does not have the figurative sense of 
state in mind. As we suggested above, it is in Machiavelli’s subtle allusions and deliberate 
omissions that we can find indications about his thoughts concerning higher, transpolitical 
matters. Chapter 11 of the Prince is peculiar first because it comes unannounced. When 
Machiavelli lays out his plan at the beginning of the book, one expects to find the contents of 
chapters 2 to 7, but not those that come afterwards.491 But chapter 11 is also peculiar because 
although the title indicates that he will speak of ecclesiastical principates, in the second 
paragraph he leaves off discussing them. Strictly speaking, the content of the rest of the chapter 
is not about ecclesiastical principates but about “how it came to be that the Church came to such 
greatness in temporal [affairs],” of which he is willing to speak not spontaneously but only if 
someone asked him about it.492 
Machiavelli first omits mentioning ecclesiastical principates; then he announces them but 
leaves off their discussion. This double omission compels us to look closely at the opening 
paragraph of that chapter, which contains everything Machiavelli will say explicitly of those 
principates which are of a superior kind. Aside from the odd remark that they are acquired either 
through virtue or fortune, and that they are maintained without either, it is even more striking 
that “they keep their princes in state, in whatever mode they proceed and live.” Moreover, 
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Machiavelli says that “these alone have states which they do not defend and subjects which they 
do not govern; and these states, by not being defended, are never taken away and the subjects, by 
not being governed, never care.” Subjects of such principates, Machiavelli continues, “never 
think of alienating themselves from their princes, nor could they do so if they thought of it,” to 
conclude by saying that “only these princes, then, are secure and happy.” Machiavelli’s 
description of purported ecclesiastical principates seems to be more appropriate of a 
philosophical one. At any rate, what is allegedly true of ecclesiastical principates according to 
what he says in this introductory paragraph is unquestionably true of philosophy. 
Let us go over each of these points. It is only that principate which is guided by wisdom 
that is maintained without virtue or fortune, because it is maintained through the attainment and 
communication of knowledge. Likewise, a philosophical state does not need defense. Indeed, to 
defend a philosophical state might prove counterproductive because it is precisely in publicly 
defending the principles of philosophy that the philosopher risks being punished “with dishonor, 
fines, and death.”493 And it is those who are philosophically inclined, those who have chosen the 
pursuit of wisdom, or those who have realized that wisdom is the guiding principle, who belong 
to a philosophical state. They would never think of alienating themselves from previous 
philosophers nor could they, because being loyal to wisdom they remain loyal to those who 
defend it too.494 Only those princes, that is, those who have chosen the path of wisdom, are 
secure and only they are truly happy because the changes of fortune cannot affect them if they 
have truly acquired that state. 
To be sure, all these assertions could also be true of those who follow the path of God. It 
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is precisely because Machiavelli is not unaware of the similarities between a philosophical and 
an ecclesiastical state that his account of the former is hidden in this chapter. But it is meaningful 
that Machiavelli leaves it to his readers to disentangle the philosophical from the ecclesiastical 
account. Machiavelli traces the path that leads to the replacement of faith by reason but conceals 
his blasphemy, so that it is ultimately the readers who will make wisdom take the place of God. 
Leo Strauss has explained such Machiavellian maneuvers when referring to Machiavelli’s 
concealed blasphemies: “a concealed blasphemy is worse than an open blasphemy, for the 
following reason. In the case of an ordinary blasphemy, the hearer or reader becomes aware of it 
without making any contribution of his own. By concealing his blasphemy, Machiavelli compels 
the reader to think the blasphemy by himself and thus to become Machiavelli's accomplice.”495 
Machiavelli’s double omission regarding ecclesiastical principates seems warranted. 
Despite its departure from the first paragraph, the rest of chapter 11 confirms what we 
have suggested above, that Machiavelli departs from the ancients only to preserve political 
freedom and ancient philosophy.496 In the third paragraph, Machiavelli diagnoses the political 
illness caused by the Church and explains how it put Italy in a position of weakness and 
vulnerability before its enemies. Although Italy might have seemed strong to those under the 
sway of the Orsinni or the Colonnas, the invasion of King Charles made their weakness and 
vulnerability tangible. The Church’s ailment is what necessitates Machiavelli’s new political 
modes and orders. Only by radically subverting the existing order could political freedom be 
restored. And political freedom, to repeat what we said above, was the necessary step to make 
freedom of thought a viable possibility again.497 
If we again ignore the name of the principate and pay attention to its description instead, 
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Machiavelli seems to further reveal the similarity between a philosophical and an ecclesiastical 
state when he describes the kingdom of the Sultan in chapter 19 of the Prince.498 He there says 
that: 
this state of the Sultan is different from all other principates, because it is similar to the 
Christian pontificate, which one cannot call either a hereditary principate or a new 
principate; for it is not the sons of the old prince who are the heirs and remain the lords, 
but he who is elected to that rank by those who have authority. And since this order is 
ancient, one cannot call it a new principate, for one finds therein none of the difficulties 
that new ones have; for although the prince is new, the orders of that state are old and 
ordained to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord. 
Could this not be a description of a philosophical state? A philosophical state is neither 
hereditary nor new in a strict sense. The authorities that sanction the ascent to the rank of prince 
are both previous and subsequent philosophers. Indeed, in a philosophical state, the rank of 
prince may be conferred posthumously.499 We said above that Machiavelli was both an inheritor 
and a founder. In accordance with the description of the Sultan’s kingdom that we quoted, we 
could say that Machiavelli is an inheritor of the orders of the philosophical state, which are old 
and ordained to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord. 
Machiavelli shows that he is a worthy heir of philosophy because of his serenity in the 
face of fortune. Machiavelli’s imperturbability becomes patent in his efforts to acquire state, for 
he does not fall back despite the daunting task that lies before him. In his retelling of Livy’s 
 
498 That discrepancies between titles and contents are not unusual in Machiavelli’s way of writing is apparent not 
only from the fact that he does not discuss ecclesiastical principates despite the title of chapter 11 of the Prince, but 
it is also indicated by those chapters in the Discourses where the content contradicts what the title says, not to 
mention the cryptic character of the titles of these works themselves. See Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 16, 
28, 37-38. 
499 See Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 83. 
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description of Camillus in the Discourses, which reminds one of Aspasia’s words in Plato’s 
Menexenus, it is possible to recognize Machiavelli’s own character: “Great men are always the 
same in every fortune; and if it varies—now by exalting them, now by crushing them—they do 
not vary but always keep their spirit firm and joined with their mode of life so that one easily 
knows that fortune does not have power over them.”500 Despite the great and continuous 
malignity of fortune that Machiavelli bears, he remains adamant in his defense of the philosophic 
way of life, and loyal to his wise “counselors.” We said above that Machiavelli was prudent 
because he knew how to choose between inconveniences. Now we can add that he was also 
prudent because, like a prudent prince, he knew how to choose from his state wise men and gave 
only to them the free will to speak the truth: Machiavelli’s counselors are ancient philosophers. If 
he was not wise, he at least consigned himself to those who alone would govern him.501 
In chapter 3 we said that philosophy is like the lotus flower that grows out of the mud and 
mire of politics. Machiavelli is perhaps the clearest example of the philosopher who grows out of 
politics. In a now famous letter he wrote to Francesco Vettori, Machiavelli describes his politico-
philosophical way of life thus: 
When evening has come, I return to my house and go into my study. At the door I take off 
my clothes of the day, covered with mud and mire, and I put on my regal and courtly 
garments, and decently reclothed, I enter the ancient courts of ancient men, where, 
received by them lovingly, I feed on the food that alone is mine and that I was born for.502 
Machiavelli’s writings are for this reason difficult to understand properly on their own and are 
 
500 Discourses, 3.31.1; see p. 187 above; also Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 192-3. 
501 See Prince, ch. 22 (40-41). 
502 See Harvey Mansfield’s translation of the Prince, Letter to Francesco Vettori, December 10, 1513 (109). For a 
commentary on this letter in the context of Machiavelli’s correspondence with Vettori (or in relation to the Prince as 
what Strauss would call a “tract for the times,” Thoughts on Machiavelli, 56), see John Najemy, Between Friends, 
221-241. 
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best read in the context of the Socratic philosophical tradition. In his analysis of Xenophon’s 
Anabasis, Eric Buzzetti has suggested the ways in which Xenophon may be considered a 
Socratic prince. Buzzetti argues that in the non-Socratic works, Xenophon is very discreet in his 
references to philosophy and to Socrates, but he nevertheless points once and again in the 
direction of the Socratic works. In a similar way, at least in his two main works, Machiavelli 
points in the direction of the ancients, and especially to Xenophon. Unlike Xenophon, who 
points to wisdom through his Socratic dialogues, Machiavelli does not give himself the account 
of wisdom that guides his thought. Nevertheless, by pointing us to Xenophon, he indirectly 
points also to Socrates.503 It is true what Strauss says, that Machiavelli is less politic than 
Xenophon, but that Machiavelli showed so much circumspection as regards philosophy proves 
that it is only partially true that he separated wisdom from moderation.504 Both his courage and 
his moderation give sufficient proof that Machiavelli can be ranked among the greatest 
philosophers, and can be considered without reserve a Socratic prince. 
 
Conclusions: Machiavelli’s Ambiguous Legacy 
The most characteristic trait of Machiavelli’s enterprise is that he jettisoned nobility or 
what the ancients called kalokagathia and promoted virtue not as an end in itself but as a means 
to acquire. In the eyes of Machiavelli, kalokagathia, that veil of excellence, was like a fortress 
the ancients built to point to philosophy and protect it. But as with actual physical fortresses, 
Machiavelli thinks that nobility became, useless in times of peace, and dangerous or 
 
503 Cf. Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 290-91. Although according to Strauss, Machiavelli, unlike Xenophon, 
“forgets Socrates,” I hold that Xenophon plays in Machiavelli’s works the same role that Cyrus plays in Xenophon’s 
works. Just as Xenophon’s account of Cyrus’s life is ultimately meant to point to Socrates’s life, references to 
Xenophon are indirect or silent references to the Socratic tradition. 
504 See Xen. Mem. 3.9.4, and Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, 56 and 184; Natural Right and History, 123; and Xenophon’s 
Socrates, 7, 78, and 101. 
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counterproductive, in times of war. The best fortresses are those that protect the prince not from 
external enemies but from his own subjects, and the best way to be protected from one’s own 
subjects is not to be hated by them.505 Machiavelli thus encourages princes to be of service to the 
people and to appeal to the people’s desire to acquire. There is no better way to prevent hatred 
and, therefore, no better fortress. 
The teaching of effectual truth was therefore indispensable to transform common opinion. 
This transformation aimed at turning people away from the abject condition in which he found 
them and lead them to a spirited way of life with ambition as their driving force. Likewise, the 
few who had truly philosophic aspirations would in theory be able to see beyond effectual truth. 
The teaching of effectual truth served to bring down the dominant power of Christianity; 
however, by abandoning nobility Machiavelli also abandoned any link there could be between 
his political teaching and his philosophical pursuit. If in the ancient context we think of 
kalokagathia as the burning fire inside Plato’s cave, which is not the sun but in a way resembles 
it, Machiavelli deemed it best to put the fire out by pouring water onto the flames. In his time, 
everyone seemed to be captivated by a fire which resembled less and less the light of the sun 
because it no longer helped to benefit most to the greatest possible extent, on the one hand, and it 
prevented the few from pursuing a truly philosophic path, on the other. While it is true that 
darkness now infuses the cave, that darkness is, for Machiavelli, a more adequate description of 
the nature of political things and therefore closer to the truth.506  
Although Machiavelli’s break with tradition should perhaps be called Obfuscation rather 
than Enlightenment,507 through that Obfuscation he sought to benefit all to the greatest extent. 
For his new modes and orders would be more useful in politics and would make philosophy 
 
505 See Prince, ch. 20 (129). 
506 See Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 162-3. 
507 See Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli, 173. 
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possible again. In some of his minor works, he gives indications that the effectual truth is inferior 
to knowledge. For example, in the Mandragola, Machiavelli points in a vulgar but amusing way 
to the limits of the effectual truth by showing how ”touching” the truth is useless if one lacks 
understanding and knowledge.508 But it remains a moot point whether he truly made philosophy 
possible again. The condition for the core teachings of philosophy to be restored is that at least a 
few will be able to see beyond the teaching of effectual truth to look for truth outside the cave. 
But Machiavelli was so successful in replacing nobility with the teaching of effectual truth that it 
is today difficult to see beyond that teaching. As Harvey Mansfield once said: “we are altogether 
too much impressed by effectual truth.”509  
Perhaps it is true that Machiavelli had no better option and was forced to choose between 
inconveniences. However, if he found himself between Scylla and Charybdis, one must say that 
he saved philosophy from the one but delivered it to the other. While he managed to escape 
Christian morality, he directed philosophy to the voracious impetus of what would come to be 
known as modernity, under the command of historicism, as we will see in the next chapter. The 
teaching that was intended to free humankind from religious tyranny of thought has led the world 
to new, unforeseen secular forms of tyranny of thought. In his favor, we may conclude by saying 
that against the standard of all time, the time for philosophy is not counted in seconds but in 
centuries. Whatever his intention might have been, perhaps Machiavelli’s enterprise served to 
buy us time and to create the conditions that will allow us to undertake a true recovery of the 
classics. Since modern tyrannies seem to be based on Machiavelli’s teachings or are a direct or 
indirect result of the revolution of thought that he led, we will reassess Machiavelli’s enterprise 
 
508 See how Nicia is deceived by his blind trust in the senses, Mandragola, 51. See also how Nicomaco is deceived 
in the Clizia. 
509 Harvey Mansfield, “Machiavelli’s Verità Effettuale” (lecture, University of Dallas, Irving, TX, February 7, 
2014). https://youtu.be/T_tyqr8QuAc?t=2996. 
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TYRANNY AS UTOPIA: THE STRAUSS-KOJÈVE DEBATE 
 
Freedom becomes tyranny as soon as we try to impose it upon others. 
Octavio Paz, Cervantes Award Speech (1982) 
 
 
Contrary to today’s commonplace belief that it is the ancients who were idealists whereas 
modern man has both feet on the ground, upon reflection one realizes that the ancients were 
much soberer in their enthusiasm about how much practical life could be improved by 
knowledge. With the advent of a new understanding of science, men revived the ancient belief 
that through the knowledge of causes any desired effects could be produced.510 The 
Machiavellian teaching that human nature need not be pushed toward its perfection but can be 
molded to fit any political framework fueled utopian dreams and expectations. Whereas the 
ancients thought of the human problems as universal and permanent but were well aware that all 
solutions are of necessity partial and temporary—particularly in the sphere of politics—many 
thinkers in modernity are guided by the false impression that there are universal and permanent 
solutions that must, for that reason, be found, pursued, and put into effect. 
One such modern thinker was Alexandre Kojève, or at least it so appears if one judges by 
the arguments he defends in his text “Tyranny and Wisdom.” This essay by Kojève is part of 
what has come to be known as the Strauss-Kojève debate,511 which begins with Leo Strauss’s 
 
510 See, for example, Hobbes, Leviathan 5.17 (25); also Xen. Mem. 1.1.15. 
511 There are numerous discussions of this debate, among which I would like to highlight four that I have found most 
useful: Philosophy, History, and Tyranny, edited by Timothy W. Burns and Bryan-Paul Frost (in their Introduction, 
p. 3 n. 4, they include a larger list of articles and book chapters that have been published on the debate); “Legitimacy 
and Legality, Thinking and Ruling in the Closed Society and the World State,” chapter 3 of Robert Howse’s Leo 
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extremely detailed analysis of Xenophon’s Hiero. According to Strauss, Xenophon’s Hiero is 
“the only writing of the classical period which is explicitly devoted to the discussion of tyranny 
and its implications.”512 Strauss was naturally attracted to this text because he considered that the 
question raised by the Hiero is of utmost relevance for a proper understanding of the problems 
facing political philosophy today. Although the Hiero does not offer answers to the problems it 
raises, it directs our attention to other texts in which those problems can be seen from a broader 
perspective. In agreement with each other, Strauss and Kojève decided to publish the book On 
Tyranny with a literal translation of the Hiero, Strauss’s analysis, Kojève’s critique (“Tyranny 
and Wisdom”), and Strauss’s reply (the “Restatement”).513 It is in light of this most fertile 
discussion that, with the aid of Leo Strauss, we can approach modern tyranny to understand the 
problems it poses for political philosophy. 
The Strauss-Kojève debate is important because it brings genuine problems to the 
foreground, even if the authors disagree about the way in which those problems ought to be 
understood. In one of his lectures, Strauss said that “every disagreement presupposes some 
agreement, because people disagree about something. If the disagreement is fundamental, they 
agree regarding the importance of that something regarding which they disagree.” And in a letter 
to Kojève he says that they agree “about what the genuine problems are, problems which are 
nowadays on all sides denied [Existentialism] or trivialized [Marxism].”514 As Victor Gourevitch 
and Mark S. Roth wrote in their introduction to On Tyranny, Strauss and Kojève “fully agree that 
there is a tension, indeed a conflict, between philosophy and society; and they agree that 
 
Strauss; Steven Smith’s “Philosophy as a Way of Life: The Case of Strauss”; and Eric Buzzetti’s “Guide to the 
Study of Leo Strauss’ On Tyranny.” 
512 On Tyranny, 23. 
513 See On Tyranny, the Strauss-Kojève Correspondence, especially the letters of May 26, September 4, and 
December 26, 1949, and of January 18, 1950. 
514 On Tyranny, 244. Aside from Existentialism and Marxism, Strauss also refers there to Thomism. 
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philosophy and wisdom ranks highest in the order of ends, that it is an architectonic end or 
principle.”515 Both agree that philosophy must turn to politics but they disagree regarding the 
relation between philosophy and politics.  
Whereas Kojève believes that philosophy and politics ought to work as an ensemble 
because they are in the end expected to be in harmony, Strauss thinks that the goals of 
philosophy and of politics are not wholly compatible; indeed, in the final analysis, they are likely 
to be discordant. As a fitting representative of modernity, Kojève has lost sight of that broader 
dimension which reveals that “there is a disproportion between the intransigent quest for truth 
and the requirements of society.”516 Thus, in “Tyranny and Wisdom” Kojève speaks of the final 
coincidence of philosophy and politics in the “final stage” of history, that is materialized in a 
form of beneficent tyranny which he calls the universal and homogeneous state.517 Strauss’s 
concern is that the tyrannical project put forward by Kojève, rather than making philosophy and 
politics finally coincide, would surely make philosophy disappear.  
Although this form of tyranny does not seem to be looming on the horizon, or not as 
prominently as it did in the postwar era of the twentieth century, one does well to take Leo 
Strauss’s words seriously when he says that “society will always try to tyrannize thought.”518 
Whether it might come from the far left or the far right, there is always a chance that tyranny will 
emerge; it is therefore worth exploring the scenario Kojève proposes as well as Strauss’s answer, 
which always reflects the classical teachings. In this chapter we will first take up the topic of 
Kojève’s universal and homogeneous state to understand both the premises of his thought and the 
goal he is aiming for. We will then address the primacy of politics over philosophy based on 
 
515 On Tyranny, xi. 
516 On Tyranny, 27. 
517 Kojève, “Tyranny and Wisdom,” 168. 
518 On Tyranny, 27. 
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Kojève’s understanding of human beings. In the second part of this chapter, with the help of 
Strauss’s insights, we will focus on how the classics might have responded to Kojève. We will 
finally examine to what extent facing modern tyranny might require a new, bold solution, in the 
style of Machiavelli or to what extent we are more in need of classical moderation. 
A secondary but still important aim of this chapter is to reassess Machiavelli’s enterprise. 
Since the origins of modern tyranny, or of the state as presented by Kojève, can be traced back to 
Machiavelli’s revolution and to his defense of beneficent tyranny, guided by Strauss we can look 
anew at Machiavelli’s enterprise by taking into account its effects today. We wish to round off 
our reading of Machiavelli by drawing his oeuvre as close as we can to the classics. Indeed, we 
will suggest that his break with the classics is best understood as a collaboration rather than as a 
genuine rupture with them. 
 
I. The Laborious Life 
THE UNIVERSAL AND HOMOGENEOUS STATE 
As concerns the relations among states, according to reason there can be no other way for them to emerge from the 
lawless condition, which contains only war, than for them to relinquish, just as do individual human beings, their 
wild (lawless) freedom, to accustom themselves to public binding laws, and to thereby form a state of peoples 
(civitas gentium), which, continually expanding, would ultimately comprise all of the peoples of the world. 
Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace  
 
In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger asserts that “there can be no rest from evils and 
toils for those cities in which some mortal rules rather than a god.”519 The ancients had the 
conviction that despite the progress political communities can make, no regime could ever make 
its citizens perfectly good or perfectly happy. All human regimes fall short and will always fall 
short of the best regime, regardless of the technological advances that continuously change the 
world. In antiquity, even the best feasible regime—the best version of the mixed regime—had its 
 
519 Pl. Leges 4.713e. 
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shortcomings. But the same holds true for all modern, contemporary, or future regimes. Despite 
social or intellectual revolutions, political life is essentially inferior to the best individual human 
life or to the way of life of the philosopher. No political community can ever be philosophical. 
It is by virtue of these realizations that the ancients did not seek and in fact warned 
against seeking to instantiate the very best regime. They knew that although philosophy and 
politics can be gradually harmonized in several respects, full compatibility between them can 
never be attained. One must resist the urge to attempt to amalgamate philosophy and politics, not 
to make the one disappear and the other inordinately oppressive. In light of this, the best 
alternative that the classics found was to benefit the community to the greatest extent possible, 
without doing violence to it by trying to make it philosophical, on the one hand, but also without 
negating the possibility of philosophy, on the other. The risk of the latter is what compelled 
Machiavelli to welcome a more aggressive way of approaching both philosophy and politics. But 
we find that his success was relative because the efforts to thwart a pious tyranny of thought 
opened the door to another, equally dangerous, version of tyranny, a secular and universal 
tyranny of thought. 
To view that form of tyranny from the proper perspective, one has to consider that the 
prospect of modern tyranny stems from an erroneous conception of the relation that exists 
between philosophy and politics. How far one believes political life can be improved depends on 
whether one thinks that philosophy and politics can be made fully compatible or not. Belief in 
the full coincidence of philosophy and politics leads to the imposition of excessive demands on 
political life or to a considerable lowering of philosophical standards. Kojève’s universal and 
homogeneous state seems to me to be a mixture of these two elements. On the one hand, his 
expectations about the possible improvement of political life lead him to favor tyranny for the 
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sake of what he sees as the “definitive solution” to the political problem. On the other, his view 
of philosophy is that it is valuable only insofar as it is translated into political action. According 
to Kojève, philosophy that does not have a direct impact on politics is just an endlessly ongoing 
discussion to a problem that has been “virtually resolved”; and History, he asserts, will ultimately 
put an end to it.520 
Tyranny as Kojève thinks of it is for him a good solution to the political, and indeed to 
the human problem, because its aim is no longer to benefit the ruler or his class over and against 
the ruled. Tyranny is to be sought for the benefit of mankind. Moreover, tyranny is not only a 
solution but the best solution because only through tyrannical measures would it be possible to 
overcome the rigid limits of the polis or the nation, which tend to reproduce the master-slave 
relation between rulers and ruled. Since the cohesion of the ancient polis, like the modern nation, 
is largely based on geographical or ethnic grounds, only a universal empire could dilute those 
“limits,” for example, by means of intermarriage.521 Likewise, the universal state alone could 
merge the conquerors and conquered so as to transcend their inequality by worshipping or being 
guided by something higher, namely, reason or Logos.  
The most solid proof for Kojève that men have sought universal rule in this spirit, one 
that transcends the limits of the polis or the nation, is embodied by Alexander the Great. 
Alexander the Great is at the same time an example of a man of action who sought to rule an 
empire or a universal state, on the one hand, and both a direct pupil of a philosopher (Aristotle) 
and an indirect pupil of other philosophers (Socrates, Plato, and Xenophon), on the other. 
According to Kojève, “instead of establishing the domination of his race and imposing the rule 
of his fatherland over the rest of the world, [Alexander] chose to dissolve the race and to 
 
520 Kojève, “Tyranny and Wisdom,” 167-68. 
521 Kojève, 170. 
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eliminate the fatherland itself for all political intents and purposes,” because he had been 
influenced by philosophy. As a result of his philosophical education, Alexander could devise a 
universal state whose cohesion would not be based on class, race, geography, but on man’s 
essence. Alexander might have realized that “all men can become citizens of the same State (= 
Empire) because they have (or acquire as a result of biological unions) one and the same 
‘essence.’” Like Alexander’s struggle, many efforts to actualize the universal state or empire 
thenceforth are driven by a philosophical idea that can be traced back to Socrates.522 
Although Kojève does not refer here to peace, it can be gathered that peace is yet another 
benefit that the universal character of the state brings because a universal state would have 
eliminated all external threats. The universal state precludes the possibility of enemy attacks and 
can focus on the well-being of its citizens without having to rely excessively on military force. 
No smaller nation could do so because for their survival they must be ready to fight against and 
to defend themselves from other states. This, however, does not mean that there will be no 
“police” to guard against internal disruptions or coups d’état in the universal state. Kojève, 
however, puts more emphasis on persuasion than on compulsion to prevent a citizens’ uprising. 
Indeed, citizens will protect rather than attack the state if they are satisfied. But for them to be 
truly satisfied, another criterion must be met, namely, the homogeneity criterion. 
A homogeneous state is one that is made up of a “classless society.”523 Unlike what 
happens historically with the universal criterion, whose spirit was embodied by Alexander and 
other statesmen after him up to our time, Kojève can offer no example of a statesman who has 
attempted to establish a homogeneous state. To be sure, the first example of one who may have 
initiated those efforts is, Kojève says, the Egyptian Pharaoh Ikhnaton. Although certainly a 
 
522 Kojève, 171-72; all emphases hereinafter are in the original. 
523 Kojève, 172. 
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statesman, Ikhnaton cannot be said to have pursued a homogeneous state as Kojève thinks of it 
because the equality that purportedly united the Pharaoh’s empire does not originate on a rational 
basis but on a religious-theistic one. His empire was classless only to the extent that he 
considered all men equal before the god Aton. In the words of Kojève, “its basis was a common 
god and not the ‘essential’ unity of men in their capacity as humans (=rational).”524 
Aside from Ikhnaton’s empire, Kojève says that the transcendent-religious unifying basis 
of an empire was also adopted, for example, “by St. Paul and the Christians, on the one hand, 
and by Islam, on the other.” However, Kojève asserts, it is the universal Church that stood the 
test of history. Nevertheless, its religious basis “did not and could not engender a State properly 
so called,” because the Church is not a state but a “mystical body.”525 But even if the world has 
not experienced political homogeneity, the example of the Church can serve as inspiration for it. 
In other words, although at the political level no one has yet achieved homogeneity, Kojève 
thinks that to attain the universal and homogeneous state has become a political goal of our time. 
The philosophy that drives this political urge is not philosophy in the classical sense but one that 
is derivative from Christianity insofar as it constitutes its negation. When attained, the universal 
and homogeneous state will be the first and only state to rule based on man’s essence or on 
human nature. At this point, the question arises whether it is truly human nature or the perfection 
of human nature that would be the basis of this state. We will turn to that question in the final 
section, where we will also address Kojève’s lowering of the classical philosophical standards. 
But to conclude our exposition of Kojève’s universal and homogeneous state, let us add 
that because he embraced modernity’s deliberate abandonment of the perfection of human nature 
as the ancients understood it, he seems little concerned about the means to attain the truly 
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valuable goal, which for him is not individual but political perfection. In agreement with the 
ancients, tyranny is for him the fastest and most efficient way to improve political life.526 
Whereas the ancients dropped tyranny as a viable solution because that cure seemed to them 
worse than the disease, Kojève is convinced that with the right goal in mind, tyranny can be 
made truly beneficent in the highest sense. His expectations that through tyranny the coincidence 
between philosophy and politics can be actualized betrays his idealism, the very idealism he 
criticizes and which he erroneously attributes to the classics. 
 
PREEMINENCE OF POLITICS OVER PHILOSOPHY 
No work is disgraceful but idleness is disgraceful. 
Hesiod, Works and Days 
 
Since they do not toil, they do not discover what a good man should be; so they are able to be neither pious nor wise; 
and, being uneducated, they censure very much those who have been educated. Therefore, through these men 
nothing would be in a noble condition, but everything that is beneficial to human beings has been discovered 
through the better sort—and the better are those who are willing to toil. 
Xenophon, Cynegeticus 
 
We said above that Kojève appears to be like other modern thinkers because, against the 
thought of the classics, he does not believe in the permanent tension that exists in the relation 
between philosophy and politics. Whereas the classics thought that there are permanent problems 
and only temporary solutions, Kojève, conversely, believes not in permanent problems but in 
permanent solutions. But that Kojève espouses the main tenets of modernity does not make him a 
superficial thinker. Despite his inclination for historicism, Kojève’s philosophy is in all 
seriousness rooted in the conviction that knowledge of the whole is an all-important matter. 
Furthermore, although he makes wisdom dependent on history, in a somewhat surprising 
agreement with the ancients he believes that the path toward wisdom culminates in self-
 
526 Pl. Leges 5.735d-36b. 
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knowledge: “that man is Wise who is fully and perfectly self-conscious.”527 In other words, as 
Allan Bloom said, “Kojève is above all a philosopher,” because “he is primarily interested in the 
truth, the comprehensive truth. His passion for clarity is more powerful than his passion for 
changing the world.”528 We must therefore read Kojève with the same seriousness with which he 
engages the fundamental human questions. 
Kojève believes that philosophy or the path to self-knowledge begins not with thought 
but with desire, for “contemplation reveals the object, not the subject.”529 Philosophy is political 
because self-knowledge begins with Desire directed toward another Desire, and desire calls for 
action. Action is thus placed by Kojève above “‘thought,’ ‘reason,’ ‘understanding,’” because it 
is at the same time more fundamental and more necessary for the development of Being, which 
he understands as “becoming.”530 Likewise, for Kojève, human society is a set of Desires 
mutually desiring one another as Desires, and self-knowledge is attained through the desire of 
recognition.531 Kojève would therefore agree with Strauss that there is a hierarchy of beings, 
except that according to Kojève it is not the philosopher but the man who seeks honor who ranks 
highest, the aner or “real man.” Indeed, Kojève argues that “Simonides does not believe that the 
quest for glory is the distinctive feature of all creatures with a human form. The quest for glory is 
specifically and necessarily characteristic only of born Masters.… these ‘real’ men who live for 
glory are to a certain extent ‘divine’ beings”;532 the real man is the only one who is truly human 
because he alone is Being-for-Himself. But the view of real men or masters is only one part of 
the picture. It must be complemented with the view of slaves. 
 
527 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 76; all emphases hereinafter are in the original. 
528 “Editor’s Introduction” to Kojève’s Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, p. viii. 
529 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 3. 
530 Kojève, 3-5. 
531 Kojève, 5-6. 
532 Kojève, “Tyranny and Wisdom,” 140; see also Hiero 7.3-4. 
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To see the broader picture, one must look at Kojève’s understanding of human beings. 
Kojève identifies the essence of human beings not with rationality but with struggle.533 Although 
wisdom or reason in the fullest sense certainly ranks highest in the hierarchy of goods, wisdom is 
not attainable through the experience of any human being alone due to our finite nature. “If the 
human reality can come into being only as a social reality,” wisdom, if ever attained, must first 
be made accessible through and by history.534 And, since the development and progress of history 
is not furthered through thought but through action, the most characteristic trait of human 
existence cannot be thought but action, particularly action of man in opposition to man, on the 
one hand, and of man in opposition to nature, on the other.535 On these grounds, Kojève rejects 
the classic view that thought or contemplation is superior to action. Thought that does not result 
in action is idle thought. 
In the same vein, Kojève rejects the utopias of the classics as either useless or defective, 
to the extent that they do not contribute to the development of history. That utopias may serve 
both to show the limits of political life and to point to wisdom, as the ancients thought, is 
something Kojève is not willing to acknowledge. For Kojève, the ancients’ reliance on utopias 
betrays their “‘aristocratic’ existential attitude,” the attitude Hegel would attribute to Masters.536 
Inspired by the mind of aristocrats or masters, ancient utopias fail to encompass all the possible 
improvements of political life that can be attained through revolution. Moreover, they are flawed 
or vain because, by definition, they are not intended as political projects that will be actualized. 
Likewise, they cannot point to true wisdom because they disregard the viewpoint of the Slave, 
not to mention their disregard for history. 
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History, for Kojève, “must be the history of the interaction between Mastery and Slavery: 
the historical ‘dialectic’ is the ‘dialectic’ of Master and Slave.” And history in the full sense of 
the word, says Kojève, requires that the opposition of thesis and antithesis become reconciled in 
a synthesis. “If the science of man must possess the quality of a definitively and universally valid 
truth—the interaction of Master and Slave must finally end in the ‘dialectical overcoming’ of 
both of them.”537 Since for Kojève Being itself is not to be understood as static but as developing 
or unfolding,538 knowledge of the world and of oneself requires historical knowledge or 
knowledge of concrete historical reality. Of little worth are therefore utopias or even philosophy 
when they are not intended as a contribution to the development of history. Philosophy that uses 
dialectic not in the sense of dialectical history but only as “discourse,” does not further the 
progress of history and is destined to remain as endlessly ongoing discussion that will never 
attain truth. 
The true path toward wisdom implies the synthesis between mastery and slavery. 
Therefore, even masters cannot overcome their state if slaves remain slaves. It is crucial for the 
reconciliation between mastery and slavery that the slave comes out of his slavish-animal 
condition or that he “overcome his being-outside-of-himself.“539 Moreover, since the struggle of 
masters for recognition ends in an existential impasse because the only recognition they can get 
is that of slaves,540 who are inferior, the true progress of history depends on the slaves’ 
emancipation from their condition as slaves. In the words of Kojève: 
The complete, absolutely free man, definitively and completely satisfied by what he is, 
the man who is perfected and completed in and by this satisfaction, will be the Slave who 
 
537 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 9. 
538 Kojève, “Tyranny and Wisdom,” 152. 
539 Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 13, 16. 
540 Kojève, 19. 
180  
has “overcome” his Slavery. If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, 
is the source of all human, social, historical progress. History is the history of the 
working Slave.541 
It is through laborious life that history makes progress. In this regard, Kojève likes to refer to 
Prodicus’s myth of Hercules, according to which no honor is possible and no satisfaction can be 
attained if there is no noble work of one’s own.542 And by work, Kojève means the production of 
something outside oneself or something objective. He does not count the noble work that can be 
done within because, being subjective, it cannot be recognized or earn recognition for the 
“worker.” The satisfaction that ancient philosophers might have found is inferior to the 
satisfaction of the working slave, for although philosophers are “lovers of the sight of truth,”543 
according to Kojève they could not and did not find truth. They unknowingly remained trapped 
in the view of the Master. 
It is understandable that Kojève should adopt this position in regard to the ancients 
because he had succumbed to the charm of absolutism. Perhaps he was repulsed by the idea of 
philosophy as a Sisyphean task, a philosophy that could never be able to bring about or 
materialize what good the ancients had found.544 Or maybe his noble aspirations regarding the 
perfection of political life made him see anything below it as mediocre. However, whether the 
actualization of the perfect political life as imagined by Kojève is necessary or sufficient for 
attaining wisdom depends wholly on the assumption that Being is not immutable but 
“becoming,” as we said above.545 But even if we were to grant that premise, it is still highly 
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improbable, not to say impossible, that the perfect political life can be attained, whereas the risk 
one runs by seeking its actualization is all too great. Judging not by his personal political 
engagement—in which he showed considerable moderation546—but by what he says in “Tyranny 
and Wisdom,” it seems that Kojève ignored or decided to ignore such risk. If his noble 
aspirations led him to seek political perfection, they did not impede him from being blinded by 
the mirage of historicism. 
 
II. Dystopia: Dangers of Modern Tyranny 
KOJÈVE’S HISTORICISM AND THE PRIMACY OF HONOR 
Philosophy, as defined by Strauss, is the quest for wisdom or “for universal knowledge, 
for knowledge of the whole.” It is “the attempt to replace opinions about the whole by 
knowledge of the whole.”547 As we have seen in the previous chapters, according both to Plato’s 
and Xenophon’s Socrates, the quest for wisdom must begin with examining what is better known 
for us, what is first for us, rather than by “examining what the sophists call the cosmos.”548 
Socrates, we have said, turns to the political because in human nature lies our best chance of 
knowing the whole, both because knowledge of the nature of men is knowledge of a part of the 
whole and because the nature of the whole cannot be known directly. Philosophy must therefore 
turn to the study of the political or human things. But aside from the fact that the philosophical 
inquiry must begin as a political inquiry, it remains unclear what the precise relationship between 
philosophy and politics should be or how far one ought to influence the other.  
As we have seen, one question raised by the discussion between Strauss and Kojève is 
whether the tension between philosophy and politics can be overcome or whether that tension 
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will always exist and even become stronger at times. According to Kojève, the full coincidence 
of philosophy and politics is possible, but it is possible only at the end of history, once the 
universal and homogeneous state has been established. To better understand Kojève’s position 
we must examine the role that recognition plays in his perfect state. We mentioned above that, 
for him, it is through the desire of recognition that self-knowledge is attained. At the end of 
history, self-knowledge and recognition or honor can be equated, the only distinction being that 
the former represents the peak of the philosophic way of life whereas the latter is the peak of 
political life. Kojève’s view of the relation between self-knowledge and recognition presupposes 
that all human beings, even philosophers, seek recognition and that without recognition they 
cannot fulfill their human purpose. 
Given the emphasis on honor by the classics, one could be misled into thinking that 
Kojève is probably right in placing recognition or honor as highest, in seeing in honor the 
characteristic trait of Masters and that which distinguishes real men from “mere human beings” 
or beasts, as well as the final aim of Slaves once they have overcome their slavery. True, the 
classics put considerable emphasis on honor. For instance, according to Xenophon, Socrates 
“held that the gods are most gratified by the honors from those who are most pious,” that those 
who “honor neither temple nor altar nor any other divine thing” are madmen, and that gods ought 
to be revered and honored for their works.549 If the gods themselves find pleasure in honors, how 
could one argue that honor is not highest for the ancients? However, one must consider that the 
ancients also held that honor cannot be good if it is not guided by something higher. Moreover, 
the tension between the philosopher and the city becomes apparent precisely in relation to honor 
and the life of Socrates.  
Xenophon writes that “Socrates—since this was the sort he was—deserved honor from 
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the city rather than death.”550 From what we know of Socrates’s life and because he was 
sentenced to death, it is clear that the city did not honor the right people and that those they 
honored were not honored for the right reasons. We are thus compelled to find out also what 
honor means for the many. Xenophon tells us both that Alcibiades was honored (timōmenos) by 
the demos “due to his power in the city and among the allies,” and that the many censure 
(epitimōmenon) the philosophers collectively.551 Likewise, he writes that Socrates taught that the 
rich who think that their wealth, without education, is enough to be honored by human beings are 
foolish because they ignore how to distinguish the beneficial from the harmful.552 Certainly, 
honor often implies benefit but different people understand “benefit” in different ways. Whereas 
most people believe that great wealth and valuable possessions are always goods, the philosopher 
argues that these can only be considered goods if one knows how to make good use of them. 
Since the many mistake wealth and power for unqualified goods, they honor those who 
give them money and a share in power. The many, we are thus led to think, grant honors for the 
wrong reasons, such as wealth or power. The “honor” they bestow is low because it is based on 
ignoble actions and can only be called vulgar honor. Conversely, the many are incapable of 
honoring men such as Socrates, not only because they are unable to recognize their wisdom but 
also because they feel threatened by their teachings. Rather than being a source and object of 
honor, Socrates was accused of causing fathers and relatives to be dishonored. By praising those 
who know, rather than one’s own, he dishonored the family as well.553 As we saw back in chapter 
3, seen from Socrates’s perspective one cannot rely on honor as a trustworthy standard for the 
many who are not philosophic and cannot judge properly what should be honored.  
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Admittedly, against these arguments, Kojève would perhaps contend that the many will 
not always work for the sake of power over others nor to become wealthy, but merely out of the 
pleasure that labor brings. “The joy that comes from labor itself, and the desire to succeed in an 
undertaking, can, by themselves alone, prompt a man to undertake painful and dangerous 
labors… A man can work hard risking his life for no other reason than to experience the joy he 
always derives from carrying out his project or, what is the same thing, from transforming his 
‘idea’ or even ‘ideal’ into a reality shaped by his own efforts.” This “slave” view of labor is 
lacking in the ancients and, Kojève asserts, it must complement the view of “idle aristocrats.”554  
But Kojève, on the one hand, fails to see that Socrates’s life encompasses the view of the 
slave and surpasses it, because the actions he undertook were for their own sake and not for the 
sake of honor or recognition—and, in addition, they were good actions that would either benefit 
or do no harm to others, they were not only a selfish “project” that could either bring no benefit 
or even potentially produce great harm. On the other hand, Kojève also grants that those who 
find pleasure in mere labor will also seek recognition or honors as soon as “emulation among 
men appears which, in fact, is never absent, and which… is necessary even for agriculture, 
industry and commerce truly to prosper.”555 Despite underscoring the significance of the view of 
slaves and of labor for its own sake as liberating, in the final analysis Kojève places more 
importance on recognition. Rather than truly refuting the ancients, he reads them through the lens 
of historicism and ascribes to them views that are not theirs or fails to read them as they 
intended. 
At this point, it is worth noting that in his analysis of the Hiero Kojève does not show any 
familiarity with Xenophon’s other texts nor does he refer to them—unlike Strauss, whose 
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analysis is full of references not only to every work by Xenophon known to us but to other 
classic authors as well, such as Plato, Aristotle, Isocrates, or Cicero. Whereas Strauss strives to 
understand the ancients as they understood themselves, Kojève’s “Tyranny and Wisdom” is 
devoted either to criticizing what, from the viewpoint of historicism, he sees as shortcomings in 
the Hiero or to taking from it only what helps him advance his historicist argument; rather than 
delving into the past, he hastily plunges into the present. The risk of Kojève’s approach is that 
the subtle nuances of Xenophon’s dialogue are likely to go unnoticed.  
To be sure, Xenophon’s dialogue can be understood in itself. Nonetheless, it is 
advantageous especially for us to read it against the broader background of Xenophon’s other 
texts to adapt ourselves to the classical mindset. Among other nuances that Kojève misses or 
disregards as not crucially significant is the following: “Kojève—Strauss asserts—fails to 
distinguish between philosophic politics and that political action which the philosopher might 
undertake with a view to establishing the best regime or to the improvement of the actual 
order.”556 Kojève is thus unable to recognize the role of philosophic politics within the larger 
framework of classical political philosophy. We said above that Kojève, like Strauss, 
acknowledged that there is a tension between philosophy and politics. But according to Kojève, 
the stark discrepancy between the philosopher and the many can be overcome by creating the 
“conditions that permit the exercise of philosophical pedagogy.”557 Kojève’s philosophical 
pedagogy takes the place of the philosophic politics of the classics. 
Kojève’s philosophical pedagogy serves a double purpose. First, it educates the many—
for the philosopher will want to direct his teachings to as many people as possible—and, second, 
in its public confrontation it helps the philosopher to avoid being subject to sectarian prejudices, 
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it is “his guarantee against the danger of madness.” The real tension for Kojève stems not from 
the disproportion between the quest for truth and common opinion but from “man’s temporality 
and finitude.”558 Man’s tragic character and the inaccessibility of wisdom arises from our 
finitude. Unlike God, whose eternity—“in the sense of not needing time to act and think”—
makes him simply wise, man needs time to become wise. And whereas the conflict between the 
philosophers’ individual meditations does not arise for God,559 it is precisely in that confrontation 
with others that the philosopher, with the help of history, can gain access to wisdom. The 
philosopher wishes to devote all his time to philosophy but in order to create the proper 
conditions for philosophy, he must turn to politics. Rather than ruling himself, however, he 
chooses to give advice to rulers instead. 
In consequence, if Kojève were to admit the need of philosophic politics, he would admit 
it only for the time being. Precisely because he does not believe in the permanent character of the 
tension between philosophy and politics, he would deny the permanent necessity of a political 
defense of philosophy. Likewise, he reads philosophic politics as cowardly or insufficient efforts 
to improve political life to the highest degree. The reason why some philosophers think the 
necessity of philosophic politics is permanent is because they remain trapped in contemplation 
and do not wish to take action, or because they are not truly wise: they are skilled in imagining 
abstractions but lack knowledge regarding the concrete ways of actualizing such abstractions.560 
Moreover, in connection with this argument, Kojève could have granted that philosophers are 
superior with regard to statesmen in their quest for wisdom, but even if that were true they 
remain inferior with regard to statesmen in the most important respect, the quest for honor 
which, by the way, comes closer to what he considers the true quest for wisdom. Philosophers 
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are not truly wise not only because they do not take into account history but also because they do 
not help to take concrete actions that will further its progress. 
Whereas Kojève believes that philosophy may be improved through action and 
popularization, the classics thought of such a turn as an inadmissible lowering of the 
philosophical standards. The classics would reject Kojève’s arguments primarily because they 
considered the quest for honor inferior to the quest for wisdom as they understood it. It almost 
goes without saying, they believed that constant progress toward wisdom was always possible, 
even if one could only approach wisdom, as it were, asymptotically. In any case, if they did not 
think that full wisdom could be attained, they also did not think that history could change that 
fact. But they would reject Kojève’s defense of the primacy of honor as well as his idea of the 
perfect state because, as Leo Strauss argues, they are based on two assumptions that were 
inadmissible for the classics, namely, the “conquest of nature” and the “popularization or 
diffusion of philosophic knowledge.” The classics were familiar with both phenomena but, as 
Leo Strauss says, they “rejected them as ‘unnatural,’ i.e., as destructive of humanity.”561  
Although we maintain what we said in chapter 3, that philosophy, as it were, grows out of 
the mud and mire of politics, the pursuit of wisdom is not dependent on the full success of 
politics. Knowledge of the human whole and of its place within the larger whole is available 
even if political perfection is not attained. This is a crucial insight to understand what we said 
was the double purpose of the ancients or their alternative to the establishment of the very best 
regime: benefiting the community to the greatest extent possible—without destroying 
humanity—and keeping the possibility of philosophy alive. In opposition to what Kojève expects 
from political life, the classics were completely aware that efforts to attain political perfection 
might be counterproductive. In trying to improve political life one must be careful not to cause 
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greater harm than benefit, both politically and philosophically speaking. 
 
ANCIENT WISDOM 
However careful Kojève’s reading of the ancients may be, it remains distorted because he 
does not try to understand them as they understood themselves but reads them instead through 
the lens of historicism. From his reading of Xenophon’s Hiero, Kojève concludes that though the 
wise man says what measures can make tyranny beneficent, he fails to address the difficulty or 
impossibility for the tyrant to carry them out even if he wished to do so. Contrary to what Kojève 
argues, Xenophon intimates just how difficult it is to attain beneficent tyranny. Though with 
elegant subtlety, Xenophon shows that knowledge is not enough to transform tyranny into 
beneficent tyranny because such transformation depends largely on chance. For example, in the 
Cyropaedia, Xenophon explores a scenario in which fortune is so favorable as to allow the great 
nature of Cyrus to coincide with the ideal circumstances for beneficent tyranny to happen. It is 
not a minor detail that the Cyropaedia is not a historical treatise but fiction, if with historical 
characters. One must notice as well that however great Cyrus might have been, he was unable to 
ensure the continued success of his enterprise after his death. Perhaps wit and intelligence can be 
inherited and courage may be augmented through learning and practice,562 but chance, according 
to Xenophon, cannot. 
Based on Machiavelli’s revolution, Kojève believes that fortune can be tamed; he 
therefore thinks that beneficent tyranny can and ought to be pursued. But for the classics, more 
important than realizing the difficulty or impossibility of beneficent tyranny is the awareness that 
even if attained, beneficent tyranny would be beneficent only in a political, qualified sense. What 
Kojève fails to acknowledge is that even if beneficent tyranny were to exist—something that 
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neither Strauss nor the classics are willing to grant563—it would fall short from truly beneficent 
tyranny, if we may call it so, that is, from that form of tyranny in which the tyrant is wise and 
takes his bearings from the simple common good and not the common good in a political sense. 
Likewise, whereas Kojève’s tyranny averts the danger of an enemy attack due to its universal 
character—as we mentioned above, no enemy is left “outside” that could put the state in 
danger—internal enemies would also have to be dealt with. The universal state requires 
homogeneity, and homogeneity does not come naturally but must be imposed by force. 
While in a positive sense homogeneity means equality of opportunities, which is of 
course desirable, homogeneity also carries a negative, perverse sense, in which there is no room 
for thinking or acting differently.564 According to Kojève, in the universal and homogeneous state 
there will be room for a diversity of tastes, and while some might be more inclined to the arts, 
others might prefer other work or simple leisure. The philosophers can continue to be 
philosophers.565 The problem with this conclusion is how Kojève treats philosophy. Contrary to 
what Kojève insinuates about philosophers (at some point he seems to equate them with 
“intellectuals”),566 philosophy is not like any other activity that can be pursued under the rules 
and guidance of the state or only for the sake of political improvement.  
One characteristic trait of philosophy is that it is exercised through dialectic or the 
confrontation of contrary opinions. Since philosophy departs from common opinions, to exercise 
philosophy there need to be different opinions about the human things.567 Different opinions 
about what is a statesman and what is a skilled statesman, or what is rule simply as opposed to 
good rule, will eventually lead to criticism of the existing regime and its laws. Moreover, as we 
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saw in chapter 1, philosophy is the pursuit of knowledge at the highest level; therefore, by 
definition, the philosopher stands above the law, for he possesses the knowledge necessary to 
write the laws. Since it is highly unlikely that philosophers will ever rule, their activity, however 
moderate and law-abiding, cannot but be seen to be a threat to the state.  
Despite Kojève’s condescending indifference toward philosophers who are no more than 
“idle” aristocrats, it is worth considering whether the universal and homogeneous state would 
really allow those philosophers to continue having their allegedly vain discussions. Though 
philosophers do not pretend to be revolutionaries, in a sense their philosophic activity cannot 
help but be revolutionary or the cause of revolutionary deeds. We have already seen that to 
thwart its revolutionary character, philosophers were more outspoken regarding philosophic 
politics than they were when speaking about philosophic truths. Could philosophers freely 
pursue wisdom in the universal and homogeneous state? Or would the state be compelled to do 
away with them to secure its continuity? Indeed, whatever Kojève might say to the contrary, to 
do away with the wise seems one of the necessary and inevitable steps to establish or secure the 
continuity of the universal and homogeneous state.568 While doing away with the wise is not 
unique to Kojève’s state but a common trait of all tyrannies,569 the universal character of the 
former, with the additional aid of technology, renders it more dangerous than it had been ever 
before. 
Tyranny in the form of the universal and homogeneous state that Kojève champions is 
built upon premises that threaten the very possibility of philosophy on a universal scale. Perhaps 
because it is hard to question the premises of modern science on the basis of the much 
discredited classical social science, rather than attacking them—tyrants of thought will not 
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listen—Strauss chose to exhibit the main faults of the alleged utopia proposed by Kojève to show 
that, at its best, it would be a dystopia. By proving that the results Kojève expects from his 
“ideal” scenario will never be achieved, Strauss hopes to bring modernity back to its senses: he 
expects to restore sanity or “common sense.”570 To prove his point, Strauss argues, on the 
assumption that the wise do not desire to rule, “the unwise are very unlikely to force the wise to 
rule over them.” Moreover, even if the wise wished to rule, the unwise would never “surrender 
absolute control to the wise.” Therefore, Strauss concludes, “what pretends to be absolute rule of 
the wise will in fact be absolute rule of unwise men.”571 What is implied in Strauss’s words is 
that if the wise do not rule, then the good that the universal and homogeneous state pursues is 
necessarily inferior to the human good simply. It does not pursue wisdom but equality and 
recognition. It might be presented as the state that pursues freedom, but there cannot be true 
freedom where there is no freedom of thought. 
But Strauss’s analysis goes deeper than this. Toward the end of the “Restatement,” he 
examines whether the universal and homogeneous state would really live up to its promises. 
Strauss says that, according to Kojève, the universal and homogeneous state is the simply best 
social order because every human being finds in it his full satisfaction. But then Strauss calls into 
question the claim that both the criterion of full satisfaction and the criterion of universal 
equality of opportunity are met. Not everyone is equally satisfied. “The satisfaction of the 
humble citizen, whose human dignity is universally recognized and who enjoys all opportunities 
that correspond to his humble capacities and achievements, is not comparable to the satisfaction 
of the Chief of State. Only the Chief of State is ‘really satisfied.’” All those who are not the 
Chief of State, Strauss argues, “have very good reason for dissatisfaction,” for “a state which 
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treats equal men unequally is not just.”572 The purported goal of the universal and homogeneous 
state is not fully achieved. What is more, to reach that “perfect” state, slaves must have engaged 
in labor and bloody struggle that, according to Kojève, would allow them to raise themselves 
above the brutes. Strauss therefore concludes: 
The state through which man is said to become reasonably satisfied is, then, the state in 
which the basis of man’s humanity withers away, or in which man loses his humanity.… 
Kojève in fact confirms the classical view that unlimited technological progress and its 
accompaniment, which are indispensable conditions of the universal and homogeneous 
state, are destructive of humanity.573 
Conclusions: Reassessment of Machiavelli’s Enterprise 
Near the beginning of “Tyranny and Wisdom,” Kojève had asked the following question 
regarding the relationship between philosophy and tyranny: “But does it follow that these 
modern ‘tyrannies’ are (philosophically) justified by Xenophon’s Dialogue?” The answer is 
simply no, because Kojève is here referring to those tyrannies that are “exercised in the service 
of truly revolutionary political, social, or economic ideas.”574 The classics, we have seen, 
rejected all these forms of tyranny because the rewards they might in theory bring are greatly 
outweighed by the harm they are likely to produce in practice. We have learned, however, that 
the classic view is not so rigid but gives room for dealing with exceptional situations so long as 
they truly constitute an exception. In this regard we may recall Aristotle’s words in book seven of 
the Politics, when he says that “war must be for the sake of peace, occupation for the sake of 
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leisure, necessary and useful things for the sake of noble things.”575 The ancients did not rule out 
tyranny as a possible solution definitively. Kojève’s question is interesting if we consider tyranny 
more broadly, or more profoundly, not for the sake of political, social, or economic ideas but for 
the sake of philosophy itself, that is, to guarantee the possibility of the pursuit of wisdom. 
Our study of Machiavelli’s enterprise in chapter 4 dealt with exactly this scenario. 
Machiavelli, we have argued, was compelled to defend beneficent tyranny for the sake of 
philosophy. In harmony with the ancients, Machiavelli, on the one hand, sought to benefit 
everyone to the greatest extent possible without doing violence to political communities by 
trying to impose the demands of a philosophic way of life on them. At the same time, on the 
other hand, he was intent on reopening the possibility of philosophy. We may judge that 
Machiavelli failed only if we believe that philosophy is no longer possible today. Although it is 
true that one of the side effects of Machiavelli’s enterprise was that modernity, which he 
inaugurated, gradually lost sight of ancient wisdom, it is no less true that a careful approach to 
his works enhances rather than mars our reading of the ancients and, with it, our grasp of 
classical political philosophy. In other words, it is profitable to read the classics in conjunction 
with Machiavelli.  
Machiavelli seems radically different from the ancients because he understood that “the 
line of demarcation between timidity and responsibility is drawn differently in different ages,”576 
and acted accordingly. But not to misunderstand Machiavelli’s undertaking, one must read him 
with the classics as his background and foundation. Machiavelli’s oeuvre is a corollary to the 
classics; it is meant to complement, not to replace, the ancient teachings. Machiavelli’s teachings 
are profitable only if they are tied to the teachings of the ancients. But in the same way, the 
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ancient teachings are unlikely to survive or to be properly understood today without recourse to 
Machiavelli. These superficially opposed views are two sides of the same coin and, together, 
they express the starkest problem of political philosophy today. We need to mediate between the 
classics and Machiavelli in a seemingly impossible combination. That combination, however, is 
possible so long as we keep our compass in place, so long as philosophy—that is, knowledge of 
one’s ignorance577—remains the guiding principle of human affairs. (Lest anyone confuse the 
combination I propose with a Hegelian synthesis, we must keep in mind that the combination of 
the classical or Socratic tradition with Machiavellian politics ought not be understood as a 
blending of the two; each tradition must remain individually distinct. To use an image from 
Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli, this combination resembles that of man and horse, although 
not that of a centaur.578) 
That Strauss would approve of Machiavelli’s enterprise thus understood is, I believe, 
implied in his final words regarding the state proposed by Kojève. If the universal and 
homogeneous state is inevitable or is actualized, not all hope is lost: “there is no reason for 
despair as long as human nature has not been conquered completely, i.e., as long as sun and man 
still generate man. There will always be men (andres) who will revolt against a state which is 
destructive of humanity or in which there is no longer a possibility of noble action and of great 
deeds.”579 To repeat what we anticipated at the beginning of chapter 4, real men, who are 
otherwise opposed to philosophy, would again become, if unwittingly, the defenders of 
philosophy. Strauss seems to implicitly favor Machiavelli because according to this view, the 
boldest steps may be taken when philosophy and man’s humanity are at stake.580 
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We may conclude by saying that whereas the treatment of ancient tyranny constitutes an 
opportunity to address the tensions that arise between philosophy and politics, only by 
addressing present-day tyranny can those insights be transmitted in a meaningful way today. 
Unlike ancient tyranny, which can be transformed—at least in speech—into kingship, present-
day tyranny, as presented by Kojève, eventually becomes universal and homogeneous. Present-
day tyranny is different from ancient tyranny to the extent that the cause of philosophy is lost 
from the start.581 Kojève’s present-day tyranny is useful for us in speech only if we read it as a 
lesson that needs to be unlearned, if it makes us aware that a new education is required. Such 
education demands a return both to the classics and to the origin of modernity—a return to 
Machiavelli—for a restoration of their political philosophy. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
We began our inquiry by arguing that when our interest in the study of tyranny transcends 
the urgency to avoid impending abuses, it naturally gives rise to questions which are less the 
concern of politics or history than they are of political philosophy. More than offering practical 
solutions, our study of tyranny as a politico-philosophical concept provides a framework from 
which to evaluate the political solutions that philosophers and statesmen have found through 
time. However, more importantly than identifying the best political solutions, our aim is to 
understand the problems that are a constant feature in the relation between philosophy and 
politics. Emphasis on problems rather than on solutions helps us to stay fixed on the original 
meaning of philosophy which, as Leo Strauss says, “is nothing but knowledge of one’s 
ignorance” and “genuine awareness of the problems, i.e., of the fundamental and comprehensive 
problems.”582 The complex warp and weft of ideas that the concept of tyranny summons up 
prevents us from succumbing to the attraction of solutions; it helps us avoid becoming sectarians 
or blinkered ideologues. The study of tyranny is therefore crucial for political philosophy. 
Tyranny, we said, is a danger that is coeval with political life.583 But we must clarify this. 
Political life and tyranny are coeval not only in the sense that they originated at the same time, 
but also in the sense that they permanently continue to coexist. In this dissertation, we have 
argued that no political regime is free from tyrannical traits. Although these traits may be so 
insignificant that they remain hidden or unnoticed, it is important to be aware of them both for 
political and for philosophical reasons. Tyranny may grow insidiously and manifest itself 
suddenly, once full-blown tyranny has become inevitable. But it may also grow gradually, with 
the quiet connivance of patriotic, incautious citizens. Civic education does not suffice to prevent 
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tyranny because civic education teaches to obey the law and, as we have seen, tyranny may 
develop in full compliance with the law. We have therefore shown that if our aim is to impede 
tyranny, our reflections must go beyond the realm of mere politics and into philosophy. 
There is always a chance that tyranny will emerge because the perfection of human 
nature requires the development of civil society, but the necessary means for the preservation of 
civil society prove to be incompatible with man’s highest end. Though philosophy and politics 
may be reconciled to some extent, the tension between them can never be overcome. Awareness 
of this tension makes us realize that human problems are permanent, and that we can only offer 
temporary solutions which are, even in the best case, inevitably defective. But not all causes are 
lost. So long as we remain aware of the danger of tyranny, philosophy will stay alive because it is 
through philosophical knowledge that we are able to recognize tyranny in all its forms.  
Although the philosophic and the tyrannical nature may be closely linked, philosophy 
represents the opposite pole from tyranny. Whereas the tyrant is compelled to do away with the 
wise and has no trusted friends, the philosopher is characterized by both wisdom and friendship. 
Indeed, as we have discussed, philosophy is guided by two chief principles. The first and most 
important one is indicated in its name: love of wisdom. But since it is a moot point whether 
wisdom can be attained, we can safely say that philosophy is guided if not by wisdom then by 
the pursuit of wisdom, a pursuit that requires and is intimately tied to freedom of thought. To 
cultivate philosophy means to protect and promote freedom of thought.  
We are aware that by asserting that the pursuit of wisdom is the most important principle 
for philosophy we may be accused of saying that philosophers profess a kind of “intellectual 
utilitarianism”584 because they are more concerned about freedom of thought than about human 
 
584 I owe Antonio Sosa the coinage of this term, by which I believe he understands seeing morality as a means and 
not as an end in itself, and therefore as not genuinely good. 
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freedom or morality more generally. Or to put it differently, it may seem to be implied that 
philosophers care for human freedom and morality only in a secondary way, as a necessary, 
unavoidable means to pursue what is truly important. Though I contend that philosophy is first 
and foremost the pursuit of wisdom, in this dissertation I have given arguments to show that 
philosophy is not defined solely by the pursuit of wisdom. For wisdom to make sense, the second 
chief principle must come into play. 
Philosophy, we have argued, is guided by another principle or motivation, namely, by the 
desire to benefit all human beings to the greatest extent possible. A wise man would cease to be 
wise if he did not genuinely care for humankind. But precisely due to his philanthropy or his love 
of humanity, and to his knowledge of the nature of political things, the philosopher is compelled 
to reject the philosophic way of life as the best way of life for everyone. Aware of the dangers of 
making the philosophic way of life a political pursuit, he is compelled to reject all idealisms. Yet 
he does not for that reason forsake humanity. Instead, the philosopher engages with humanity in 
a different way, by fostering the cultivation of the virtues. Though for his own way of life it 
could be said that morality occupies an inferior place and is merely a means to attain something 
higher, morality is not for that reason unqualifiedly inferior for the philosopher. It is true that the 
philosopher might seem to care only ostensibly for morality, but that would not account for his 
unselfishness.  
The philosopher loves wisdom and, despite his contempt for human things, he cannot but 
love humanity as well. When he encourages in most people the moral way of life in lieu of the 
philosophic way of life, he is not being condescending. To repeat what we argued above, what 
could be read as an offensive air of superiority on the part of the philosopher is rather a sign of 
the philosopher’s realism and an instance of his remarkable generosity: he knows that to impose 
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the philosophic way of life on those who do not freely choose it would be most unjust. But the 
philosopher would not be a realist if he lacked knowledge of human things and, more 
specifically, if he lacked knowledge of the nature of political things. The philosopher’s realism 
comes from his engagement with human things and from his reflections on the subject of 
tyranny. Knowledge of tyranny is thus inseparable from knowledge of the highest things.  
Our purpose in focusing on the concept of tyranny in connection to political philosophy 
has been to show the importance of their interrelatedness. Just as politics needs the guidance of 
philosophy to avoid falling into tyranny, the study of philosophy or the quest for wisdom too 
must be complemented by knowledge of the nature of political things—which is best attained 
through the study of tyranny—to avoid falling into the trap of utopianism. Although utopias are 
useful, utopianism must be avoided because it leads to the worst kinds of tyrannies. Efforts to 
bring about the best political regime that we can imagine will most likely prove to be 
counterproductive, for they will almost certainly give rise to tyranny. Tyranny as a politico-
philosophical concept forces us to think of the best possible ways to benefit humankind. At the 
same time, tyranny makes us aware of the intrinsic limitations of political life and of the great 
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